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Résumé  
Le risque en emploi a trait aux incertitudes auxquelles les travailleurs et travailleuses se doivent 
de faire face durant leur vie économique. Ce risque se réfère plus spécifiquement aux formes 
d’instabilité salariale, d’instabilité du temps de travail et à l’érosion des structures traditionnelles 
d’avantages sociaux qui affectent le bien-être matériel et la possibilité pour les travailleurs et 
travailleuses de planifier en vue de leur futur. 
Cette thèse s’inscrit dans les débats scientifiques importants sur la nature et les causes du risque 
en emploi que doivent faire face les travailleurs et les travailleuses. Elle le fait en explorant 
l’évolution des risques en emploi dans des contextes syndiqués, et ce de deux façons. En premier 
lieu, cette étude cherche à circonscrire la nature du risque, en perspective historique, dans des 
contextes syndiqués. En second lieu, elle explore les impacts des stratégies des acteurs 
(syndicats, employeurs et États) sur les résultats du risque lors de négociations collectives à 
travers différents contextes organisationnels et institutionnels.  
Cette thèse développe un cadre théorique novateur pour comprendre le risque en emploi en 
incorporant trois dimensions (la générosité, l’individualisation et la segmentation). Chaque 
dimension ajoute une valeur quant à l’exploration de l’évolution du risque de manière 
chronologique au sein des organisations étudiées. Différentes sources de littérature sont 
mobilisées pour étudier comment, dans des contextes variés (organisationnels et institutionnels) 
et avec différents acteurs et leurs attributs (le pouvoir), les stratégies de ces acteurs influencent 
les résultats au sein des trois dimensions mobilisées. 
Des études de cas contextualisées furent réalisées lors de cette recherche. Plus particulièrement, 
cette thèse étudie le secteur de la vente d’aliments au détail, une industrie traditionnellement 
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associée à des pratiques qui conduisent à l’insécurité économique. Le devis de recherche se 
structure autour d’une comparaison longitudinale (1980-2016) de huit chaînes de supermarchés 
(les cas) dans deux économies de marché libérales (le Canada et les États-Unis d’Amérique) et 
deux économies de marché coordonnées (Allemagne et Suède). 
Cette thèse est structurée en trois chapitres d’introduction au cadre général de la recherche 
(question de recherche, approches théoriques et opérationnalisation), trois articles individuels 
présentant des aspects différents des résultats de recherche et un chapitre analytique discutant des 
résultats clés en regard de la revue de littérature et de ses conséquences pour la compréhension 
de notre objet de recherche. 
Plusieurs contributions émanent de ces résultats de recherche. En premier lieu, cette thèse 
démontre que le risque en emploi a non seulement augmenté dans les chaînes étudiées, mais que 
cette augmentation diffère en forme et en intensité à regard des trois dimensions mobilisées. Ces 
différences ont une portée quant à la façon dont on mesure les risques et de la manière que l’on 
explique leurs trajectoires. En second lieu, elle soutient que les stratégies des acteurs ont un 
impact sur le risque. Cependant, les conséquences de ces stratégies se doivent d’être analysées à 
l’aune des variables contextuelles. Finalement, elle illustre l’importance du pouvoir syndical 
dans l’efficacité des stratégies en regard du risque en emploi vécu par les travailleurs et les 
travailleuses de ces différents contextes organisationnels et institutionnels. 
Mots-clés : risque, négociation collective, vente au détail, relations d’emploi comparées, travail 
précaire. 
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Abstract 
Risk refers to the economic uncertainties encountered by workers. These include how forms of 
wage instability, scheduling uncertainty, and the erosion of traditional employee benefit 
structures are negatively affecting their material welfare and ability to plan for the future.  
This thesis speaks to scholarly debates on the nature and causes of worker risk. It does so by 
exploring the evolution of risks in unionised workplaces. This is achieved in two ways. First, the 
study seeks to provide insights on the nature of risk trends in unionised settings over time. 
Second, it explores the impacts of actor strategies (unions, employers, states) on risk outcomes in 
collective bargaining across different organisational and institutional settings.  
This thesis develops a novel theoretical framework for understanding risk, incorporating three 
dimensions (generosity, individualisation, and segmentation). Each dimension adds value to the 
exploration of risks over time in the organisations under investigation. Different literatures are 
also mobilised to examine how, in different contexts (organisational and institutional) and with 
different actors and their attributes (power), actor strategies shape outcomes across these three 
dimensions.  
Contextualised case-studies were conducted for this study. This thesis investigates experiences in 
retail food – a sector and industry typically associated with work practices that drive economic 
insecurity. The research design entails a longitudinal (1980-2016) comparison of eight 
supermarket chains (cases) in two liberal market economics (Canada and the United States) and 
two coordinated market economies (Germany and Sweden).  
The thesis is structured in three overview chapters (research question, theoretical approaches, 
operationalisation), three separate articles presenting different aspects of the research findings, 
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and an analytical overview chapter discussing key results in the context of the broader literature 
and with regard to their implications.  
Several contributions stem from these findings. First, this thesis demonstrates how risks have not 
only increased across the chains, but that these increases differ in their form and intensity across 
three dimensions. These differences have implications for how we measure risks and explain 
their trajectories. Second, this thesis finds that actor strategies matter to risk, yet that their 
outcomes can only be understood in relation to contextual variables. It also points to the 
importance of union power to the effectiveness of these strategies in mitigating the risks 
experienced by workers in these different organisational and institutional contexts. 
Keywords: risk, collective bargaining, retail, comparative employment relations, precarious 
work. 
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Introduction 
Few question that the risks facing citizens have intensified in recent decades. Osberg and Sharpe 
(2011) have found that the rise in insecurity is affecting most in the industrialised world. This 
rise touches citizens of all types, including that of workers. With the spread of atypical work 
arrangements, the swelling ranks of the “precariat” are facing insecure access to incomes, 
employment, and related forms of social protection (Standing, 2011). Some say that the rise of 
new risks exemplifies how “extreme work” is becoming the “new normal” for workers in 
modern economies (Granter et al., 2015). The increased social acceptability of high risks begs 
the question of whether this acceptance has debilitated our capacity to resist negative changes in 
the workplace.  
This thesis adds to the risk debate by examining the impact of collective bargaining strategies on 
risk in unionised settings. It seeks to provide insights on the nature of how risks evolve in this 
setting, how contextual factors constrain or enable actors to provide superior forms of protection 
to workers, and to delineate the relative influence of actor strategies on risk. To satisfy these 
objectives, this thesis engages in a critical analysis of risk trends through comparative research 
on cases drawn from a single sector (retail).  
This thesis consists of seven chapters. The first chapter outlines the research problem. It 
establishes that economic insecurity has been on the rise in most industrialised nations and that 
key transformations in the employment relationship, provoked by trends in globalisation, shifts 
in firm governance and financialisation, the decline of organised labour, and the state’s retreat 
from its traditional role in insuring against risks, are found to be negatively impacting worker 
risk. It calls for research on how risks evolve in unionised settings and the role of collective 
bargaining strategies in shaping these trends. 
The second chapter provides a review of the theories that will be considered in this thesis. It 
beings by presenting the Risk Allocation Framework, a framework to explore trends in the 
individualisation, generosity, and segmentation of risks. Four sets of theories for explaining 
worker risk outcomes are then discussed. The first consists of organisational factors pertaining to 
marketisation, organisational performance, firm financialisation, and workplace fissuring. The 
second examines the relevance of institutional factors, namely market coordination and 
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bargaining centralisation. The third concerns actor-oriented characteristics, namely power 
resources and strategic capabilities. The final set of theories explores actor strategies, those of 
firms, unions, and the state. The main argument is that an integrated analysis of different factors 
is needed to examine how firm and union bargaining strategies affect risk. The thesis framework 
to guide this analysis is presented. 
The third chapter presents the hypotheses and research design. It presents three sets of 
hypotheses relating to contextual factors, actor-attributes, and strategies. These factors are 
examined to contrast their relative influence on risk while uncovering any possible 
interconnected effects. The aim of this approach is to isolate the outcomes of bargaining 
strategies on risk. This chapter also presents the exploratory research design. Contextualised case 
studies of supermarket chains across two coordinated (Germany and Sweden) and liberal market 
economies (Canada and Quebec) were conducted. Ontario and Quebec are also examined to 
highlight sub-national differences within Canada. This study examines 8 supermarket chains, 
two in each country. It is informed by 97 semi-structured interviews, complemented by official 
documents and secondary sources.  
The research findings are analysed through three articles. The first article (Chapter 4) applies the 
Risk Allocation Framework to provide a more nuanced understanding of risk trajectories in 
developed nations. It explores risks in supermarkets across Germany, Canada, Sweden, and the 
United States over time. The second article (Chapter 5) analyses how institutional factors – 
namely bargaining structures – affect the implementation of labour-management partnerships 
and their effects on risk. The third article (Chapter 6) engages in an integrated analysis of risk 
outcomes in American, Canadian, German, and Swedish supermarkets. It explores how different 
contextual, actor-related, and strategic variables have affected three dimensions of risk over time. 
The aim of this article was to tease out the importance of union and employer bargaining 
strategies by contrasting their effects with those of other variables.  
Chapter 7 provides an overview of the research findings and their contributions to theory and the 
literature. The findings are assessed in relation to the articles and the hypotheses. The research 
contributions of theses findings are also discussed. In terms of risk theories, this research 
questions whether mainstream approaches are discounting important risk dynamics by not 
accounting for its multiple dimensions. In terms of organisational and institutional theories, the 
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findings explore the ways in which the contextual effects examined in these literatures can be 
contested by actors. In doing so, they highlight the more political nature of how organisational 
and institutional changes affect workplace outcomes. In terms of theories on bargaining 
strategies, this research emphasises the importance of power to their adoption and 
implementation. This chapter concludes by responding to the research questions set out in the 
first chapter.  
The conclusion provides a final summary of this research. First, it presents on overview of the 
thesis and its contents. Second, it addresses important research limitations pertaining to the case 
selection and variables included in this study. Third, it discusses the practical implications for 
employer, union, and state actors. Finally, avenues for further research are recommended.  
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Chapter 1 
The Research Problem 
How do risks evolve in unionised settings? Do collective bargaining strategies matter to 
economic security? These are the fundamental research questions addressed in this thesis. 
However, before these research questions are to be addressed, it is important to justify why 
research on the interactions between collective bargaining and risk is pertinent in the current 
context. This chapter will describe the current context of risk, how it relates to major trends in 
industrial relations, and then proceed to explore these research questions more deeply.  
This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part describes the concept of economic security, 
how it has risen in most OECD countries, and why growing insecurity is a problem for workers 
and citizens in the industrialised world. The second part discusses key changes in the 
employment relationship, and how these relate to globalisation and the rise of precarious work. 
The third part examines actor strategies, focussing on the impacts of firms, unions, and the state 
on worker risk outcomes. The final part elaborates on the research question, this being how 
collective bargaining strategies affect economic security. 
 
1.1 The troubling rise in economic insecurity amongst nations 
Something is happening in the economy that is degrading the economic well-being of a very 
large number of citizens in today’s richest economies. This notorious transformation is the ever 
more obvious rise in economic insecurity. Economic insecurity is a phenomenon which denotes a 
reduction in the amounts of wealth available to cushion individuals from exposure to adverse and 
uncertain economic events, as well as decreases individuals’ confidence that their incomes will 
be sufficiently stable in the future to cushion them from losses (Bossert and D'ambrosio, 2013). 
As Lars Osberg (1998: 23) puts it, economic insecurity denotes “the anxiety produced by a lack 
of economic safety—i.e. by an inability to obtain protection against subjectively significant 
potential economic losses”.  
Economic uncertainty is thereby connected to personal anxieties. These anxieties relate to two 
key components of risk: incomes and expenses. On the one hand, workers and citizens require 
 5 
 
stable incomes to support themselves and their families, and to be able to count on future 
incomes to cover expenses throughout the life course. On the other hand, they need to count on 
consistent debt levels and expenses to protect them from uncertain material deprivation. Any 
instability in either component can bring forward important consequences for the economic well-
being of citizens, workers, and families.  
 
1.1.1 Rising risk and the American tragedy 
The rise in economic insecurity throughout the last several decades has been particularly notable 
in the United States. This was a core argument in Jacob Hacker’s book The Great Risk Shift 
(2006). It argues that Americans are facing greater exposure to risks than their counterparts in 
other developed nations. They are more likely to file for bankruptcy due to adverse economic 
events. They are more likely to lose their homes. And perhaps most central to his argument, 
American incomes have become highly volatile due to shifts away from collective forms of 
social protection. 
A number of high profile studies carried out since Hacker published his book in 2006 confirm 
that American workers and citizens are still highly vulnerable from a risk perspective. Many 
Americans are still burdened by overwhelming debts and on the brink of bankruptcy. In the mid-
1980s, American households had a debt to disposable income ratio of 65%, yet this reached an 
all-time high of 133% in 2007, leaving Americans significantly more predisposed to filing for 
bankruptcy than ever before (Porter, 2012). In fact, most bankruptcies in the United States are 
caused by uncertain expenses related to illness. A major study of five American states found that 
62.1% of Americans filed for bankruptcy due to the burden of medical expenses in 2007, and 
that the share of medical-related bankruptcies grew 49.6% between 2001 and 2007 (Himmelstein 
et al., 2009). The uncertainty in health care costs highlights an important income dynamic that 
has left many Americans struggling for economic survival. 
While the decline of collective arrangements to cushion Americans from shocks deriving from 
uncertain expenses has left them more vulnerable than before, this vulnerability is exacerbated 
by flattening and unstable wage outcomes. The flattening of wages casts considerable doubt on 
the possibility that economic growth alone can improve their living standards, particularly 
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through its interactions with risks. According to an assessment of median weekly earnings, the 
PEW Research Center found that the real wages of American workers has not budged from the 
1970s till 2014 (Desilver, 2014). In fact, if we narrow in on the differences between worker 
segments by class, we find that the lowest quarter of income earners experienced declining 
wages since the year 2000, while the highest ten percent of income earners experienced a near 
10% increase in their real wages. The incomes of other worker segments stagnated during this 
period (Desilver, 2014).  
Combined with the risks posed by greater job and working hour security (Hollister and Smith, 
2014; Mishel et al., 2012), workers are highly vulnerable to shocks in incomes and expenses, 
leaving many on the brink (or beyond) of deprivation. The latter point was made all the more 
evident through research examining the economic security of households in the United States. 
According to a key study by Western et al. (2012), both the income volatility of individuals and 
households has increased from the 1970s to the 2000s, along with concomitant instabilities in 
family life. And to make matters worse, this volatility follows citizens into old age, as the greater 
dominance of defined contribution schemes, coupled with aggressive pension retrenchment, and 
even privatisation, have put retirees at greater exposure to risk (Orenstein, 2009). 
 
1.1.2 Rising economic insecurity in the OECD 
Though it is frequently observed that the United States is exceptional for its poor performance in 
risk mitigation, the sad truth is that the citizens of most developed countries have become more 
vulnerable to risk. This was an important conclusion from the Centre for the Study of Living 
Standards (CSLS), whose report assessed historical variations in economic security across 
OECD nations. The CSLS assessed indicators of risk from unemployment, financial burdens 
from illness, single-parent poverty, and old-age poverty. Measuring these risks together through 
the “IEWB Index of Economic Security”, the report found that the people of Belgium, Canada, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the U.K, and the U.S. 
were less economically secure in 2009 than they were in 1980 (Osberg and Sharpe, 2011).  
While most countries have become riskier since the 1980s, there were some key divergences. 
The studied countries varied in terms of their performance in providing citizens with economic 
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security in instances of single parenthood and old age. For example, Australia, Canada, and the 
United States performed remarkably better in protecting women from the economic perils of 
single parenthood in 2009 than in the 1980s, despite the fact that the United States is still the 
poorest performer amongst OECD countries in this category. Furthermore, Canada, Denmark, 
Germany, and Norway improved markedly in terms of protecting seniors from the risks of old 
age poverty, while the citizens of countries such as Australia, Belgium, and Sweden are more 
vulnerable than in the past (Osberg and Sharpe, 2011).  
What is most striking are the commonalities across countries. First of all, the citizens of most 
developed nations were at greater risk of being unemployed and received less generous forms of 
income replacement in the 2000s than in the 1980s (though some countries actually made 
significant improvements in this area). However, the most alarming area is the risk of being 
burdened by medical expenses relating to illness. While American private medical expenditures 
constituted a far greater share of citizens’ disposable incomes than was the case for other 
developed nations, private medical expenditures rose substantially as a proportion of personal 
disposable income in every country studied in the report, leaving the citizens of all countries 
more exposed to risks associated with illness (Osberg and Sharpe, 2011). A more recent CLSC 
study focusing on these indicators in Canada, Denmark, Germany and the United States 
corroborate the findings of their earlier report with respect to these four countries (Osberg and 
Sharpe, 2014). 
As illustrated in Chart 1.1 below, an important observation of these studies is that no developed 
nation has made marked progress towards improving the economic security of their citizens, and 
in fact, most countries have experienced overall decline (despite experiencing improvements in 
select areas). The only countries to resist overall declines were Denmark and Australia who 
experienced marginal improvements in overall security (1.8% and 1% respectively) during this 
period. Spain and the United States experienced the most significant declines, having faced 
reductions of 23.1% and 39% in their performance respectively (Osberg and Sharpe, 2011).   
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Chart 1.1 – Index of Economic Security, Selected OECD Countries, 1980 and 2009 
 
Source: Osberg, L., & Sharpe, A. (2011). Moving from a GDP-based to a Well-being Based Metric of Economic 
Performance and Social Progress: Results from the Index of Economic Well-being for OECD Countries, 1980-
2009 (No. 2011-12). Ottawa: Centre for the Study of Living Standards. 
 
1.1.3 Risk matters 
Rising economic insecurity is a serious cause for concern. Its affects are intimate, as it speaks to 
people’s ability to furnish themselves with the basic necessities of life. When people are 
economically insecure, their lives are disturbed. Economically insecure persons are at greater 
risk of poverty and homelessness, as those with fewer wealth stocks have less buffers to weather 
the economic shocks in their individual expenses (Western et al., 2012). Economic insecurity 
forces individuals to make economic sacrifices. For instance, job insecurity forces workers to 
make sacrifices in the consumption of essential consumer goods such as groceries, and in the 
pursuance of meaningful “life projects” such as home purchases (Lozza et al., 2013). Economic 
uncertainty forces us to sacrifice core areas of our economic well-being to ensure that we have 
the resources needed for survival, thereby reducing our quality of life. 
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The plight of economic insecurity is not restricted to the poor. The concept addresses an aspect 
of reality that threatens the well-being of the poor and non-poor alike (Tang, 2015). Middle class 
workers also suffer from significant drops in their standard of living when they are exposed to 
risk, such as uncertain health expenditures or retirement incomes. However, most research 
examines a single facet of economic security, such as job security or health care, rather than the 
larger phenomenon of risk and all of its facets. This problem relates not only to economic 
insecurity’s impact on material welfare, as its implications affect all aspects of individual and 
organisational well-being. 
Disturbances in economic well-being and uncertainties regarding the future take a toll on the 
health of workers and their families. One important area of concern is mental health. According 
to one study, individuals facing heightened levels of economic insecurity, particularly through 
the experience of job loss, are more likely to experience high levels of psychological distress 
(Catalano, 1991). In fact, the levels of stress associated with fearing job loss are tantamount to 
those associated with actual instances of job loss (Chirumbolo and Hellgren, 2003). One study 
suggests that economic insecurity is positively associated with increased risk of negative mental 
health outcomes such as depression, substance abuse, and even suicide (Goldman-Mellor et al., 
2010). The negative impacts of job insecurity on well-being are amplified when individuals are 
highly dependent on their employment for survival (Catalano, 1991). 
Economic insecurity also impacts the social stability of families. First of all, financial uncertainty 
deters couples from marriage. This applies not only to poor unmarried parents, but to couples 
earning middle-class incomes (Smock et al., 2005). Research also shows that stress from job 
insecurity brings rise to several forms of family dysfunction for married couples. A large body of 
research surmises that financial stress is positively correlated with divorce rates (Kalmijn, 2007). 
Declines in relationship quality, and increased incidences of conflict in particular, were found to 
be a common outcome of economic hardship for couples that were married or cohabiting (Hardie 
and Lucas, 2010). In fact, work performance and negative feelings of economic well-being are 
intimately connected to household violence between spouses (Fox et al., 2002). If we narrow in 
on the impacts on children, it is found that less consistent incomes and working hours 
deteriorates child-parent relationships (Roeters et al., 2010). 
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Risk brings forth significant implications for organisational performance. Research on this topic 
zeroes in on job insecurity and does not capture risk dynamics as a whole. The results are 
nonetheless telling. Chirumbolo and Areni found that job insecurity negatively impacts job 
performance and absenteeism (Chirumbolo and Areni, 2010; Chirumbolo and Areni, 2005). A 
similar European study shows that job insecurity negatively impacts workers’ desire to leave a 
company, even though this desire can be mitigated to some extent by positive work attitudes 
(Chirumbolo and Hellgren, 2003). Thus, even managers have reason to worry about the 
economic well-being of their workers, since instability is often of source of HR problems.  
Given the above review, risk matters. It matters for workers’ economic, psychological, and social 
well-being. Perhaps not surprisingly, it also matters for organisational performance. 
 
1.2 Risky interactions under a changing employment relationship 
Trends in economic security across nations are intimately connected to changes in the 
employment relationship. Several forces have unraveled the traditional employment relationship 
typical of the early postwar decades (Arthurs, 1967). Industrial citizenship characterised this 
period. This economic vision was centered around the male breadwinner in full-time standard 
employment, a commitment to social rights based on the principles of economic security and 
equality, and an interventionist Keynesian state yielding considerable authority over markets 
(Fudge, 2010; Arthurs, 1967). However, globalisation and the rise of precarious work have 
challenged the feasibility of this model. These changes and how they have reshaped the 
employment relationship and risk in the process is examined. 
 
1.2.1 Globalisation and risk 
Many changes in the employment relationship can be traced back to the growing prominence of 
globalisation. Globalisation has completely transformed how we produce goods and services, 
and in the process, how employees are managed in a global economy. Of course, globalisation is 
not new. Globalisation describes forms of technological, economic, cultural, and ideational 
integration across borders that have evolved over the course of human history. However, the 
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levels of integration witnessed during the last several decades signify that globalisation has 
assumed an unprecedented influence on modern economies. 
Globalisation has evolved significantly since the industrial revolution, a period when rapid 
changes in transportation and communication technologies altered how goods and services are 
produced. Since then, Western nations have experienced different phases of globalisation, each 
differing in terms of the regulation of production and the structure of multinational enterprises. 
This began with the lowering of trade barriers and the deregulation of key sectors in the economy 
during the early postwar decades. However, the major change occurred during the 1973 oil crisis, 
and the surprising stagflation that ensued. The inability of states to manage the crisis using 
commonly held wisdom on fiscal and monetary policy shocked economists and central bankers, 
to the point that the then popular Keynesian paradigm was slowly replaced by what we now call 
neoliberalism (Crouch, 2011).   
The advent of mega-globalisation has drastically transformed workplaces. A major factor is the 
fact that multinationals face fewer barriers to relocating their production activities than ever 
before. Research shows that a multinational’s access to alternative production sites and the 
structural characteristics of firms are significant indicators of whether or not a company will 
relocate production activities to a foreign location (Jalette, 2011). What makes this research 
particularly interesting is that contextual features associated with globalised production are of 
primary importance to decision-making on the allocation of production activities, leaving 
managerial values with a negligible role in such matters. In fact, research suggests that unions 
are often at the beck and call to the needs of firms in global production networks, and often 
resort to significant concession-making to prevent capital flight (MacDonald, 2014; Jalette, 
2011). 
This new context of globalised production threatens worker risk. Foreign direct investment (FDI) 
is playing a greater role in shaping employment outcomes. Through increased foreign 
investment, multinationals have precipitated a shift towards “more-elastic labour demands”, 
generating a greater need for flexible employment and higher wage volatility (Scheve and 
Slaughter, 2004). In fact, research demonstrates that workers’ perceptions of economic insecurity 
are positively correlated with volumes of FDI. Furthermore, offshoring is typically associated 
with heightened worker insecurity, though research suggests that countries’ social and labour 
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market policies can mitigate against the effects of such risk (Milberg and Winkler, 2010). 
However, while offshoring is often associated with forms of insecurity, such as heightened wage 
volatility, free trade itself may reduce such forms of economic insecurity, yet still bear negative 
consequences for worker welfare (Karabay and McLaren, 2010). Free trade and the advent of 
globalised production have had ripple effects on workers and the employment relationship. Yet 
globalisation is not the only culprit that is undermining worker security. One of the most 
prominent manifestations of increasing risk in the employment relationship is the growth of 
precarious work. 
 
1.2.2 The rise of the precariat 
The rise of the precariat is perhaps the most notable change in the employment relationship 
affecting worker risk. Coined by Guy Standing (2011), the precariat refers to a new class of 
insecure flexible workers. This new class of workers is facing unprecedented forms of insecurity 
relating to the labour market, such as job insecurity and weak collective representation. Standing 
argues that the growing precariat is an offshoot of globalisation and managers’ concomitant 
desire for labour flexibility. Castel (2000) argues that present-day insecurity is rooted in the 
“fragility of protective regulations” which evolved from the 19th century till the 1970s. These 
regulations have played an integral role in structuring the current “wage society”, thereby leaving 
disaffiliated workers vulnerable to the pressures of risk.  
And what characterizes the precariat? Through an examination of the United States, Kalleberg 
(2009) asserts that the rise of the precariat is evidenced by five features. First, due to significant 
declines in job tenure, particularly for older white men, workers have experienced decreasing 
attachment to their employers. Second, the increased duration of long-term unemployment (6 
months or more) has put workers at increased risk of psychological and economic hardship. 
Third, precarious work is associated with a diminished perception of job security. Fourth, there is 
the increase of non-standard and contingent work. Finally, the precariat class is burdened by 
having risks downloaded onto them by their employers. When combined, these features capture 
the reality of precarious work as we know it in OECD countries. 
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Unlike the traditional working class which consisted of male workers largely occupying full-time 
permanent jobs, the new precariat consists of students, the elderly, mothers, and other worker 
segments that are in constant fear of being discarded by their employers. These workers share 
remarkably little control over their working conditions, as they are easily replaceable and often 
lack access to mechanisms of worker voice. They occupy part-time and temporary jobs that leave 
them in poverty. And what makes this class all the more remarkable is that the scope of the 
precariat is not negligible. On the contrary, Standing (2011) estimates that approximately a 
quarter of workers in developed nations belong to this class of workers. 
 
1.3 Changing actor strategies and the age of risk 
The changing nature of the employment relationship, largely a result of globalisation and 
neoliberalism, is significantly intertwined with the strategies of industrial relations actors. Firms, 
unions, and states represent significant vectors of globalisation, simultaneously transforming 
national and international industrial relations contexts (Giles, 2000). In doing so, their strategies 
yield important implications for risk.  
 
1.3.1 Firm strategy: A focus on core competencies and vertical disintegration 
The changing nature of firm strategy witnessed in recent decades is a response to global 
competitive pressures. Contrary to traditional business thinking in which diversified corporations 
group together multiple strategic business units to deliver a single product, firms have now 
turned to a focus on core competencies, these representing “collective learning in the 
organisation, especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and integrate multiple 
streams of technologies” (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990: 82). It is a firms’ success in maintaining 
advantages in these core competencies, the argument goes, that best contributes to firm success 
in the long-term.  
While an emphasis on core competencies need not necessarily lead to the vertical disintegration 
of the firm, this has been an all too common consequence of the strategy. However, the 
feasibility of disintegration is as much a consequence (if not more) of technological change than 
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of a change in business mindsets. From the late 19th century to the early postwar period, 
companies like Singer and Ford succeeded by integrating separate functions into a single firm to 
achieve efficiency gains through economies of scale. However, starting in the 1980s and 1990s, 
new digital technologies (such as the bar code) facilitated the fragmentation of production. 
Coupled with the incentives of the increased costs of manufacturing equipment and new 
competitive pressures associated with more globalised regimes of production, the old model of 
vertical integration became (for many companies) a thing of the past (Berger, 2005), opening the 
door to new strategic focus for the organisation. 
In addition, technological change has resulted in a remarkable complexification of supply-chain 
governance. This complexification has been subject to various interpretations, some more 
positive than others. For example, Lakhani et al. (2013) argue that there are several types of 
value chain governance, each associated with different power configurations and outcomes for 
employment systems. These authors identify five types of value chain governance, all of which 
differ in terms of the complexity of the tasks associated with production and the levels of 
codifiability needed for knowledge exchange in the chains.  They argue that each form of value 
chain governance has its own ramifications for employment systems. For example, market 
governance is one in which customers and suppliers buy and sell standardised products through a 
chain that has high task codifiability and low task complexity (e.g. the production and sale of 
bicycles). These value chains tend to have weak lead firms with little knowledge of their 
suppliers’ employees. These suppliers often exhibit unstable employment patterns, yet also tend 
to respond more to local institutional influences. On the contrary, hierarchical chains tend to 
exhibit the exact opposite behaviour, as is the case with Japanese electronics companies. The 
lead firms in these chains are immensely powerful and demonstrate a deep understanding of 
supplier employee activities. Supplier employment tends to be more stable in these chains, while 
local institutions tend to exhibit less influence on working conditions than do the directives of 
lead firms. Thus, employment outcomes are highly connected to this type of value chain 
governance, which in some cases can be beneficial to worker risk, and in other cases detrimental. 
A broader study focussing on a variety of working conditions in the United States paints a 
grimmer picture. David Weil (2014) examines what he calls “workplace fissuring”, a concept 
which denotes firms’ strategic decisions to shed employment customarily carried out within the 
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lead enterprise to subsidiary organisations. Given the need to align their human resource 
strategies with a focus on core competencies, firms have relegated the management of most 
employees to outside organisations such as contractors, franchisees, and other actors within the 
supply-chain. This change in the employment relationship places immense pressure on 
subsidiary organisations to cut costs in the management of human resources, since they are 
struggling to produce profits under the myriad restrictions imposed on their operations by lead 
firms. For example, Dunkin Donuts’ franchisees are required to sign lengthy agreements that 
bind them to strict operational requirements, from quality control to the management of human 
resources. Many of their franchisees fail to produce a profit under a framework that forces them 
to incur high costs to comply with brand standards. 
New forms of work organisation are also linked to blurring legal boundaries. This is a principal 
argument in a contribution by Fudge (2012), in which she argues that new forms of work 
organisation have led to the commercialisation and informalisation of work, leaving workers 
unprotected and outside the scope of current labour codes. Thus, the economic security of 
employees has deteriorated as subsidiary organisations neglect labour standards and cut costs to 
maintain the viability of their businesses. 
It is worth emphasising that firm financialisation has played an important role in shaping the 
fragmented employment relationship and declining working conditions. According to Cushen 
(2013: 314), “financialisation refers to the increasingly significant role of financial markets, 
financial actors, and financial motives in daily life”. Deregulation and institutional change have 
paved new avenues for extracting wealth from firms. One critical example is the rise of pay-for-
performance arrangements in which managers are rewarded for callously monitoring and 
disciplining their employees to meet company standards. In fact, research suggests that “meaner” 
employment relations are positively correlated with the sums of CEO compensation (Batt and 
Appelbaum, 2014). Furthermore, a study of the pressures of financialisation by Cushen (2013: 
314) found that these pressures “cause insecurity, work intensification, suppression of voice and 
the enactment of falsely optimistic behaviours; all of which prompt distress and anger amongst 
knowledge workers”. Therefore, in combination with firm strategies relating to performance and 
the structuring of value chains, financialisation has placed new pressures on workers and appears 
to render them at even greater exposure to risk. 
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1.3.2 Union strategy in a context of decline 
Worker institutions have been weakened in most OECD countries, thereby hampering unions’ 
capacity as strategic actors in collective bargaining. Perhaps most notable are the declines in 
union density. Several scholars have dedicated significant amounts of energy to investigating the 
sea change in membership across OECD countries, suggesting that unionism is in a state of 
crisis. To a large extent, this is caused by economic change. New sectors of employment, such as 
high tech and growing service sectors are replacing heavily unionised sectors, like 
manufacturing. New forms of work organisation, such as the rise in independent contracting, 
have proven incompatible with traditional union structures and cultures (Dufour et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, evidence indicates that union density is positively correlated with the strength of 
the economy. Thus, fragile economic conditions chip away at sources of union support 
(Schnabel, 2003).  
Demographic change is also a key driver of union decline. Traditional white male unionism has 
been challenged by increased diversity in the workplace, challenging unions to rethink traditional 
identities and adapt to the greater importance of representing women, visible minorities, and 
youth in their activities. Other micro-level determinants include levels of education and left-wing 
political attitudes, both of which are positively correlated with support for unionism (Schnabel, 
2003). Institutions are also very relevant to support for unionism. For instance, research shows 
that the Ghent system, in which unions bear significant responsibility for welfare payments such 
as unemployment benefits, provide potential members with positive incentives to join and 
support unions. However, institutions of worker voice are eroding across OECD countries, 
leaving unions with less power than they enjoyed in the early postwar decades (Doellgast and 
Benassi, 2014). The decentralisation collective bargaining is nearly universal across Western 
countries. There has been a notable decline in multi-employer sectoral agreements and other 
institutional features that support coordinated bargaining. Unfortunately, the weakening of 
coordinated collective bargaining at the national level has impeded the possibility for cross-
national coordination (Marginson, 2015a). 
However, a key theme in the literature is that a major problem facing unions is internal. Thus, 
while external changes tell an important part of the story for union decline, understanding 
union’s internal capacity for dealing with external conditions is crucial to understanding the 
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larger study of union decline, as well as prescribing what can be done to solve it. Of particular 
interest is what Dufour and Hege (2010) describe as internal legitimacy, since today’s unions 
lack the capacity needed to represent different groups and interests, and to thereby unite workers 
under a common identity. In addition to identity, the crisis of unionism is associated to declines 
in worker power. Unions have a variety of power resources at their disposal. These include 
internal solidary, network embeddedness, narrative resources, and organisational resources. The 
strength of these resources, coupled with unions’ aptitudes for utilising them to achieve strategic 
goals, affect their ability to effectively respond to external change (Levesque and Murray, 2010).  
Unfortunately, unions have exhibited a decline in their economic and political power. Research 
on North American unions suggests that they are experiencing a crisis as working-class 
organisations, damaged by the reconstitution of union strategies such as concession bargaining 
(MacDonald, 2014). Even Quebec unions, which are often commended as a North American 
exception for resisting union decline, are struggling to maintain their strength in the neoliberal 
context. One manifestation of this weakening is the prolongation of collective agreements in the 
province, a tendency which has negatively impacted workers and their representatives (Laroche 
et al., 2015). This trend is not likely to change unless they rethink their identities and build 
political ties to exercise power in the socio-political arena (Hyman and McCormick, 2010). 
The story is not as bleak as many think. The forces of globalisation and sectoral restructuring, as 
well as decentralisation, have not had a uniformly negative impact on union densities across 
countries. In a study of 25 developed countries, Schnabel finds that net union membership (total 
union membership, including only wage and salary employees in employment) actually 
increased in more than half (13) of these countries between 1960 and 2010. The results are 
similar when the periods of 1970-2010 and 1980-2010 are examined (Schnabel, 2013).  
The pressures on unions have grave implications for their strategies vis-à-vis mitigating worker 
risk. According to Doellgast and Benassi (2014), the erosion of collective bargaining institutions 
and the rise in employer power has had negative distributional consequences for workers. The 
new power balance has weakened unions’ capacity to negotiate not only bread and butter issues 
such as wages and job security, but renders them incapable of addressing a broad number of 
issues pertaining to worker risk, such as working time and health care. The pressures on 
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collective bargaining listed above are likely to remain in the future. Thus, union strategies in a 
changing context will be all the more important to address the growing risks facing workers. 
Union strategies possess important implications for both workers and citizens. Unfortunately, 
there exists scant research examining the interconnections between collective bargaining and risk 
in general. However, related research shines some light on the role of union strategies in 
mitigating risks. One stream of research has investigated the role of mutual gains versus 
adversarial strategies to collective bargaining over risk. In the United States, Kochan and others 
(Kochan et al., 2013; Bamber et al., 2009; Kochan, 1994) have argued that joint labour-
management initiatives have demonstrated some successes in achieving mutual gains for both 
workers and their employers. They suggest that workers and their representatives can be 
important resources to firms, and that a well-compensated and trained workforce can contribute 
to improving the quality and efficiency of the production process. However, only a minority of 
firms engage in these practices, thus a major problem lies in how to diffuse these practices across 
the broader economy. This research is complemented by research in Canada which demonstrates 
that decentralised bargaining has led to inefficient supplementary benefits that burden private 
sector workers and their employers with burgeoning drug costs. Due to the adversarial elements 
in Canada’s collective bargaining system, negotiators and stakeholders argue that information 
asymmetries and a lack of employee engagement prevent Canadian industries from achieving 
cost-effective drug plans, and that some form of social dialogue and / or universal program is 
needed to rectify the problem (O’Brady et al., 2015). Thus, there is growing suspicion of the role 
of negotiation strategies in achieving equitable risk outcomes for workers.  
Moreover, economic insecurity is of particular relevance to debates on the role of unions in 
protecting insiders and outsiders. Founded by Lindbeck and Snower (1986), this theory separates 
workers into two categories. There are the insiders, those workers who enjoy favorable 
employment conditions within the firm, and outsiders, those employees who share a 
differentiated employment status with less favorable employment conditions. According to this 
theory, firms increasingly employ outsiders to meet flexibility needs while maintaining the 
privileged segment of employment held by their traditional employees. The insiders hold 
considerable power due to the high costs of hiring, training, and firing employees. They use this 
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power to obtain wages above the “market clearing” level at the expense of outsiders (Lindbeck 
and Snower, 2001; Lindbeck and Snower, 1989; Lindbeck and Snower, 1986). 
Originally designed as a theory of unemployment, this theory has evolved to explain broader 
trends in working conditions across different segments of employment. This is due to the fact 
that two-tier employment is increasingly prevalent across industrialised countries. In Canada and 
the United States, for example, employers are increasingly introducing two-tiered compensation, 
in which younger workers are offered lower wages and benefits than older workers occupying 
the same positions within firms. This has been a principal means of shifting company workers 
from defined benefit to defined contribution pension schemes (MacNeil, 2013).  
However, some unions are pursuing innovative strategies to reverse this trend towards increased 
insecurity. Dean and Reynolds (2009) have documented how South Bay’s AFL-CIO Labour 
Council worked with other stakeholders to spearhead the Children’s Health Initiative, a program 
to provide health services to children in that Californian region. Meanwhile, Quebec’s industrial 
relations actors have innovated by legislating restrictions on the use of two-tier compensation 
arrangement for workers (MacNeil, 2013). This is significant, as two-tier arrangements can 
involve shifts in risk to those specific segments of workers with less job tenure or those not 
covered under collective agreements at all.  
In their analyses of market dualisation in France and Germany, Jaehrling and Mehaut (2013) 
have shown that institutional conditions and outmoded employment regulations provide 
employers with myriad opportunities to impose risks on less fortunate outsider. However, a 
significant finding of their research is that the absence of strong employee representatives and 
weak sectoral bargaining have impeded rule enforcement and led to heightened risks in the retail, 
hotel and hospital sectors. Thus, two tier arrangements, such as low-wage agency work and other 
forms of atypical employment, have skyrocketed in those countries. Thus, unions have come 
under immense pressure to protect workers, yet changing contexts are limiting their ability to 
provide economic security to workers within and outside of their core membership. Whether it is 
the increasing decentralisation that prevents the uniform social regulation of work across worker 
segments, or the concomitant rise of employer power in a context of globalised production, 
unions are struggling to adopt effective strategies to protect workers. These changes are 
potentially undermining the historical efficacy of collective bargaining as a tool for mitigating 
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worker insecurity in many scenarios, which is why an examination of the impacts of bargaining 
strategies responding to such pressures is of critical importance. 
 
1.3.3 State strategy: Retrenchment, regulation, and risk 
States play an important role in shifting risks within the labour market. These strategies can be 
categorised in terms of retrenchment and regulation. Retrenchment, commonly known as welfare 
state retrenchment (and in some cases restructuring), denotes reduced social spending and 
expenditures. Conditioned by historical circumstances, countries have developed diverging 
welfare regimes to protect their citizens from risk. Welfare states in the Western world have been 
categorised as Liberal, Conservative, or Social Democratic, with the latter of these three being 
lauded for its successes in reducing citizen’s reliance on the market and for achieving high levels 
of economic well-being (Esping-Andersen, 1990).  
There has been intense pressure to retrench social spending in Western democracies, and most 
countries have succumbed to this pressure in some form. However, there is no clear uniformity 
in state strategies with respect to risk mitigation. Interestingly, recent research on quantitative 
indicators of welfare state spending, such as benefit replacement rates and decommodification, 
finds that welfare states are not universally engaged in a race to the bottom where social policy is 
concerned (Starke et al., 2008). More recent research on state strategies in the UK, Germany, 
Denmark, and the Netherlands finds that all states have sought to consolidate social spending and 
cut costs following the Greek sovereign debt crisis, yet each of these countries have also made 
new forms of social investment in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008-2009 (Kersbergen et 
al., 2014). 
However, despite this lack of uniformity in retrenchment activity, most OECD countries have 
experienced declines in economic security, as was identified earlier (Osberg and Sharpe, 2014; 
Osberg and Sharpe, 2011). A key aspect to understanding this augmented risk is acknowledging 
the private regime of welfare states. In fact, Colin Crouch (2009) has argued that we have 
entered a privatised Keynesian regime in which public deficits have been replaced with the 
soaring personal debts of low and middle-income earners, a transition which led to the financial 
crisis of 2008-2009. 
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While retrenchment strategies have had a direct influence on economic security, regulatory 
strategies often exhibit indirect, yet nonetheless important, effects on economic security in 
developed countries. Many states have deliberately weakened (or failed to modernise) 
employment regulations, thereby opening up opportunities for firms to make employment more 
flexible. The increase in flexible employment is actually spurring increased demands for state 
provided social protection, as fragile part-time and temporary positions continue to grow and 
play a role in segmenting workers according to employment status (Dekker and van der Veen, 
2015; Burgoon and Drekker, 2010). Moreover, a study of flexicurity in Europe shows that while 
some governments often laud the introduction of flexible employment regulations compensated 
by increased social protection measures as a means to job creation, the flexibilisation measures 
adopted by European countries outweigh the forms of social security introduced to 
counterbalance increases in economic insecurity (Tangian, 2007). Thus, key investments in 
social policy are not sufficient to offset trends towards greater insecurity, as labour market 
outcomes associated with employment regulation often drive new forms of risk (Bonoli, 2007). 
Furthermore, state strategies in employment regulation may affect how risk is distributed across 
different employee segments (Guillaud and Marx, 2014; MacNeil, 2013).   
 
1.4 The research question 
The above review provides some insight on trends in actor strategies and risk. While we know 
that risk is rising, more systematic research on how actors influence risk outcomes is needed. 
Interestingly, most of the existing research focusses on state strategies, particularly those 
pertaining to the retrenchment (or non-retrenchment) of welfare regimes. This finding is 
puzzling. The above cited research shows that while only half of Western industrialised nations 
demonstrate clear evidence of retrenchment in their welfare states, risk continues to grow in the 
OECD. This suggests that a major source of risk lies outside the purview of state policies. 
While there is some research on how industrial relations actors have interacted with risks, these 
focus on specific aspects of risk, and do not capture the broader dynamics of economic security. 
Perhaps more importantly is that the existing research is hardly sufficient to draw any 
conclusions on how firm and union strategies have interacted with risk, particularly through 
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collective bargaining (Martinez Lucio and Stuart, 2005). Considering that risk trends relate to 
employment, lack of research on the interactions between actor strategies and risks at the firm 
level is particularly troubling, yet shows why research on this area is all the more pertinent. 
Two research questions are presented to examine the influence of collective bargaining on risk. 
First, how do risk trends differ across unionised settings? This involves examining the degree 
of these trends, by examining whether unionised workplaces have become more or less risky 
over time, and the nature of risk transformations over time, in terms of how changes in incomes, 
working hours, and arrangements to cushion expenditure shocks (e.g. health insurance), to shed 
light on how workers in these environments are being impacted by risk. Furthermore, particular 
attention will be paid to whether and how these risks are allocated across different segments of 
workers, in order to assess whether shifts in risk have had a differentiated impact on workers. In 
doing so, this investigation will provide considerable insights on how unionised workplaces have 
fared with respect to the various risk dynamics briefly described above, all of which will be 
addressed in greater detail in the following chapter. 
Second, this thesis will investigate how collective bargaining strategies have impacted these 
risk trends. This involves a thorough examination of actor strategies in various settings to 
determine how they impact risk. First, this will involve explicitly identifying the actor strategies 
that affect risk. That is, how do the actors themselves perceive these strategies, and how can they 
be understood conceptually? Second, what are the impacts of these strategies on various aspects 
of risk? The focus will be on delineating the importance of employer and union bargaining 
strategies to risk. The aim is to account for how these bargaining strategies matter to risk by 
assessing them in relation to contextual factors, actor-attributes, and the strategies of other actors 
(especially the state). This approach to the research problem will be further developed in the next 
two chapters. 
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical Explanations of Collective Bargaining and Risk 
How do current theories contribute to our understanding of collective bargaining and risk? This 
chapter answers this question through multiple means. First, it examines the notion of risk, and 
discusses its relevance to collective bargaining. It goes beyond the general notion of risk 
discussed in the first chapter by developing a new framework for analysing risk. As will be 
shown below, risk allocation addresses three dimensions of risk, capturing how risks change in 
terms of their generosity, individualisation, and segmentation.  
Second, this chapter examines different theories for explaining risk outcomes in organisations. It 
first proceeds by exploring how factors relating to markets, institutions, organisations, and actor 
attributes potentially affect risk. This is followed by a theoretical examination of different 
bargaining strategies and their potential outcomes. This chapter concludes with a wrap-up of the 
major conclusions of this review and proposes a simple framework for examining the impacts of 
bargaining strategies on risk in different settings. The aim of this set-up is to draw out the 
influence of various factors to risk outcomes in unionised contexts, and to then delineate the 
influence of bargaining strategies. 
 
2.1 Conceptualising risk: Towards a model of risk allocation 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, risk denotes uncertainty over whether an individual is to 
experience economic hardship, a phenomenon which contains both subjective and objective 
dimensions. A key contribution of this research is that it explores how risk is shaped through 
collective bargaining. The concept of risk allocation addresses three key risk dynamics: shifts in 
individualisation, changes in generosity, and segmentation. The following sections unpack these 
three dimensions and integrates them into a single model. 
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2.1.1 Shifts between the collectivisation and individualisation of risk 
Collective bargaining outcomes interact with larger societal shifts in risk. In his book The Great 
Risk Shift, Jacob Hacker (2006) argued that collective arrangements of risk sharing that were 
once spearheaded by governments and firms have eroded, resulting in the devolution of 
responsibility for risks onto individuals. On the one hand, the state is moving away from forms 
of social protection that involve risk pooling. Welfare state retrenchment, or what some call 
welfare state restructuring, has added new pressures on collective bargaining, as most 
jurisdictions face immense pressures to recalibrate or even privatise critical components of their 
welfare states while unions and employers pursue divergent strategies to fill the gaps (Johnston 
et al., 2011; Schelkle, 2011). These shifts in risk at the state level may be interpreted as an 
“unacknowledged policy regime” (Crouch, 2009). Resembling some form of privatised 
Keynesianism, the old regime reliant on the use of public debts to fueling economic demand 
while guaranteeing economic security has been replaced by one in which states are rigidly 
practicing austerity, making personal debts the core driver of economic demand in an 
individualised economy. Thus, a major shift has taken place in which the role of welfare states 
has substantially changed in recent decades, as the state has withdrawn responsibility for 
managing risks in many areas.   
On the other hand, firms are also playing a critical role in shifting risks. Firms are increasingly 
opting out of arrangements to collectivise risks, preferring individualised arrangements for 
mitigating risks or abandoning responsibilities for such risks altogether. In terms of 
individualised forms of risk mitigation, the major aspect of this strategy has been to replace risk 
pooling with individualised savings accounts or lump sum payments dedicated to buffering risks. 
The shifts from collective health insurance and defined benefit pension plans to individualised 
savings accounts have become notorious in recent decades (Hacker, 2006). The 1980s marked a 
major departure in firm strategy towards pensions in the United States, as firms were relentless in 
their pursuit of “cost containment and flexibility”, thereby abdicating “their role as a critical risk 
bearer in society”. Cobb (2015: 1332) argues that the weakening of employee voice mechanisms 
is to blame for the erosion of collectivised retirement benefits in the United States. Others 
question whether unions can maintain any influence on pension funds at all, as financial markets 
have imposed considerable constraints on pension governance (Skerrett et al., 2018). 
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Thus, risk individualisation is taking place in many scenarios, denoting the tendency towards 
shifting away from collective arrangements to arrangements in which greater responsibility for 
risk management is in private hands. While individualisation represents a key dynamic in terms 
of risk, in that workers must increasingly fend against insecurity individually, it does not address 
the importance of the level of resources dedicated towards the mitigation of risks in many areas. 
For this reason, we need to acknowledge the importance of the generosity of both private and 
public resources to risk mitigation, a concept which is developed in the following section. 
 
2.1.2 Generosity: Exploring the resources that mitigate risk 
Generosity matters to risk outcomes. In his landmark book The Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism, Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s (1990) examination of welfare regimes focused on their 
respective capacities for de-commodification, which is largely a reflection of their generosity in 
terms of providing individuals with resources dedicated to buffering the risks inherent in the 
market (1990). The more generous the welfare provisions of public and private actors, the greater 
is the regime’s capacity for mitigating undesired risks. This work sparked an interest in the 
private and public welfare mix, creating a point of departure for future research on the 
contributions of public and private actors to risk mitigation. It involves incorporating the 
importance of both state-provided and occupational forms of welfare to analyses of risk; thereby 
addressing the combined importance of public and private resources towards shielding citizens 
and workers from uncertainty (Seeleib-Kaiser et al., 2012; Powell and Barrientos, 2004).  
Drawing on this work highlighting the importance of public and private sources of risk 
mitigation, a slightly revised version of the concept used in the welfare state literature will be 
applied. The concept of generosity refers to the amount of a resource that workers receive to 
cushion themselves from financial hardship. It addresses both public and private resources, 
whose contributions to risk mitigation are continuously renegotiated amongst social actors 
(Seeleib-Kaiser, 2008).  
Furthermore, while the welfare state literature focusses on conventional forms of social 
protection (Burchardt and Obolenskaya, 2016; Seeleib-Kaiser, 2008; Klein, 2006; Hacker, 2002), 
such as public and private pension and health care benefits, the concept of generosity developed 
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in this thesis focusses on all resources provided to individual workers by their employers, states, 
and even unions. Thus, it can also refer to the provision of working hours, salaries, and other 
areas which typically affect worker risk (Bonnet et al., 2003). The more resource provision is 
below what is necessary to weather the variabilities inherent in an individual’s economic life, the 
greater is their exposure to risk.  
Generosity is to be distinguished from the concept of individualisation discussed earlier. While 
the individualisation literature focusses on the nature of risk sharing (collective versus 
individualised arrangements), the concept of generosity concerns the level of resources provided 
to protect workers from risks. To some extent, the generosity of an arrangement can even offset 
the negative impacts of individualisation. For example, a highly individualised arrangement 
associated with a high expected guarantee may be preferable to an arrangement in which the risk 
is collectivised but the guarantee is poor. Meanwhile, a generous defined contribution plan, in 
many contexts, can translate into a higher level of retirement security than a less generous 
defined benefit plan (Brown and Weisbenner, 2014). Thus, the level of resources committed to 
employees by employer, state, and union actors matters for risk alleviation. However, a final 
piece of the puzzle deals with the distribution of risks across different categories of workers.  
 
2.1.3 From integrated to segmented risk outcomes 
While risks shift along the individualisation/collectivisation continuum and differ in terms of the 
generosity of arrangements to weather the adverse economic shocks of contemporary life, 
segmentation describes how risks are segmented across different categories of workers. 
Segmentation draws on the idea of market dualisation. Dual labour market theorists posit the 
existence of a privileged core of employees that enjoy full-time status and all of the security 
benefits such status provides, these being within what has come be known as an “internal labor 
market”. Furthermore, they posit the existence of a “secondary labour market” comprised of 
employees with insecure working conditions (Doeringer and Piore, 1971). Those within the 
secondary labour market encounter considerable barriers to penetrating the internal labour 
market, and are typically trapped in short-term unskilled work with weak working conditions, 
due to the fact that these jobs are more susceptible to market fluctuations (Kalleberg, 2003). For 
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countries in which labour market protections are weak, the secondary labour market can be 
tantamount to a poverty trap for many (Maloney, 2003). 
How divergences in working conditions across dual labour markets persist is aptly addressed by 
insider-outsider theory, which argues that these disparities are a function of the relative power of 
insiders and outsiders on the labour market. This theory was originally introduced to examine 
how segments of employees who command greater market power, largely through their levels of 
job protection due to firm turnover costs and status as unionised employees, impact the wages 
and employment levels of entire categories of employment, often to the detriment of outsiders 
who do not hold privileged positions within their firms (Lindbeck and Snower, 2001; Lindbeck 
and Snower, 1989; Lindbeck and Snower, 1986).  
The relevance of insider-outsider theory is that it shows that risks can be shifted across worker 
segments, and that the political divide across the two types of workers and their relative power 
matters for job quality (Chung and Mau, 2014; Schwander and Häusermann, 2013). Poor 
working conditions tend to shift from insiders to outsiders in highly dualistic systems, such as 
through wage increases in escalator clauses (Cousineau et al., 1983). This is less so when 
dualism is less evident, and hence the insider-outside divide less poignant (Crouch, 2015). 
However, while insiders share a more privileged status on the labour market, research shows that 
they too are vulnerable to worsening working conditions, as their command of relative labour 
market power alone is not sufficient to shield themselves from the internal and external pressure 
on firms to download risks onto employees (Häusermann et al., 2015). The focus of this research 
is on how unionised employees exemplify the insider category and how different types of labour 
politics affect insider-outsider relations and their associated work outcomes such as job security 
(Emmeneger, 2009).  
So far the discussion has suggested that there exists a dichotomy of workers with differential 
privileges and status in the labour market, and that the relative power of each group may impact 
shifts in worker risk across different categories of workers. However, the real story is more 
complex, as the concepts of dualism and insider-outsider relations are binary, and reflect 
disparities across workers largely in terms of their employment status. Other work has shown 
how social location represents some of the many “vectors of inequality and social exclusion”, 
due to the fragmenting of the employment relationship and its differentiated effects on union and 
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state capacities to protect minorities from harmful working conditions (D’Amours et al., 2017). 
The importance of social location brings us to segmentation theory. Segmentation theory 
expands on the dual labour market hypothesis to assessing multiple categories of workers and 
how their working conditions vary in terms of both employment status and social location (Reich 
et al., 1973). These include how working conditions are segmented on the basis of gender, race, 
and immigrant status, and how these forms of segmentation affect workers’ exposure to non-
standard work arrangements (Hudson, 2007). 
One important facet of segmentation is women’s continuing struggle with worker precarity. For 
example, research has found that Canadian women, even those in full-time permanent positions, 
are more likely than men to experience precarious working conditions, an outcome of a labour 
regulation regime rooted in the early post-war decades. This outmoded regime has failed to adapt 
to new realities pertaining to the entry of women in the workplace, and while women have made 
marked improvements in reducing segmentation within core employment, Canadian labour 
regulation centered on the male breadwinner model still facilitates the segmentation of women 
into non-standard work arrangements (Cranford et al., 2003; Fudge and Vosko, 2001; Zeytinoglu 
and Muteshi, 2000).  
This differentiation is made evident by research on Canada’s public and private sectors. Research 
has found a significant wage differential by gender in casual and contract work (Fuller and 
Vosko, 2008). Further research on the Australian context has found that non-pay related work 
experiences, such as harassment at work, are segmented along gendered lines, particularly in 
occupations where women’s reliance on the market is particularly strong (Peetz, 2015). Similar 
findings were found in the United States, where males tended to be exposed to more 
“persuasive” forms of control in the workplace that enhance their creativity, autonomy, and 
satisfaction with work tasks, while females experienced more “coercive” forms of control such 
as direct supervision, thereby diminishing their dignity at work along gendered lines (Crowley, 
2013). Gendered segmentation is still a grave concern for workers in both internal and external 
labour markets, as differential working conditions have been found across genders in both 
settings (Fuller and Vosko, 2008). 
Segmentation by race, a term attributed to visible minorities otherwise known as non-caucasians 
(Fuller and Vosko, 2008), has proven particularly relevant to workers’ differential experiences 
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with job quality. In the United States, the segmentation of risk is critically evident, as the 
segregation of “separate societies” by race in the country’s major cities has formed the basis of 
class-relations. Structural changes in the American economy have trapped racial minorities in a 
downward spiral of heightening risks coupled with diminished economic opportunity (Goldsmith 
and Blakely, 2010). In Canada, research suggests that segmentation by race is just as evident as 
segmentation by gender, as visible minorities are considerably more likely to engage in non-
standard work. The segmentation effects are amplified when gender and race characteristics are 
combined, meaning visible minority females are the most likely to work in precarious working 
conditions. Moreover, immigrant workers fared even worse than their non-immigrant 
counterparts (Fuller and Vosko, 2008), thereby showing that immigrant-status is particularly 
important to segmentation outcomes. In fact, immigrants in Canada experienced a considerable 
decline in wages relative to Canadian born workers, particularly those at the “low end of the 
wage distribution” (Boudarbat and Lemieux, 2014). In his research on immigrant workers in the 
United States, Hudson (2007) found that immigrant status and citizenship, even more so than 
race or sex, are useful predictors of how certain worker segments experience barriers to entry 
with respect to entering privileged primary sector positions in the American labour market. 
Meanwhile, Canadian research has shown that major increases in immigration and those with 
visible minority status, coupled with an interaction effect with gender and age, leads to social 
exclusion and segmentation as immigrants experience weak returns from their education, work 
experience and union affiliation, as well as the negative effects of socialisation processes that 
tend towards the idealisation of characteristics associated with being Canadian born (Lightman 
and Gingrich, 2013; Malenfant et al., 2010). 
While the above research explores segmentation across select countries, they illustrate a trend 
present across Western industrialised democracies. A large study by Seeleib-Kaiser et al. (2012) 
on France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States has shown that all of these 
countries, despite their institutional differences, have experienced segmentation in specific risk 
areas. They call this trend the “dualization of welfare”. Similarly, Häusermann and Schwander 
(2012) found that all post-industrial countries have experienced the effects of segmentation 
across insiders and outsiders, as well as in social location, in terms of their workers’ 
differentiated experiences in the labour market, with social welfare, and in terms of political 
integration, which addresses gaps in political participation and union membership. This research 
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suggests that while segmentation is significant in all societies, Nordic welfare regimes have been 
the most successful at mitigating the disparities in “job perspectives, income, welfare rights and 
political integration” compared to other post-industrial labour markets. Thus, the above review 
has suggested that segmentation is indeed pertinent to workers’ risk experiences, by invoking 
how risks differ and shift across employment status and social location. Having demonstrated the 
relevance of segmentation as a key dimension to risk allocation, the final section in this part links 
all three dimensions of risk allocation into a single model.  
 
2.1.4 A risk allocation model 
Drawing from the discussion of risk movements above, a Risk Allocation model has been 
constructed for describing risk outcomes in collective bargaining (Figure 2.1). It delineates 
between the best- and worst-case scenarios in which shifts in risk allocation take place. On the 
one hand, solidaristic security describes the best-case scenario in which risks are fully 
collectivised, generosity is high, and there is no segmentation across worker categories. On the 
other hand, differentiated insecurity describes the worst-case scenario in which risks are fully 
individualised, generosity is low, and high levels of segmentation are observed. This second 
scenario occurs when the ideals of high security and solidarity have been entirely compromised, 
leaving workers poorly positioned to deal with the risks that lay before them.  
This model offers a way to study the complexity of risks in the contemporary context of the firm. 
While the literature on risk tends to focus on one of the three aforementioned dimensions of risk 
in isolation, the three dimensions of risk will be integrated into a single model for this research. 
This is perhaps the first holistic model for examining movements in risk, capturing the full range 
of dynamics, while also highlighting the importance of public and private contributions to risk 
mitigation, as well as how they change over time. It demonstrates important dimensions of risk, 
and shows how they interact together to impact the overall risks affecting workers as a whole. 
Having developed this risk allocation model to portray movements of risk in the context of 
collective bargaining, the second part of the chapter now turns to key theories to explain risk 
outcomes in collective bargaining. 
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Figure 2.1 – Risk Allocation Model 
 
2.2 The Importance of Theoretical Diversity to Explaining Bargaining Outcomes 
As elaborated by Beatrice Webb, collective bargaining consists of a process in which workers 
negotiate for better working conditions with their employers as a collective, rather than 
individually (Webb, 1907; cited in Doellgast and Benassi, 2014). While this broadly refers to 
broader interactions between two core parties, these traditionally being unions and employers, 
their outcomes also reflect dynamics that go far and beyond those between firm and union 
representatives. Inspired by a body of research that suggests that contextual and structural factors 
must be incorporated into research on work and employment (Hyman, 2008; Edwards and 
Kuruvilla, 2005; Paauwe and Boselie, 2003; Godard, 1997), the analysis of actor strategies will 
be complimented by an examination of market-related, organisational, institutional, and actor-
oriented characteristics. This research posits that risk outcomes in collective bargaining may be 
the result of various factors and that theoretical diversity is therefore required. These are 
reviewed in the next parts.  
 
Collectivisation High generosity Integration 
Individualisation Low generosity Segmentation 
Solidaristic Security 
Differentiated Insecurity 
Risk Allocation 
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2.3 Markets 
The following sections provide a brief examination of how markets relate to bargaining 
outcomes. Since collective bargaining in the private sector affects companies, profit-making 
entities, it seems natural to presume that the supply and demand of products affects their capacity 
to improve working conditions in their workplaces. The major factor examined here is 
marketisation. This concept was chosen because of how it captures the importance of price 
competition to bargaining outcomes and the growing literature dedicated to understanding its 
social effects on workers.  
 
2.3.1 Marketisation 
The concept of marketisation is mobilised to examine how market dynamics affect bargaining 
outcomes. It is defined as the “intensification of price-based competition” (Greer and Doellgast, 
2017: 193). Marketisation is to be distinguished from other types of competition, such as those 
based on product or service quality, in that it specifically refers to instances where firm survival 
in the market hinges on their ability to provide low prices. The intensification of price 
competition can be precipitated by many factors, including the entry of new competitors to 
domestic markets, the internationalisation of markets, labour market deregulation, the vertical 
disintegration of the firm, and the arrival of new technology. The fact that it stems from so many 
sources explains why its growth can be difficult to anticipate. 
The fact that marketisation has negative implications for working conditions has become more 
conspicuous in recent years. When marketisation is high, profit-margins grow tighter and 
employers experience considerable pressure to cut costs. Since personnel costs represent a large 
portion of firm budgets, workers are often directly affected. For example, historical research has 
documented how Wal-Mart’s successes in supply-chain optimisation, anti-union avoidance 
strategies, and aggressive control of in-store labour costs have undermined traditional retailers’ 
competitive position, pushing them to introduce extreme forms of insecurity to compete based on 
low prices (Lichtenstein, 2009; Carré and Tilly, 2017). Thus, price-based competition may be 
associated with ripple effects on firms. As one company offers consumers significantly lower 
prices through changes to work practices, others feel inclined to follow suit.  
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Marketisation also matters to collective bargaining.  Most glaringly is that it drives competition 
for weaker working conditions across bargaining units (Greer and Hauptmeier, 2016). Employers 
often use price competition to pressure unions into making concessions in order to keep their 
operations financially viable. Unions often concede because they fear that they may lose 
members should their company become less profitable, or worse, go bankrupt. It is for this 
reason that research associates higher levels of competition with a weakened bargaining position 
for unions (Pulignano et al., 2016). Given the above research, intensified price competition 
should be associated with effects on worker risk. 
 
2.3.2 Summary 
The above sections highlight why price competition may be of importance to collective 
bargaining outcomes that affect risk. On the one hand, marketisation hinders firm capacities to 
mitigate risks by forcing them to cut labour costs. On the other, marketisation provides unions 
with a disadvantage in collective bargaining by forcing them to choose between maintaining 
members over constraining their firms’ ability to use labour cost flexibility to give them an edge 
in pricing their products.  
 
2.4 Organisational contexts 
The following sections provide an overview of contextual factors pertaining to organisations. 
First, organisational performance is examined. However, the notion of performance is widely 
contested, as organisational performance represents a wide range of variables whose importance 
ranges depending on the subjective views of corporate and union actors, each of whom tend to 
emphasise different aspects of organisational performance as being crucial to a firm’s success. 
The following section examines financialisation. This refers to a growing literature stream which 
has dedicated itself to how shareholder value and financial engineering, often by private equity 
firms, is transforming working conditions and the employment relationship. The relevance of 
fissured workplaces in shaping firm outcomes is also examined, showing how different firms 
organise their value-chains matters for job quality.  
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2.4.1 Organisational performance 
It has been argued that organisational performance “has acquired a central role as the deemed 
goal of modern industrial activity” (Richard et al., 2009: 719). In fact, an entire field of enquiry 
has dedicated itself to understanding organisational performance. This is the central 
preoccupation of scholars subscribing to the Strategic Human Resource Management school of 
thought, a research paradigm whose core focus is on how human resource practices impact 
performance. Informed by micro-level studies rooted in the psychology, economics, and 
management literatures, these studies have tried to explain how HR practices affect various 
indicators of organisational performance, often treating firms as closed systems and workers as 
quantitative units of analysis (Batt and Hermans, 2012; Wright and McMahan, 2011; Lengnick-
Hall et al., 2009).  
Interestingly, this research has found that HR practices, including those that relate to risk, impact 
performance. For example, research on risk suggests that job insecurity has negative impacts on 
organisational performance, mainly in the form of increased absenteeism, poorer job 
performance, and higher turnover (Chirumbolo and Areni, 2010; Chirumbolo and Areni, 2005; 
Chirumbolo and Hellgren, 2003). While this literature is quite limited in terms of its choice of 
performance indicators, case selection, and narrow definition of risk, it suggests that greater risk 
outcomes may negatively impact a company’s bottom line. But if risk is bad for performance, 
why do firms pursue strategies that augment risk to begin with? Do they implement other 
measures to counteract the negative impacts of risk, such as programs that improve employee 
attitudes (Chirumbolo and Hellgren, 2003), or has the literature simply done a bad job of 
exploring the links between risk and performance? 
The concept of organisational performance has been the subject of debate. This attests to the 
difficulty of defining organisational performance as a construct, whose dimensions are highly 
variable by field of study, type of stakeholders, and the levels of analysis privileged by 
researchers (Rogers and Wright, 1998). Many have gone beyond the narrow scope of 
performance focusing on economic valuations and the limited viewpoint of the firm to reflect a 
diversity of stakeholders, objectives and outcomes (Kaufman, 2015; Godard, 2014; Batt and 
Hermans, 2012; Kaufman, 2012; Batt and Banerjee, 2012).  
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The major proposition here is that aspects of organisational performance may indeed be of 
immense importance to risk outcomes in collective bargaining. Objective performance is 
important, in that it addresses the concrete performance outcomes of firms, which play an 
important role in guiding decision-making (Richard et al., 2009). Since the links between 
specific human resource practices and organisational performance are often difficult to confirm 
empirically (Meier and O’Toole, 2013), the subjective views of actors on how human resource 
practices drive worker security affect organisational performance is of particular interest. 
However, performance considerations cannot be separated from important trends pertaining to 
financialisation and value chain governance, two organisational characteristics which are also of 
considerable importance to risk. 
 
2.4.2 Financialisation 
It is impossible to discuss the relevance of organisational performance without addressing the 
financialisation of firms during the 20th century. Krippner (2005: 181) argues that firm 
financialisation denotes “a pattern of accumulation in which profits accrue primarily through 
financial channels rather than through trade and commodity production”. It refers to businesses’ 
decreasing reliance on primary production activities to maintain profitably, to the neglect of such 
activities in favor of financial methods of profit-making. For example, research on the retail 
sector internationally has shown that leading retail companies have been able to capitalise on 
dividends, even while the total revenues of their companies have been in long-term decline. In 
the context of financialisation, this research shows how retailers use strategies not related to 
traditional production activities to expand profits, thereby shifting their focus away from core 
competencies. These strategies include “foreign expansion, financialisation of assets, 
deterioration of suppliers' and workers' positions and the use of working capital management to 
transform market power into financial gains” (Baud and Durand, 2012: 241). This has led to a 
crisis of accumulation, in which the gains of production are being diverted away from productive 
investment to financialised activities, thereby transferring considerable power to the financial 
industry in the process, to the detriment of workers and worsening income inequality (Van der 
Zwan, 2014; Crotty, 2005). 
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Furthermore, financialisation is often associated with the rising power of the private equity (PE) 
model. According to Eileen Appelbaum and Rosemary Batt (2014), private equity firms have 
acquired 11,500 companies in the United States. The core objective of these private equity firms, 
through notorious financial strategies (e.g. leveraged buyouts), is to extract maximum value from 
firms, often at the expense of workers. More specifically, private equity firms profit from loading 
their companies with immense debts while selling key assets. Provocatively, these firms are not 
responsible for the debts incurred by their companies, or even incidences of bankruptcy, leaving 
other firm stakeholders (often their workers) negatively impacted by short-term strategic 
decisions. This leads to the proposition that firm financialisation may have negative implications 
for risk outcomes in collective bargaining.  
 
2.4.3 Fissured workplaces 
Originating in the work of David Weil, “fissured workplaces” research shows how responsibility 
for jobs has been shed from lead firms to franchisees, subcontractors, and supply-chain actors, 
and that this adds pressure on non-lead employers to cut corners on working conditions to 
maintain viable businesses (Weil, 2014; Weil, 2011). For example, research on employment in 
franchise jobs demonstrates that job quality in such settings is markedly inferior to that of less 
fragmented workplaces (Cappelli and Hamori, 2008).  
The fissuring of workplaces has been particularly relevant to collective bargaining. Research has 
shown that the blurring of the employment relationship, through the “vertical disintegration” of 
the firm has led to the erosion of traditional collective bargaining structures in some contexts. 
For example, franchising and subcontracting have been used as a means to avoiding collective 
bargaining and other employee voice mechanisms in Germany (Doellgast, 2012; Doellgast and 
Greer, 2007). Thus, fissured workplaces have not only introduced governance structures which 
hurt workers by squeezing actors across value chains, but they are associated with a regulatory 
environment that facilitates a form of exit from collective bargaining. However, this last point 
becomes clearer in the later section on bargaining structures.   
The key analytical point here is that fissured workplaces are a relevant aspect of contemporary 
organisational contexts. They matter for organisational performance, as organisational 
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performance is not confined to the experiences of a single firm, but rather a variety of actors in 
value chains who possess different objectives concerning performance. Furthermore, they matter 
for the extent that actors across value chains have discretion over human resource practices, 
including those pertaining to risk. Responding to this, the proposition drawn from this section is 
that workplace fissuring, on account of how it fragments workers’ relationships with both firms 
and unions, is likely to play an important role in shaping risk outcomes in collective bargaining.  
 
2.4.4 Summary 
The above sections proposed that organisational contexts likely play a critical role in shaping risk 
outcomes in collective bargaining. First, organisational performance was examined, since 
performance considerations figure prominently in how firms manage their workers and is a key 
consideration in decision-making for both firms and unions who have a stake in their company’s 
profitability. Second, financialisation is also considered, as it shifts firm priorities away from 
workers and productive activities to more financial objectives. Third, workplace fissuring is 
identified for its impacts on who bears responsibility for risk outcomes. It also alters how firms 
conceive performance objectives (shaped through power relationships between lead and 
subordinate firms) and affects unions’ ability to provide workers in a given firm with 
representation. However, while organisational contexts are likely very influential to bargaining 
outcomes, organisations are embedded in institutional contexts. The next sections will examine 
institutional theories that contribute to explaining how risks are shaped through collective 
bargaining.  
 
2.5 Institutional theory 
This part will provide a brief assessment of key institutional theories and their implications for 
risk. These theories examine the rules which govern the interactions between actors in collective 
bargaining. It begins with Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) theory, examining the role of 
institutions for market coordination in influencing risk outcomes. It then analyses neoliberal 
convergence, VoC’s counter-theory which proposes that non-market institutions have become of 
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lessor importance to work outcomes over recent years. It ends by discussing the bargaining 
structures literature, which proposes that collective bargaining arrangements may also matter, 
perhaps more so than national institutions.  
 
2.5.1  Varieties of Capitalism: On the role of institutional complementarities 
Varieties of Capitalism made its way to industrial relations in the 1990s. It entered the 
mainstream in 2001 after Peter Hall and David Soskice published their seminal work entitled 
Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. The key 
thesis is that national institutions for market coordination impact societal outcomes. According to 
this firm-centric theory, modern economies are split into a dichotomy. They are either liberal 
market economies (LMEs), in which firms and other actors interact on the basis of market 
principles, or coordinated market economies (CMEs), in which their actions are guided by non-
market forms of coordination.  
In their initial work, Hall and Sokice (2001) argued that Germany and the United States differed 
across five spheres of activity relating to industrial relations, vocational training and education, 
corporate governance, inter-firm relations, and employee relations. Being a coordinated economy 
(CME), Germany’s system of industrial relations emphasises coordination over wages and 
working conditions, coordination over employee training, patient capital emphasising long-term 
returns, cooperative inter-company relations to resolve coordination problems and facilitate 
transfers in technology, as well as a cooperative relationship with employees emphasising 
consensus, reputations within networks, and long-term employment contracts. On the other hand, 
the United States operates as a liberal market economy (LME), in that it emphasises the primacy 
of markets in setting wages and working conditions, focuses on general education and skills (as 
opposed to industry specific skills in CMEs), shareholder capitalism with a short-term 
orientation, market-based and competitive relations between firms, and unilateral management 
decision-making authority and short-term employment contracts. According to VoC theory, there 
exist multiple complementarities within each economy’s institutions. These complementarities 
affect firm strategies, as firms in LMEs are more short-termist than those in CMEs.  
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VoC theory’s relevance to risk bears on its explanation of business strategies. Due to institutional 
complementarities, firms in coordinated market economies are more likely to invest in long-term 
strategies. For instance, Hall and Soskice’s initial work in the area suggests that CMEs are more 
conducive to incremental innovation, while institutions associated with LMEs facilitate radical 
forms of innovation (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Later work showed that coordinated economies 
exhibit higher economic growth because of their long-term orientation towards investing in 
production (Hall and Gingerich, 2009). Since firms in coordinated market economies are more 
oriented towards the long-term, they are more likely to invest in their workers rather than 
pursuing short-term economic goals. This being the case, the proposition is that national forms of 
market coordination will affect investments in workers, and hence risk in the process.  
 
2.5.2 Neoliberal convergence theory: The other side of the coordination continuum 
VoC theory sparked a debate on the resilience of coordinative institutions. Its chief challenger is 
convergence theory, a theory which challenges the institutional resiliency and complementarities 
claims of VoC theorists. The basic premise of neoliberal convergence is that the divergences in 
countries’ industrial relations institutions, which were relatively stable in the early postwar 
decades, have been steadily disappearing. As a consequence, we have witnessed a convergence 
in industrial relations systems across most OECD countries in recent decades, bringing nations 
towards a common model emphasising flexibility and deregulation.  
Considerable research has been dedicated to validating this claim. In an influential 15 country 
study with a focus on Western Europe, Baccaro and Howell (2011) argued that all Western 
countries have been moving towards a common model of liberalisation between 1974 and 2005, 
which is most exemplified by the reconfiguration of centralised collective bargaining institutions 
in many countries. Institutions, they argue, exhibit surprising plasticity, and operate quite 
differently in changing environments. What is to blame for this convergence? The authors 
suggest that it is likely rooted in contemporary economic restructuring (deindustrialisation and 
the financialisation of capitalism), the breakdown of traditional class compromises, and rising 
employer power. Three in-depth case studies on convergence theory examining institutional 
change Britain, France, and Sweden reached a similar conclusion, which is that there has been 
 40 
 
some level of institutional convergence “towards decentralized, individualized, firm-centered 
industrial relations institutions offering much greater flexibility, and autonomy in the 
determination of pay and conditions at the firm level” (Howell and Givan, 2011: 250). Therefore, 
while the VoC literature stresses the importance of maintaining institutional complementarities 
to achieving successes in economic performance, convergence theory suggests that we are in fact 
witnessing a breakdown of the traditional dichotomy, suggesting that institutional 
complementarities no longer play a critical role in institutional reproduction. The major 
difference between the convergence and VoC literatures is that the former proposes that it is the 
decline of national institutions that is of critical importance to industrial relations, bringing forth 
a certain amount of institutional homogeneity in terms of practices and outcomes, while the VoC 
literature argues that national institutions have actually maintained a considerable amount of 
resiliency and signify that cross-country differences still matter. The proposition stemming from 
this research is that the convergence of national institutions also matters to risk. 
 
2.5.3 Bargaining structures: Does centralisation matter? 
The VoC and convergence literature streams have emphasised the importance of national forms 
of market coordination to collective bargaining outcomes. A distinct but related stream of 
research examines the importance of bargaining structures to outcomes in collective bargaining. 
The level of collective bargaining may be centralised (national or multi-employer agreements) or 
decentralised (plant or establishment agreements). These levels are historically rooted in 
employer preferences (Clegg, 1976), including a desire to neutralise labour conflicts in the 
workplace (Sisson, 1987).  
Bargaining structures have decentralised cross-nationally in past decades, as many sectors have 
supplanted national or multi-company bargaining with arrangements at firm or establishment 
levels (Katz, 1993). There exist many explanations for decentralisation. Decentralisation is 
attributed to macro-level trends such as market liberalisation and labour market de-regulation, 
and micro-level trends relating to changing firm structures and preferences towards performance 
(Ortigueira, 2013; Traxler, 2004; Katz, 1993; Hendricks and Kahn, 1982). However, counter-
intuitive research has shown that some employers in fact strategize to maintain the stability of 
 41 
 
centralised bargaining despite greater economic uncertainty. This appreciation for institutional 
stability can be a reflection of power relations and the “strategic positioning of key actors in the 
industry”, demonstrating that not all employers are unequivocally in favor of local-level 
negotiations (Laroche and Murray, 2012: 90).   
Bargaining structures are clearly influential to the behavior of both employers and trade unions 
(Sisson, 1987; Clegg, 1976). Changes in these structures come with consequences for workers. 
Germany is an important case in point. Once heralded for its dual system of collective 
bargaining, Germany exemplifies the negative effects of decentralisation. On account of the 
erosion of sectoral bargaining, German workers were the only workers in the EU to experience a 
decline in their real wage (-6.2%) between 2001 and 2009 (Lehndorff, 2016). The share of 
German workers in non-standard employment also rose in this period. Thus, this research 
suggests that the German economic “miracle” is in fact a façade, as recent gains in employment 
came with adverse impacts on job quality. In a larger study on the wage effects of collective 
bargaining in Belgium, France, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom, Bosch (2015) finds 
that “shrinking bargaining coverage” negatively impacts wages and income inequality in each of 
these countries, suggesting that the negative impacts of decentralisation are widespread. In 
addition to their negative effects on working conditions, Traxler (2003) shows that single-
employer bargaining fails to meet performance expectations. Given the interconnections between 
the above aspects of work and centralisation, the proposition drawn from this research is that 
bargaining structures affect worker security.  
 
2.5.4 Summary 
In addressing key theories on institutions, this part of the chapter has argued that they may be of 
critical importance to shaping risk outcomes in collective bargaining. The VoC and convergence 
literatures disagree on many points. However, their work brings forth a common proposition, 
which is that levels of market coordination matter for risk. Bargaining centralisation is also 
proposed to affect risk. Bargaining structures are to be distinguished from market coordination, 
as they focus on aspects of collective bargaining that are often independent from macro-level 
trends in market coordination. However, a mere focus on institutions appears insufficient, as the 
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above theories neglect the role of actors and the impacts of their choices in different institutional 
settings. There is a need to examined theories that acknowledge the importance of actors and 
power to risk outcomes. For this reason, the following sections will examine actor-centered 
approaches. 
 
2.6 Actor-centered approaches  
Actor-oriented theories have arisen to account for the role played by actors in shaping their 
environments, going beyond simplistic institutional theories that are overly rationalistic and 
overplay the importance of path dependency. This part looks at how the attributes of actors might 
contribute to explaining risk outcomes. It discusses the relevance of power resources and the 
strategic capabilities of unions.  
 
2.6.1 Power resources and strategic capabilities 
Mainstream industrial relations theories frequently neglect the role of power. Research 
emphasising power resources has emerged as an alternative line of analysis, challenging varieties 
of capitalism for failing to acknowledge the rise of corporate power and its tragic consequences 
for industrial relations (Doellgast and Benassi, 2014). However, how do we characterise labour 
power? Levesque and Murray (2010) identify four key resources available to unions. They 
propose that internal solidarity (e.g. cohesive identities), network embeddedness (diverse links to 
unions and other community members), narrative resources (interpretative frames of union 
action), and infrastructural resources (material, human, processes, policies and programmes) are 
essential to achieving change. However, they go beyond the work of traditional power resource 
theorists by highlighting the importance of actors’ “strategic capabilities” in using their power 
resources. Thus, unions must master the strategic capabilities of intermediation (fostering 
collective actions through network activation), framing (defining a clear and autonomous 
agenda), articulating (over different levels and spaces), and learning (to diffuse learning within 
the union) should they wish to successfully manage their resources in enacting change.  
 43 
 
A long line of research dedicated itself to exploring the links between these power resources to 
bargaining outcomes. For instance, research shows that union delegates yielding greater power 
resources feel more powerful in collective bargaining and exert more influence on workplace 
change (Murray et al., 2014). Others have pointed to the importance of international coalition 
building as a means to bolstering union influence at the local level (Dufour-Poirier and 
Hennebert, 2015; Fairbrother et al., 2013; Kay, 2011; MacDonald, 2003).  These are merely 
examples of a much larger body of work that has emerged on the relevance of actor power to 
collective bargaining outcomes. Thus, it is proposed that actor power and capabilities are critical 
to understanding their role in mitigating risk. More pointedly, it is the power of labour actors in 
challenging private interests that appears most relevant, as stronger unions are more likely to 
succeed in serving their workers’ interests through collective bargaining.  
 
2.6.2 Summary 
The core proposition drawn from the actor-oriented theories examined in the above sections is 
that actor attributes may matter to risk. This may be in the form of power resources and the 
strategic capabilities held by unions, as unions who feel strong may be react differently to threats 
facing working conditions. An analysis of these attributes enables one to capture important actor 
dynamics that matter to collective bargaining. However, they do not address the specific choices 
that actors make in collective bargaining. For this this reason, the next part will examine the 
importance of actor strategies, this representing the core subject of this thesis. 
 
2.7 Actor strategies 
Of core interest is providing insights on how collective bargaining strategies impact risks in 
various contexts. Even when faced with similar pressures, actors operate according to different 
ideas and rationales in crafting their responses to change. The contents of bargaining strategies 
may be particularly relevant to bargaining outcomes, since considerable research suggests that 
actors in collective bargaining possess critical latitude to choose, despite the influence of 
organisational and institutional contexts (Bélanger et al., 2013; Almond et al., 2005; Kochan et 
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al., 1986). Furthermore, while collective bargaining is principally carried out between unions and 
employers, this study suggests that state strategies also merit special emphasis for their effects on 
risk on labour relations. Thus, the strategies of all three actors is examined.  
 
2.7.1 Firm Strategy towards employee and union relations 
How do firm strategies influence risk? Drawing on Walton et al.’s (2000) work on “strategic 
negotiations”, the importance of firm strategies vis-à-vis both employee and union relations will 
be highlighted. With respect to employee relations, firm strategies tend to diverge in terms of 
how they motivate their workforces to achieve the goals set out by the company. On the one 
hand, they can choose a strategy of compliance, in which they attempt to control their employees 
and discipline them throughout the production process. On the other hand, they can opt for a 
commitment strategy in which they positively engage their employees to ensure that they have a 
vested interest in the company’s success.  
The employee relations strategy pursued by firms has never been so important. Given the 
growing pressures of globalisation and technological change, companies have had to make 
critical choices concerning how they manage their employees to ensure their competitiveness in 
changing contexts. Kalleberg (2003) provides an excellent illustration of how commitment and 
compliance strategies relate to working conditions. His research has identified how some firms 
opt for a “low road” approach in which workers are treated as “disposable” inputs of production. 
Through an emphasis on “numerical flexibility” – such as large-scale efforts to reduce labour 
costs - employee commitment is sacrificed to address labour cost concerns. As a result, a 
compliance strategy in which employee control is necessary to motivate production becomes the 
core strategy pursued by the firm.  
However, a considerable number of firms have pursued the “high road”, by implementing 
commitment strategies that consist of training a high flexibility workforce that excels at 
teamwork and provides significant input into company operations (i.e. high-performance work 
systems). By realising “functional flexibility” within the enterprise, without necessarily 
diminishing working conditions, firms adopting this model attempt to capitalise through the 
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productivity gains achieved through a highly trained, compensated, and thereby committed 
workforce (Kalleberg, 2003).  
Of course, firms can adopt variants of both strategies. They can apply commitment models 
towards certain categories of workers and compliance strategies towards others. This mixed 
strategy has played a significant role in expanding labour market segmentation. This 
segmentation effect in hospital and metal sectors was explored by Crouch (2015). Employers in 
union and non-union firms have incentives for protecting core skilled (or sometimes non-skilled) 
workers to ensure skills retention, while segmenting certain categories of workers to buffer 
against changing economic conditions. However, the combination strategy need not necessarily 
be bad. For example, Locke et al.’s (2009) research on the global apparel industry found that a 
commitment model can overlap with a compliance model as a means to problem solving and 
sharing “best practices” across the value chain. Thus, the two approaches, when effectively 
combined in a non-segmented fashion, can in fact yield some interesting outcomes for firms and 
workers.  
A second strategy relates to labour relations. As this thesis investigates collective bargaining, it is 
of interest that firms experiencing similar environmental pressures pursue divergent strategies of 
engagement towards unions. According to Walton et al. (2000), this is the “social contract aspect 
of labor relations”. First, firms can implement a strategy of tolerance, but not active cooperation, 
which the authors describe as arms-length accommodation, the most common form of labour 
relations during the traditional New Deal era of unionism. Second, firms may opt to avoid unions 
altogether by adopting an oppositional stance. Through this, these firms seek to evade, weaken or 
even eliminate the union altogether. Finally, there are those firms which embrace union 
cooperation and seek to encourage participation through various means.  
Given the decline of traditional arms-length accommodation, most firms today are faced with a 
choice: do they to oppose or cooperate with unions? Much research on this suggests that 
cooperative firm labour relations strategies are conducive to superior working conditions. A 
general study analysing the Australian Worker Representation and Participation Survey found 
that the industrial relations climate tends to be poor in establishments where management is 
perceptibly opposed to unions (Pyman et al., 2010). Other research has focussed on the specific 
strategy used by employers to oppose unions in their sectors and establishments. For example, 
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Hatton has studied how employers hire temporary agency workers to weaken unions. Through an 
analysis of 106 labour-management disputes, Hatton’s (2014: 86) research argues that the hiring 
of such workers is carried out “to prevent unions from forming, to weaken existing unions, to 
apply pressure on unions during negotiations, and to intimidate or harass striking workers”. 
Thus, the negative impacts of union opposition may be felt by unionised workers through 
managerial efforts to weaken their bargaining position, as is done through the pursuance of exit 
options such as temporary agency workers, or by merely meeting the needs of flexibility by 
shifting poor working conditions to workers at the periphery (Jansen et al., 2014; Jaehrling and 
Méhaut, 2013). 
Furthermore, it is of importance to note that the employee and labour relations strategies of firms 
are often interconnected. International research on the airline industry has found that some firms 
adopt strategies to avoid unions while controlling employee behavior, a combination that leads to 
flexibility and the deterioration working conditions. Meanwhile, others pursue union partnerships 
coupled with a commitment strategy, often to the benefit of their employees. Interestingly, it is 
often presumed that low-cost business strategies are more compatible with the avoidance/control 
strategy, thereby perpetuating the myth that low-costs (in the airline industry) can only be 
attained through union avoidance, low commitment, and poor working conditions. However, 
research has shown that high commitment strategies (profiting from functional flexibility) 
coupled with union partnerships, have been integral to many firms’ low-cost business strategies, 
thereby serving as a counter-example which justifies the amelioration of working conditions to 
achieve efficiency goals (Gittell and Bamber, 2010; Bamber et al., 2009).   
The proposition here is that firm strategies could also explain risk variations in collective 
bargaining. What is also of interest is how these strategies relate to different institutional and 
organisational contexts. Furthermore, it is also important to recognise that other actor strategies 
may also be of considerable relevance to economic security in collective bargaining, such as 
those of unions and the state.  
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2.7.2 Union strategy: A question of cooperation and mobilisation   
As the other key actor in collective bargaining, union strategies are also important to negotiations 
over worker security. Union collective bargaining strategies involve positioning towards two 
goals, the first relating to the type of labour-management relationship aspired to by the union, 
and the second pertaining to its mobilisation strategy. With respect to the labour-management 
relationship, there is significant literature dedicated to the extent of cooperation sought from 
management by union actors. This is a significant aspect of Walton and McKersie’s (1965) 
classic “behavioral theory of labor negotiations”, in which unions could choose between 
distributive bargaining of a zero-sum and confrontational nature, and integrative bargaining of a 
positive-sum and more cooperative nature. The choice over whether to cooperate, it is argued, 
has a ripple dynamic on the entirety of the collective bargaining process. 
Drawing from this theory, Boxall and Haynes (1997) provide a simpler model suggesting that 
union strategies towards employers can be either adversarial, cooperative, or a mixture of the 
two. The choice of whether to cooperate has been a source of contention for unions in many 
countries. The expected benefits of such a strategy are that a long-term oriented approach based 
on relationship building would orient employers’ preferences towards improving the working 
conditions of their employees. Many have had concerns that such a strategy could lead to the 
“co-option” of labour representatives, should labour be demobilised through the process. 
However, through a cooperation strategy based on strong union organisation and worker 
unionisation, it has been shown that both unions and their employers can gain from the mutual 
legitimation of interests, as well as the restructuring of expectations necessary to preserving a 
positive relationship between the two parties (Oxenbridge and Brown, 2002; Haynes and Allen, 
2001). 
Considerable research suggests that workers tend to benefit from union partnerships with 
management. This research points to the “informal consultative processes” and augmented levels 
of trust inherent in successful partnerships that have proven fruitful to the amelioration of 
working conditions (Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004: 388). For example, Geary’s (2008) study on 
labour-management partnerships in Ireland found that a very large majority of union members 
perceived such arrangements quite positively. In fact, most argued that labour-management 
cooperation had a positive effect on pay conditions, employment security, job satisfaction, 
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employee performance, confidence in management, and even their ability to embrace change. In 
connection with this, fewer than 20% of these members found that such arrangements had a 
negative impact on their unions’ capacity to represent their needs (Geary, 2008). Furthermore, 
another study by Price et al. (2014) argues that the non-adversarial nature of collective 
bargaining in Australia’s retail sector is the core reason that this sector’s unions, despite their 
weak organising efforts, have been capable of improving working conditions in a sector that is 
internationally known for precarious work. 
While significant research suggests that partnerships yield positive outcomes for workers, such 
arrangements can be fraught with challenges. As shown by Harrisson et al. (2011), cooperative 
arrangements can challenge the traditional identities of union representatives, who find it 
difficult to strike the right balance between maintaining close, trusting, and cooperative relations 
with managers, and maintaining solidarity and trust with their own members. Rolfsen’s (2011) 
research argues that union cooperation with managers becomes particularly problematic when 
unionists start being perceived as managers. This takes place when union representatives bear 
responsibility for the diminishment of wages, benefits, and working conditions, particularly 
when union positions taken in the context of the partnership do not reflect those of their 
membership base. This becomes even more complex in a neoliberal environment in which 
employers find it difficult to keep their bargain with unions and in which workplace mutuality 
(in voluntarist bargaining systems) is increasingly rare (Dobbins and Dundon, 2015). Thus, 
unions struggle against pressures both to resist concession-making and maintaining the 
confidence of their members. 
In addition to whether unions seek to cooperate or oppose management, unions also vary in 
terms of their chosen mobilisation strategy. Mobilisation strategies can take a variety of forms, 
ranging from the provision of basic services to core employees within the bargaining unit, to 
mobilising a broad alliance within and outside of the firm through some form of alliance. The 
most basic strategy has been dubbed a “servicing” strategy (Boxall and Haynes, 1997). The 
premise of this strategy is that unions serve a basic function for the bargaining unit, by providing 
the mere exchange of basic services in return for fees. These services can be the provision of 
expert advice, representation functions towards management, and participation in employee 
benefit governance, but little more.   
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An over-reliance on servicing, including instances where servicing is mixed with cooperative 
practices, can be highly problematic to resisting the pressures associated with neoliberalism. The 
major issue here is that a servicing strategy is one in which there is no coalition building from 
within nor outside of the organisation. This deficiency can render the union incapable of 
mounting an offensive to resist pressures deriving from within and beyond the firm (Boxall and 
Haynes, 1997). The major critique of unions adhering to the servicing model is that its limited 
focus is associated with many weaknesses in terms of worker solidarity. Solidarity, many have 
argued, is a necessary precondition to maintaining union influence through collective bargaining, 
as it enables unions to capitalise on power rooted both within and outside of the firm to enact 
change for workers (Lévesque and Murray, 2013; Lévesque and Murray, 2010; Lévesque and 
Murray, 2002; Boxall and Haynes, 1997).  
The above research informs two propositions that both the labour relations and mobilisation 
strategies of unions impact risk outcomes in collective bargaining. Given the above review, 
decisions over whether to cooperate with management or mobilise workers have implications for 
outcomes in risk. However, one final piece of the puzzle is the state and its direct and indirect 
influence on risk. 
 
2.7.3 State strategy towards risk and the employment relationship 
Finally, state strategy is of potential importance to collective bargaining outcomes pertaining to 
risk. The literature on state strategy argues that despite the relevance of institutional contexts, 
there is still considerable room for the state to make choices through public policy. This may be 
divided into two propositions.  
First, it is proposed that social policies directly impact worker risk. For many countries, the 
current context is one in which welfare state retrenchment has left citizens bereft of the many 
forms of publicly provided risk mitigation measures that were present in the early postwar 
decades. This refers to the retrenchment of public health care, pensions, and other social 
programs that have historically played a key role in risk mitigation. Some have called this a 
transition to market citizenship, in which states have become less committed to social outcomes, 
allowing them to be determined through market dynamics rather than public policy (Fudge, 
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2005). Furthermore, international welfare state research has shown that states have had 
differentiated responses to the pressures of globalisation and neoliberalism, and that these 
responses come with important implications for risk mitigation (Bonoli and Natali, 2012). Thus, 
drawing on welfare state research, the state plays an important role in risk mitigation through 
social policies that enhance public and private welfare provisions (Seeleib-Kaiser et al., 2012; 
Powell and Barrientos, 2004; Esping-Andersen, 1990).   
Second, it is proposed that pro-labour state strategies indirectly impact risk. Labour regulations 
have been noted for their role in protecting workers. Vallée (2005) has shown that states can 
introduce a variety of regulations to reduce the vulnerability of workers, ranging from redefining 
legal categories of employment, enhancing fundamental worker rights, better access to social 
rights, and reforming institutions of collective representation. For example, recent research has 
examined how various jurisdictions are demonstrating creativity in crafting strategic labour laws 
to address the growth of precarious work falling outside the scope of traditional employment 
statutes. For example, childcare providers in the province of Quebec have been granted the right 
to collective bargain as a bargaining unit formed around their profession (rather than the 
boundaries of a single firm). Through negotiations with the state, childcare providers are able to 
negotiate standards for compensation and working conditions across the province (McCrystal, 
2014). In some cases, laws that address both collective representation and forms of direct risk 
alleviation can be mixed to produce innovative outcomes. In illustration, the new German 
minimum wage has been integrated into their system of collective bargaining, stipulating that it 
is the social partners who decide the wage increases and that these increases be aligned with 
those of collectively bargained wages in the country (Bosch, 2018). Thus, states can be major 
facilitators in helping workers to access their social rights and means to collective representation. 
On the other hand, labour laws can disrupt traditional bargaining relationships with negative 
consequences for workers, as has been documented with the right-to-work movement in the 
United States. Through the unraveling of the New Deal and providing states with discretion over 
labour regulations concerning union security, the decline of closed shops has been linked to 
diminished union power and rising inequality in the country (Hogler, 2015). Of course, these are 
merely examples of how state strategies impact collective bargaining, as states have an immense 
variety of policy instruments at their disposal for addressing risk and labour relations.  
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This section adopts propositions that state strategies may have important implications for risk 
outcomes in collective bargaining. Policy choices matter for directly addressing risk through the 
welfare state. They may also indirectly influence risk outcomes by regulating the employment 
relationship.  
 
2.7.4 Summary 
Firm, union, and state strategies may be of considerable importance to risk outcomes in 
collective bargaining. This potential link is supported through several propositions. First, firm 
employee relations and labour relations strategies were deemed of importance to risk. Second, 
unions strategies on whether to cooperate with managers or mobilise their workers were also 
singled out for their relevance to risk. Finally, while the state is not normally directly involved in 
collective bargaining, states strategies in the form of social policies and labour regulation matter 
too. This being the last set of theoretical approaches examined in this chapter, we now turn to a 
presentation of the theoretical framework. 
 
2.8 Conclusion and theoretical framework 
This brings us to the thesis framework (Figure 2.2). This framework provides guidance on how 
to test how these sets of explanations relating to strategies, contexts, and actor attributes relating 
to worker risk. First is the concept of risk allocation. This broad concept integrates the risk 
dimensions of individualisation, generosity, and segmentation, seeking to go beyond most 
existing research on risk that has investigated one of the three aspects of risk at the expense of 
others. These three dimensions of risk will structure the examination of worker risk trends in 
collective bargaining.  
This chapter also identified three sets of theoretical explanations that are of relevance to risk. 
First, the core focus is on the actor strategies of firms and unions, and to a lesser extent the state. 
This encompasses firm labour relations and employee relations strategies. It also includes 
unions’ labour relations and mobilisation strategies. Finally, state strategies are assessed, those 
that directly affect risk (social policies) and those that indirectly affect risk (labour regulation).  
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Figure 2.2 – Thesis Framework 
 
 
Second, the relevance of contexts is also addressed. These contexts are market-related, 
organisational and institutional. First, marketisation, otherwise known as intensified price 
competition, was highlighted for its effects in constraining firms’ financial capacity to absorb 
risk and unions’ structural advantage in negotiating. Second, organisational factors are of 
interest. These include organisational performance and whether it aligns with improved working 
conditions. Financialisation and its effects on the reordering of firm priorities was also discussed. 
Finally, fissured workplaces and their effects on who bears responsibility for workers were 
highlighted. Third, institutions were relevant. This includes the influence of market coordination 
on the long-term orientation of firm strategies and its associated effects on risk. It also includes 
bargaining centralisation and its effects on risk through standardising working conditions.  
Third, theories relating to the attributes of actors were examined. The power resources and 
strategic capabilities of unions may be of considerable importance to risk. Stronger unions may 
Actor Attributes 
Strategies 
Worker Risk 
1. Individualisation 
2. Generosity 
3. Segmentation 
Contexts 
Firm Strategy 
Union Strategy 
State Strategy 
Performance 
Fissuring 
Coordination 
Barg. Structure 
Power/Cap. 
Financialisation 
Marketization 
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be more capable of exacting change through collective bargaining and other means. In this case, 
it may not necessarily be the strategy adopted by the union that matters (though this may be 
important), but rather the strength of the union engaged in collective bargaining.  
The ultimate aim of this framework is to examine the effects of bargaining strategies (firm and 
union) on risk. Contrasting the influence of multiple factors to risk serves two purposes. First, it 
attempts to delineate the relative influence of bargaining strategies (firm and union) by 
acknowledging the relevance of other factors to risk outcomes. Only by teasing out different 
possible explanations can the influence of collective bargaining strategies be truly understood. 
Second, this framework enables the thesis to account for the interconnectedness of different 
factors that matter for risk. Causality is never straight-forward. Thus, an understanding of 
bargaining strategies alone would be insufficient to understand their effects on risk, as these tend 
to differ based on the setting.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 54 
 
Chapter 3 
Operationalisation and Research Design  
The first chapter established that economic security is a serious and growing issue amongst 
OECD countries. The second chapter outlined the key theories for exploring the interconnections 
between collective bargaining and risk. This chapter concretises the research aim through two 
parts. The first seeks to operationalise the theoretical framework by clarifying the concepts that 
will be used to investigate the core research question: how do collective bargaining strategies 
impact economic security?  Various hypotheses will be advanced as possible explanations to 
guide the examination of how actor strategies, understood in their market-related, organisational 
and institutional contexts, matter for worker insecurity.  
The second part of the chapter outlines the research design. On account of its growing 
prominence as a low-wage sector and its notoriety for perpetuating the growth of precarious 
work, as well this sector’s union presence in all OECD countries, the retail sector provides the 
testing ground for examining the interrelationships between collective bargaining and risk. 
Through comparative case studies of different retail firms (supermarkets specifically) in Canada, 
Germany, Sweden, and the United States, the comparative-case study methodology sets out to 
examine the influence of strategies, contexts, and actor-attributes on risk allocation. The 
hypotheses will be tested through the analysis of semi-structured interviews, official documents, 
government data, and secondary literature.  
 
3.1 Operationalising the framework 
In order to operationalise the framework, the first part of this chapter begins by defining risk 
allocation, the dependent variable whose variance is to be explained in this thesis. Key 
hypotheses will then be formulated through this conceptual review. Given that supermarket 
chains will be examined, a point to be justified further on in this chapter, some aspects of the 
operationalisation will take this into account.  
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3.1.1 Dependent variable: Risk allocation 
As discussed in the previous chapter, risks are allocated through shifts in individualisation, 
changes to generosity, and segmentation. However, what exactly are the risks to be assessed 
through the risk allocation framework developed in this thesis? Most significant research 
defining core areas of economic security in the modern context has been carried out since the 
early 2000s. This research consists of several strands. Rooted in the works of Jacob Hacker 
(through his work with the Institution for Social and Policy Studies) and colleagues, and that of 
Lars Osberg and others affiliated with the Centre for the Study of Living Standards (Osberg and 
Sharpe, 2014; Hacker et al., 2014; Osberg and Sharpe, 2011; Osberg and Sharpe, 2005; Osberg, 
1998), this first strand examines risk from a public policy perspective. Meanwhile, another strand 
has been shaped out of the works of Guy Standing (through his work with the International 
Labour Organisation) and related researchers focusing on work-related elements of economic 
security (Hacker et al., 2014; Bonnet et al., 2003; Standing, 2002).  
Elements from these literature streams have been combined to capture those aspects of economic 
security which are most pertinent to this study. These different strands have been integrated into 
a Worker Risk Indicators Table (Table 3.1) which draws out the relevant aspects of risk from 
these research streams. It also situates these different types of risk into the Risk Allocation 
Framework for testing in this thesis.  
Four risk areas will be explored. The first area denotes risks in wages. These reflect the extent 
that worker wages provided are sufficient to purchase life’s necessities, firm real wage 
guarantees, and the segmentation of wage risks to certain workers.  The second area denotes 
risks in retirement incomes. These reflect the level of resources to buffer risks in retirement, the 
minimum guarantees provided by firms and the state, and the segmentation of these risks to 
certain workers. The third area denotes risks in working time. These reflect the extent that 
workers have access to full-time work, minimum scheduling protections provided by firms, and 
how these risks are segmented certain of workers. The fourth and final area denotes risks in 
health care. These reflect the resources provided to buffer health care expenses, basic guarantees 
provided by firms and the state, and their segmentation to certain workers.   
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Table 3.1 – Risk Allocation Indicators Table 
Indicators of Risk Allocation 
Types of risk Generosity Individualisation Segmentation 
Wages  The level of wages provided 
to purchase life’s necessities 
The extent that real wage 
increases are guaranteed by 
firms 
The extent that wage risks are 
isolated to specific categories of 
workers 
Retirement 
incomes 
The level of resources 
provided to buffer income 
risks in retirement  
The extent that minimum 
retirement incomes are 
guaranteed by firms or the state 
The extent that risky retirement 
arrangements are isolated to 
specific categories of workers 
Working time  The extent that workers have 
access to full-time work 
The extent that minimum 
scheduling protections are 
guaranteed by firms 
The extent that risky working 
hour arrangements are isolated to 
specific categories of worker 
Health care The level of resources 
provided to buffer health care 
expenses   
The extent that basic health care 
is guaranteed by firms or the 
state 
The extent that risky health care 
arrangements are isolated to 
specific categories of workers. 
  
The purpose of these indicators is to provide an indication of the risk trends facing different 
cases observed later on the thesis. Negative movements across the areas in each dimension lead 
to high-risk scenarios (illustrated in Figure 3.1 and Table 3.2). Positive movements contribute to 
low-risk scenarios. However, it can be shown how a variety of outcomes may be possible, as a 
combination of negative and positive trends can contribute to medium risk outcomes. The 
broadness of this framework is of considerable importance, this conceptualisation of risks is 
useful to comparative research. The extent that risks are high or low is relative, and depends on 
the outcomes of the cases. What matters most is that these indicators provide the conceptual 
groundwork for categorising risk trends across cases. Now that this section has discussed how 
the independent variable (i.e. risk) will be measured across the cases, the next sections will 
explore hypotheses pertaining to various independent variables to explain risk outcomes.  
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Table 3.2 – Description of Risk Dimensions: The Case of Increased Risk 
Dimensions Definition  Examples of increased risk 
Declining 
generosity  
(Increasing 
generosity) 
A reduction in the level of 
private and public resources 
available to alleviate risks 
An Increase in the level of private and 
public resources available to alleviate 
risks 
Wage rate reductions, working hour reductions, lower 
employer benefit contributions 
 
Individualisation 
(Collectivisation) 
The extent that workers must 
bear responsibility for risk 
mitigation alone  
The extent that firms and states 
provide minimum guarantees to 
protect workers from adverse 
circumstances 
 
Abandonment of real wage increase commitments, weakened 
scheduling guarantees, shifts from collectivised insurance to 
savings accounts 
 
Segmentation 
(Integration) 
The extent that risks are 
confined to workers by social 
location or employment status  
The extent that risks are more equally 
spread across categories of workers 
Development of riskier terms of employment for part-timers, 
creation of non-union jobs or establishments, tiered wages 
and benefits discriminate against newer employees 
Figure 3.1: An Illustration of High-Low Risk Trends 
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3.1.2 Contextual IV #1: Marketisation 
As identified in the previous chapter, contextual factors may be of considerable importance to 
risk outcomes in collective bargaining. This and subsequent sections develop hypotheses relating 
to marketisation, organisational performance, firm financialisation, workplace fissuring, and 
market coordination so that these variables can be tested for their influence on risk outcomes in 
collective bargaining. 
Marketisation, otherwise known as the intensification of price competition (Greer and Doellgast, 
2017), was identified for its relevance to bargaining outcomes. This is addressed through the 
following hypothesis: 
H1.1 Risk outcomes are higher under intensified price competition 
This intensification of price competition was identified for how it constrains employers’ ability 
to cope with higher cost human resource practices and how it incentivizes union competition 
towards lower labour costs through collective bargaining. It is measured by the extent that low-
prices become of focal importance to competition, as opposed to other types of competition 
relating to product quality or service delivery. The greater the focus on low prices, the greater the 
likelihood that risk outcomes become high. 
 
3.1.3 Contextual IV #2: Organisational performance 
Considerable research suggests that there is a strong connection between performance and job 
quality (Batt and Hermans, 2012; Chirumbolo and Areni, 2010; Chirumbolo and Areni, 2005; 
Chirumbolo and Hellgren, 2003). More specifically, this research suggests that worker security is 
positively related to performance. It suggests that secure workers are more productive and 
provide superior customer service, and that the benefits of risky work practices do not outweigh 
the negative performance effects of such insecurity. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1.2: Risk outcomes are higher when organisational performance is weak 
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Table 3.3 – Organisational Performance Indicators Table 
Performance indicator Definition 
Financial performance  
Net operating profits Firm’s revenue minus the cost of goods sold and selling, general and administrative 
expenses. Taxes and interest are removed to reach this net figure 
Store Profit margins Ratio of net operating profit to sales by store 
Product market performance  
Market share Firm sales revenue in the product market divided by the total sales revenue 
available in that market 
Sales Firm revenue from goods sold. 
Sales growth Change in sales over the period, expressed as the difference between sales last 
period and those this period as a percentage of the sales last period 
Workforce-related 
performance 
 
Employee satisfaction Satisfaction with service quality, physical environment and management style 
Employee loyalty Expressed through rates of turnover and absenteeism 
Productivity and output quality Sales per square foot, mystery shopper results 
 
Sources: Richard, P. J., Devinney, T. M., Yip, G. S., & Johnson, G. (2009). Measuring organizational performance: 
Towards methodological best practice. Journal of management; Silvestro, R., & Cross, S. (2000). Applying the 
service profit chain in a retail environment: Challenging the “satisfaction mirror”. International Journal of Service 
Industry Management, 11(3), 244-268. 
This hypothesis presumes that bargaining outcomes that diminish worker security also diminish 
organisational performance. Subjective measures of performance will be examined. This choice 
is made for two reasons. First, it is actors’ views of organisational performance that inform their 
decision-making, not the empirical measure. This enables us to escape some of the biases 
associated with expectations (what is deemed strong performance for managers in one company 
may not be sufficient to satisfy those in another). Second, it enables the study to adapt the 
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measures of performance to reflect those aspects that matter most to a given company. For 
example, some companies might care more about sales while another may care more about 
profits.  
The work of Richard et al. (2009) is applied to establish what constitutes performance. It focuses 
on actors’ perceptions of financial (net operating profits, store profit margins), product market 
(market share, sales, sales growth), and workforce-related (employee satisfaction, employee 
loyalty, and product and output quality) aspects of performance (Table 3.3). The intent is to 
focus on a variety of performance related concerns to ensure that actors have the opportunity to 
discuss the performance concerns that matter for their organisations. 
 
3.1.4 Contextual IV #3: Firm financialisation 
As discussed in the previous chapter, organisational performance objectives cannot be separated 
from trends in financialisation. Financialisation is associated with a restructuring of firm 
objectives, privileging short-term shareholder returns over other types of performance. In 
addressing these trends, the following hypothesis will be tested: 
H1.3: Risk outcomes are higher when firm governance is financialised 
Firm financialisation denotes trends in which companies acquire increasing shares of their profits 
through financial means, rather than through a reliance on core production activities (Krippner, 
2005). This thesis measures two types of financialisation. First, it examines how risk outcomes 
differ between publicly owned entities and other types of corporate governance (private 
companies, cooperatives, and so forth). Second, it draws from the work of Appelbaum and Batt 
(2014) by examining the role that institutional investors play in corporate governance. 
Institutional investors are any entity that pools money together for investments (e.g. private 
equity firms), including managing portfolios of companies acquired for the sake of short-term 
gain (Foroohar, 2016). Drawing from these two aspects of financialisation, publicly owned 
entities and firms governed by institutional investors are expected to expose their workers to 
more risks. 
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3.1.5 Contextual IV #4: Workplace fissuring 
There is one last characteristic of organisational contexts that deserves attention. This is the 
extent of workplace fissuring, which refers to the extent that responsibility for employment has 
been “shed” from lead firms to franchises, subcontractors, and across supply-chains (Weil, 
2014). In other words, workplace fissuring occurs when the standard employment relationship 
between an employer and its employees has splintered, leading to a situation where multiple 
organisations (lead firms, franchises, subcontractors, and actors along the supply-chain) share 
authority over employment. This phenomenon leads to declining working conditions, as 
numerous actors across the value chain exert pressure on workers to maintain profitability. This 
being the case, one final hypothesis concerning the organisational context examines this variable: 
H1.4: Risk outcomes are higher when workplace governance is fissured 
Workplace fissuring will be examined to capture the possible importance of franchise, 
subcontracting, and supply-chain actors to risk outcomes. Higher worker security is expected 
when lead firms are unilaterally responsible for employee working conditions. Meanwhile, 
worker security is likely to suffer when lead firms shift this responsibility to franchises, 
subcontractors, and supply-chain actors while maintaining control over critical components of 
their business operations. 
 
3.1.6 Contextual IV #5: Market coordination 
The earlier discussion on institutional approaches suggested that forms of coordination may be of 
importance to risk. For this reason, this thesis examines one hypothesis related to institutions and 
their relationship with worker risk outcomes in collective bargaining. This hypothesis is the 
following: 
H1.5: Risk outcomes are lower in coordinated market economies 
The original varieties of capitalism model focused on five spheres of coordination, these being 
industrial relations, corporate governance, inter-firm relations, relationships with employees, and 
vocational skills and education (Hall and Soskice, 2001). However, relationships with employees 
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may be interpreted as more of a strategic choice, as Schneider and Paunescu have argued (2012). 
Thus, the other four spheres of coordination addressed in the original model will be examined. 
Hall and Gingerich (2009) have undertaken considerable work in operationalising the first two 
spheres and their composite elements. Coordination in industrial relations can be examined 
through three types of coordination. First, it can be assessed through the level of wage 
coordination. This refers to the levels of coordination, with national or sectoral coordination 
most epitomising coordinated economies, while firm wage coordination is more common in 
liberal market economies. The degree of wage coordination refers to the extent that wages are 
strategically coordinated by unions and employers. As this thesis focuses on economic security, 
it broadens coordination to include all aspects of working conditions relating to risk, not merely 
wages. A final form of coordination in industrial relations refers to labour turnover, an important 
indicator of labour market fluidity which assesses the proportion of employees within the 
economy that have held their jobs for less than one year. Thus, economies with high levels and 
degrees of coordination over working conditions, as well as low labour turnover, are said to 
coordinated. The reverse is true for liberal market economies. 
Coordination in corporate governance can also be measured through three indicators. First, 
shareholder power refers to the amount of power shareholders possess relative to firm managers 
or dominant shareholders. These are measured through “the availability of proxy voting, deposit 
requirements for shares, the election of directors, the legal recourse available to minority 
shareholders, shareholders’ rights to issues of new stock and the calling of shareholder meetings” 
(Hall and Gingerich, 2009: 455). Second, dispersion of control refers to the number of firms in 
the economy relative to the number of shareholders, expressed as the percentage of firms without 
controlling shareholders. Higher dispersion exists when few firms have controlling shareholders 
(possessing 10 percent or more in voting rights). Third, the size of the stock market refers to the 
“market valuation of equities on the stock exchanges of a nation as a percentage of its gross 
domestic product” (Hall and Gingerich, 2009: 455). Thus, environments in which dominant 
shareholders bear significant influence in the economy, with low dispersion, and in which stock 
markets are large are characteristic of coordinated market economies, while the reverse scenario 
characterises liberal market economies. Furthermore, while some of these elements were 
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discussed in the section on firm financialisation, the institutional aspects of corporate governance 
refer to broader financial trends throughout the economy, not merely how they relate to one firm. 
This thesis uses the original formulation of Hall and Soskice (2001) to define the other two forms 
of coordination. Vocational training and education is said to be coordinated when trade unions 
and employers’ associations share responsibility over the provision of training in efforts to meet 
specific industry needs. Meanwhile, it is market oriented when education systems are geared 
towards general skills training, and in which the social partners share little to no responsibility 
for coordination over training. Finally, inter-firm relations are coordinated when contract law and 
employment institutions facilitate exchanges aimed at resolving coordination problems between 
companies, particularly with respect to contracting and the transfer of technologies. Furthermore, 
these are market oriented when standard market relationships guide inter-firm interactions 
through enforceable formal contracts. Liberal markets also tend to incentivise competition 
through anti-trust legislation. Thus, this thesis will examine the hypothesis that coordination 
across these four spheres is positively related to risk outcomes.  
 
3.1.7 Contextual IV #6: Bargaining structure 
Bargaining structures are also important. In particular, the centralisation of bargaining structures 
is expected to be related to risk outcomes. This relationship is examined through the following 
hypothesis:  
H1.6: Risk outcomes are lower under centralised bargaining structures 
The concept of bargaining structure is not a simple one to define, as levels of centralisation differ 
across different subject areas (e.g. wages and work organisation) (Katz, 1993). Drawing from 
Hugh Clegg’s (1976) seminal work on collective bargaining, the extent, level, and scope 
dimensions of bargaining structures will be examined. The extent of bargaining refers to the 
proportion of employees covered by collective agreements. The level of bargaining refers to 
whether it is unions and employers’ associations at the district, regional, national or confederal 
levels who negotiate collective agreements, or whether this is relegated to worker 
representatives. The scope of bargaining refers to the number of elements covered under 
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collective agreements. Thus, more centralised structures are those in which bargaining coverage 
is high, negotiations centrally cover workers in multiple companies and establishments, and the 
scope covers many aspects of employment. It is heavily decentralised when coverage is low, 
negotiations cover a single firm or establishment, and the scope of working conditions is narrow. 
These represent purely centralised and decentralised forms of bargaining, as various gradations 
exist in between.  
 
3.1.8 Actor-oriented IV #1: Union power resources and strategic capabilities 
While an examination of contextual factors will facilitate delineation between the influence of 
contexts and bargaining strategies on risk, there is also a special space for actor attributes. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, Union power resources and strategic capabilities may be more influential 
to bargaining strategies than outcomes. Thus, more powerful and strategically competent unions 
may in fact be more capable of mitigating worker risk. This is examined through the following 
hypothesis: 
H2.1: Risk outcomes are lower when unions are strong and possess strategic capabilities 
The research carried out by Levesque and Murray analyses power resources and strategic 
capabilities which are relevant to risk outcomes in collective bargaining (Figures 3.1 and 3.2). 
The first key power resource is internal solidarity, which is maintained when bargaining units 
maintain cohesive internal identities, high deliberative vitality in decision-making, and 
significant member participation in union activities. The second power resource is network 
embeddedness, which is strong when a union has strong links to other unions and actors in the 
community. The third element of power resources are narrative resources, which are strong when 
“values, shared understandings, stories and ideologies that aggregate identities and interests and 
translate and inform motives” serve a pro-labour agenda (Levesque and Murray, 2010: 339).  
Finally, infrastructural resources are those materials, processes, policies and programmes that aid 
unions to achieve their goals. 
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Figure 3.1 - Union Power Resources  
 
Source: Lévesque, C., & Murray, G. (2010). Understanding union power: resources and capabilities for renewing 
union capacity. Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, 16(3), 339, 342. 
Figure 3.2 - Union Strategic Capabilities 
 
 
Source: Lévesque, C., & Murray, G. (2010). Understanding union power: resources and capabilities for renewing 
union capacity. Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, 16(3), 339, 342. 
 66 
 
Four strategic capabilities are necessary for making use of union power resources. The first 
strategic capability is intermediation, which refers to how unions foster collective action by 
activating their networks. The second is framing, which denotes unions’ capability of activating 
their networks by “defining a proactive and autonomous agenda” (Levesque and Murray, 2010: 
342). The third is articulating, which refers to arbitrating between different forms of action in 
different locations and temporal periods. Finally, learning is also critical, and refers to how 
unions learn and spread knowledge within their organisations to inform action (Levesque and 
Murray, 2010). These four power resources, as well as four strategic capabilities, will be 
examined to test whether they are in fact positively related to strong forms of risk mitigation in 
collective bargaining. 
 
3.1.9 Strategic variable #1: Union partnerships 
Being the core focus of this thesis, actors’ collective bargaining strategies will be investigated for 
how they shape worker security. The research assessed in the previous chapter suggested that job 
quality is most likely to be ameliorated when employers and unions adopt cooperative strategies. 
Thus, a significant body of research suggests that working conditions are positively related to 
union partnerships (Price et al., 2014; Geary, 2008; Gittell and Bamber, 2010; Bamber et al., 
2009; Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004; Oxenbridge and Brown, 2002; Haynes and Allen, 2001; 
Boxall and Haynes, 1997). This brings us to the hypothesis that union partnerships may also 
yield positive impacts for worker security, as the benefits of partnerships on job quality may be 
transferable to worker risk. This hypothesis is the following:  
H3.1: Risk outcomes are lower under labour-management partnerships 
Union partnerships represent one of two factors: 1) the existence of an informal cooperative 
relationship between company and union representatives; and 2) complementary employee 
participation mechanisms such as joint committees (Dobbins and Dundon, 2015; Wilkinson et 
al., 2014; Kochan et al., 2008). Partnerships are strategic because the adoption of cooperative 
positions by both sides is a pre-requisite to its maintenance. Adversarial bargaining ensues with 
the absence of cooperative posturing on both parts, leading to distributive bargaining tactics 
(Kochan et al., 2008; Walton et al., 2000). Of course, mixed outcomes are possible, as some 
 67 
 
union partnerships may be more successful than others. This being the case, this thesis examines 
whether greater degrees of cooperation lead to greater degrees of worker security.  
 
3.1.10 Strategic variable #2: Firm commitment strategy  
Research presented in the previous chapter suggested that job quality is positively related to firm 
commitment strategies adopted to motivate their employees. Greater degrees of commitment 
may thereby be positively related to risk. This is examined through the following hypothesis: 
H3.2: Risk outcomes are lower when firms adopt commitment strategies 
Through such a strategy, firms choose to motivate their employees through a combination of 
functional flexibility and high investments in training to obtain their commitment, aiming for 
higher productivity in the process (Bamber et al., 2009; Gittell and Bamber, 2010; Kalleberg, 
2003). It is the importance of job quality in maintaining the overall commitment of workforces 
that is integral to firm commitment strategies.  Furthermore, this feature of commitment 
strategies distinguishes them from compliance strategies which couple cost-cutting with coercive 
disciplinary measures (Walton, 1985).   
 
3.1.11 Strategic variable #3: Union mobilisation 
Union mobilisation strategies may also matter for risk. This seen as preferable to a servicing 
strategy in which the union acts as a simple service provider and focuses on relationship building 
to maintain working conditions.  This hypothesis is the following: 
H3.3: Risk outcomes are lower when unions adopt mobilisation strategies 
Union mobilisation strategies consist of engaging stakeholders both internally and externally to 
the bargaining unit (Grimshaw et al., 2014; Lévesque and Murray, 2013; Lévesque and Murray, 
2010; Palier and Thelen, 2010; Harvey, 2009; Lévesque and Murray, 2002; Boxall and Haynes, 
1997; Mahon, 1991). On the one hand, the union engages its members frequently to garner their 
support for potential resistance to managerial authority in the future. On the other hand, the 
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union also engages other unions and community members in an effort to coordinate over 
common goals.  
 
3.1.12 Strategic variable #4: Social policies 
There is an important space for state strategies and how they shape risk outcomes. While 
institutions are of critical importance, states can choose from a range of policy instruments to 
shape welfare state outcomes and bargaining relationships. Two hypotheses related to state 
strategies are of interest. The first relates to the role of social policies in mitigating worker risk. 
This is explored through the following hypothesis: 
H3.4: Risk outcomes are lower when states adopt social policies to mitigate risk 
Social policies have been described as those which are implemented by the state to satisfy 
citizens’ basic needs for human welfare, which some describe as social rights (Morel et al., 2012; 
King and Waldron, 1988; Marshall, 1950; Beveridge, 1942). They are any government policy 
that is introduced to meet a basic human need, such as pension policies or changes to 
employment insurance. Strong welfare enhancing social policies are generally perceived as 
positively related to the economic security of citizens and retrenchment leads to insecurity 
(Bonoli, 2012; Seeleib-Kaiser et al., 2012; Fudge, 2005; Powell and Barrientos, 2004; Esping-
Andersen, 1990). However, while the relationship with worker risk may appear obvious, there is 
a possibility that even perceptibly progressive social policies can result in negative impacts on 
risk. Should states fail at enforcement or should firms respond to social policies by shifting risks 
to other aspects of working lives, it is possible that progressive social policies may be associated 
with negative impacts on worker risk.  
 
3.1.13 Strategic variable #5: Labour regulation 
The previous chapter argued that state strategies which alter the employment relationship can 
improve or deteriorate working conditions. The following hypothesis tests the effects of labour 
regulation on risk: 
 69 
 
 H3.5: Risk outcomes are lower in the presence of interventionist pro-labour employment 
standards 
Labour regulations can threaten labour by restricting the right to collective bargaining and instill 
divisions and inequalities within the workforce. For example, this is the case with right-to-work 
legislation in the United States (Hogler, 2015). On the contrary, pro-labour regulations can 
protect and even enhance bargaining rights (McCrystal, 2014), such as laws which provide 
workers with greater opportunities to become represented by a union and negotiate collective 
agreements. The presence of pro-labour regulations that provide more rights to workers are 
expected to be positively associated with risks, since they enhance their ability to influence firm 
governance through employee voice mechanisms.  
 
3.1.14 Summary 
Given the overview of the key concepts and hypotheses presented above, three sets of 
hypotheses will be investigated to assess the impacts of contextual, actor-oriented, and strategic 
factors on worker risk (Table 3.4). These sets of hypotheses enable this study to explore not only 
the impacts of strategies, with particular attention on firm and union bargaining strategies, but 
facilitates delineation between the influence of strategies, contexts, and actor attributes on risk 
outcomes.  
While the variables under investigation were defined above, table 3.5 clarifies the 
operationalisation of these variables. It indicates the gradation that may be found when assessing 
the concepts against data from the field. Furthermore, there is a clear possibility that some 
independent variables may impact certain dimensions of risk (individualisation, generosity, and 
segmentation) but not others. Their impacts may also be differentiated across different risk areas 
(wages, retirement incomes, working time, and health care). Having operationalised the key 
concepts of this thesis, the second part of this chapter will outline the research design for testing 
these hypotheses through qualitative research. 
 
 
 70 
 
Table 3.4 – Summary of Hypotheses 
Hypotheses 
Contexts 
H1.1 Risk outcomes are higher under intensified price competition 
H1.2 Risk outcomes are higher when organisational performance is weak 
H1.3 Risk outcomes are higher when firm governance is financialised 
H1.4 Risk outcomes are higher when workplace governance is fissured 
H1.5 Risk outcomes are lower in coordinated market economies 
H1.6 Risk outcomes are lower under centralised bargaining structures 
Actor Attributes 
H2 Risk outcomes are lower when unions are strong and possess strategic capabilities 
Strategies 
H3.1 Risk outcomes are lower under labour-management partnerships 
H3.2 Risk outcomes are lower when firms adopt commitment strategies 
H3.3 Risk outcomes are lower when unions adopt mobilisation strategies 
H3.4 Risk outcomes are lower when states adopt social policies to mitigate risk 
H3.5 Risk outcomes are lower in the presence of interventionist pro-labour employment 
standards 
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Table 3.5 – Indicators: Dependent and Independent Variables 
Dependent Variable 
Dimensions of Risk Allocation 
Individualisation High, medium, low 
Generosity High, medium, low 
Segmentation High, medium, low 
Independent Variables 
Contextual Variables 
Intensified price 
competition 
High, medium, low 
Organisational 
Performance 
Strong, medium, weak 
Firm Financialisation High, medium, low 
Workplace Fissuring Lead firm versus fissured responsibility for employment 
Market Coordination High, medium, low 
Bargaining Centralisation High, medium, low 
Actor-Oriented Variables 
Union Power Strong, medium, weak 
Strategic Capabilities Strong, medium, weak 
Strategic Variables 
Firm and Union Labour 
Relations 
Partnership or adversarial 
 72 
 
Firm Employee Relations Commitment or compliance 
Union Mobilisation Servicing or solidarity 
Social Policy Welfare enhancing or retrenchment  
Labour Regulation Pro-labour or anti-labour 
 
3.2 Research design 
The hypotheses examined in this thesis will be tested through comparative contextualised case 
studies. As illustrated in the project description (Table 3.6), it will examine the influence of 
collective bargaining strategies across eight companies in Canada (Ontario and Quebec), 
Germany, Sweden, and the United States through semi-structured interviews. Thus, this thesis 
will compare numerous cases at the company level, while highlighting the importance of national 
(and sub-national) and sectoral contexts.  
Thus, this study embraces the case study as its methodology of choice. Drawing from the work 
of Wilbur Schramm (1971), Yin (2013) provides a standard definition of what constitutes a case 
study. It is described case studies in the following manner: 
The essence of a case study, the central tendency among all types of case study, is that it tries 
to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, 
and with what results. (Yin, 2013: 12). 
This definition is highly illustrative of what is sought from this research. Cases will be compared 
to examine how decisions in collective bargaining have positively or negatively affected worker 
risk in various contexts. It is important to note that the independent variables may differentially 
impact the three dimensions of risk. Thus, a contextualised case-study methodology is being 
adopted (Streb, 2010), in order to capture the nuances relating to the different independent 
variables and their relation to the different dimensions of risk. 
A major strength of this methodology is how it aims to produce practical knowledge in a manner 
consistent with both phronetic (Flyvbjerg, 2001) and reflexive (Burawoy, 1998) approaches to 
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social science. The research problem and methodology is informed by a stay with the European 
Trade Union Institute. Preliminary fieldwork with seventeen expert witnesses in unions, 
corporations, think tanks, and the European Union was conducted to flesh out the research 
problem, variable choice, and case selection. Thus, this qualitative multi-case comparison adopts 
a reflexive approach to field research, as it involves multiple close encounters with key actors in 
the field (Burawoy, 2003). It is a theoretically driven project that embraces the historical and 
embedded nature of the cases. While it may suffer from the problem of generalizability, it 
complements research on large populations by getting closer to the causal nature of social 
phenomena (Edwards and Belanger, 2008), thereby engaging in a deeper analysis than is 
possible in positive science which limits itself to “context effects” (Burawoy, 1998).  
Table 3.6 – Description of Research Project 
Description of Research Project 
Methodology Contextualised Case Studies (Comparative) 
Case selection 8 Supermarket chains (2 per country) in Canada (Ontario and Quebec), 
Germany, Sweden, and the United States 
Period under 
investigation 
1980-2016 
Data sources 97 semi-structured interviews (including preliminary interviews), 
official documents, and databases 
Types of respondents Firm representatives, union representatives, expert witnesses 
Sampling strategies Convenience and snowball sampling 
Data analysis technique First-level and pattern coding of interview data 
Analysis through meta-matrices and clustered summary tables 
 
Three levels of analysis on collective bargaining outcomes will be examined. The cases (i.e. 
companies) will be compared across national and subnational jurisdictions to account for 
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differences in institutions and actor strategies at the macro-level. Furthermore, the meso-level of 
analysis will be investigated through a focus on a single sector in order to hold certain market 
and technological factors constant. Finally, this study will investigate the micro-level 
characteristics of the firm. Thus, companies will be compared not only within jurisdictions, but 
across jurisdictions to highlight how strategies, contexts, and actor attributes affect risk. The 
following sections will describe this thesis’ case selection in more detail.  
 
3.2.1 National and subnational case comparisons: Comparing companies in Canada, 
Germany, Sweden, and the United States 
The main objective of making national comparisons is to isolate the impacts of macro-level 
institutions and actor strategies on risk allocation. This thesis adopts the diverse case method as 
its selection strategy in order to tease out possible causal relations between a variety of cases 
(Seawright and Gerring, 2008). In line with the theory on collective bargaining reviewed thus 
far, this thesis strategically selected cases that differ in terms of market coordination, while 
leaving open the possibility that these institutions may be connected to strategic differences 
across the cases. It compares two coordinated market economies with two liberal market 
economies. The examined cases will account for what Hall and Gingerich (2009) deem as the 
archetypal liberal-market economy (United States) and coordinated-market economy (Germany). 
Research has shown that liberal- and coordinated-market economies vary significantly, both in 
terms of the way that they deal with risk and of the role of union actors in risk alleviation 
(Soskice, 1999).  
Furthermore, this study will also account for forms of coalitional power. The case selection will 
also include Canada (LME) and Sweden (CME) to capture important differences in collective 
bargaining traditions. This is significant as worker solidarity is not explained through 
coordination typologies (iconic Germany versus United States). While being a liberal-market 
economy like its American counterpart, Canada’s higher and more stable union densities are 
linked to more effective union organisation and superior performance in collective bargaining 
(Rose and Chaison, 1996). The fact that Canadian labour unions were “incorporated as a class 
representative into a labour regime governed by a class idea”, rather than merely one of many 
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interest groups as in the United States, has had considerable impacts on the relative bargaining 
power and capacity of maintaining worker solidarity in its provinces (Eidlin, 2015: 200). The 
same is the case for Sweden, whose unique history has facilitated significant forms of solidarity, 
despite considerable international pressures (Mahon, 1991). This distinguishes Sweden from 
Germany. Like Sweden, Germany’s system of collective bargaining is highly coordinated, and 
has experienced some pressures towards decentralisation in recent years (Bosch, 2015; Haipeter 
and Lehndorff, 2014). However, the presence of greater coalitional power in Sweden makes a 
difference in collective bargaining, as recent research on income distribution will attest (Thelen, 
2014).  
This study will also conduct a within-case comparison to further examine the impacts of actor 
strategies and industrial relations institutions in subnational jurisdictions that evidence many 
institutional similarities. One such similarity is the welfare regime. Germany (Corporatist-
Statist), Sweden (Social Democratic), and the United States (Liberal) have developed 
considerably different welfare regimes which differ in terms of their generosity and the 
universality of programs (Esping-Andersen, 1990). While a federation, Canada’s provinces are 
also typical of liberal welfare regimes. Due to the role of the federal government in maintaining 
pan-Canadian programs, whose erosion or expansion has been linked to variations in federal 
commitment, the welfare regime characteristics of Canada’s provinces have been historically 
similar (Mahon, 2008). These regimes relate to collective bargaining in different ways, and differ 
significantly in terms of the public and private mix of social protection (Seeleib-Kaiser et al., 
2012; Powell and Barrientos, 2004).  
The Canadian federation, in which the actors and institutions of collective bargaining vary by 
province, makes for an excellent testing ground for the hypotheses examined in this thesis. In 
recognition of the political variation within Canada’s regions, this study will examine both 
Ontario and Quebec, the latter being a “hybrid” regime combining French civil law with North 
America’s labour relations model and which blends aspects of both liberal and coordinated 
market economies (Bélanger and Trudeau, 2009; Jalette et al., 2017). Ontario, on the other hand, 
is more typical of a liberal market economy. Furthermore, Quebec also differs from Ontario in 
terms of workplace regulation, as the former is more inclined towards state intervention, such as 
restricting two-tier compensation through provincial regulations (McNeil, 2013) and favouring 
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greater access to unionisation and the more effective use of the strike (Murray and Verge, 1999; 
Haddow and Klassen, 2006). 
 
3.2.2 Sectoral and company analysis: A review of collective bargaining in supermarket 
chains 
This study focuses on a single sector, acknowledging that industrial relations practices often vary 
more by sector than by country (Bechter et al., 2012). The retail sector makes for an excellent 
testing ground for the impacts of collective bargaining strategies on worker security. This is so 
for numerous reasons. First, the sector represents the epitome of worker insecurity. According to 
a recent ILO report (2015: 1), “no industry has experienced greater diversification in its waged 
employment over the last four decades than retail commerce, where different forms of atypical, 
non-standard employment practices have now attained standard status”. In addition, Standing 
(2011) recognised that retail workers were the largest segment of the swelling ranks of the 
“precariat”. Critically, the dominant strategy of large firms in this sector has been one of 
combining high performance with low wages and short working hours, contributing to declining 
job quality in many countries (Carré et al., 2010).  
Second, the technological and market conditions pressures facing this sector are uniform across 
many countries. These are the increased use of information technology in supply management, 
“optimal staff scheduling”, the spread of “aggressive discount chains” that fiercely compete with 
traditional retailers through the skillful use of logistical technologies, and that most countries are 
experiencing some form of liberalisation in this sector (Carré et al., 2010: 215). Because of these 
uniform pressures, coupled with the similar human resource needs of firms in this sector, the 
tasks performed by the bulk of retail workers, these being cashiers and stock clerks, are uniform 
across developed countries.  
Finally, there is the fact that despite these similarities, collective bargaining has proven relevant 
to the sector in all OECD countries. This is for two reasons. First, there is a union presence 
within the sector in all developed countries. Second, the divergent forms of collective bargaining 
across countries have proven relevant to working conditions in the sector. One study has 
demonstrated that while working conditions have deteriorated across most OECD countries, the 
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experiences of retail workers can vary across collective bargaining regimes, such as in the form 
of wages, labour turnover, working time, and unemployment within the sector (Carré et al., 
2010). In fact, a more recent study has suggested that collective bargaining has positively 
impacted job quality in Sweden’s retail sector, using indicators such as wages, working time, and 
employee benefits (Andersson et al., 2011). This research suggests that Sweden may be a global 
exception for retail work. Thus, given that the sector is notoriously insecure and structurally 
similar across developed nations; available evidence suggests that collective bargaining is highly 
relevant to the sector. However, whether and how it is relevant to economic insecurity has yet to 
be explored.  
Table 3.7 – Case Selection 
Case Selection 
Jurisdiction Supermarket Chain Business Model 
Germany DEU-1 Franchise and Corporate Owned 
DEU-2 Corporate Owned 
Canada CAN-1 Franchise, Independent Retailers, and 
Corporate Owned (Quebec) 
Corporate owned (Ontario) 
CAN-2 Corporate Owned (Quebec and 
Ontario) 
Sweden SWE-1 Independent Retailers 
SWE-2 Corporate owned (Cooperative) 
USA USA-1 Corporate Owned 
USA-2 Corporate Owned 
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This study narrows the focus by examining food retail, the largest segment of the retail sector. 
This involves investigating supermarket chains in particular. Supermarkets are traditional 
grocery stores in which customers purchase food and household products in a self-serve fashion, 
and which are smaller in scale than hypermarkets that are “very large-surface self-service stores, 
usually out of town, selling a wide range of both food and non-food goods” (Geppert et al. 2014: 
256). This thesis will thereby examine two major supermarket chains in each country (Germany, 
Canada, Sweden, and the United States), amounting to eight chains in total. The chains identified 
in Table 3.7 represent some of the most significant supermarket chains that have a union 
presence in the countries studied for this thesis. Furthermore, aside from the United States, the 
case selection facilitates a comparison of franchise, independent retailer1, and corporate owned 
establishments in each of the countries. This case selection was informed by preliminary 
interviews with seventeen expert witnesses through a research stay with the European Trade 
Union Institute and a related research project on employee benefits negotiations conducted with 
a researcher at Carleton University. Thus, this case selection was part of an iterative process with 
the field to ensure that the cases are treated holistically and are representative of the sector.  
Thus, this study will examine two large food retailers with a union presence in each country. In 
the case of Germany, this study will examine the experiences of DEU-1 and DEU-2, two of the 
country’s larger supermarket chains. DEU-1 operates corporate owned stores while DEU-2’s 
stores are a mix of corporate owned and franchise establishments. In Sweden, SWE-1 operates 
according to the independent retailer model, compared to SWE-2 which is a cooperative 
enterprise that operates corporate owned retail establishments directly. In the United States, this 
study will examine both USA-1 and USA-2, neither of which have establishments run by 
franchisees. Finally, this study will compare CAN-1 and CAN-2’s operations in Ontario and 
Quebec. CAN-1 operates a mix of franchises and corporate owned stores in Quebec, but only 
corporate owned stores in Ontario. Meanwhile. CAN-2 operates corporate owned stores in both 
provinces. The fact that CAN-2’s organisational structure is similar across the provinces is 
particularly useful, as it enables this study to isolate the impacts of strategies and institutions on a 
                                                          
1 Independent retailers are similar to franchise owners, in that they also license the right to use the chain’s brand 
for their stores. The main difference is that they share considerably more discretion in maintaining their product 
lines and in setting the HR policies of their stores. 
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retailer whose organisational characteristics are similar across different sub-national 
jurisdictions.   
 
3.2.3 Historical period under investigation 
The interactions between collective bargaining and risks from 1980 till 2016 are examined. This 
timeline enables this study to capture important dynamics. First, this period captures the decline 
of economic security (Osberg, 2009; Hacker, 2006), be it the withering of the golden age of 
social security (Pierson, 1998), or the failures of private actors to resist pressures to augment 
risks in various settings (Johnston et al., 2011; Schelkle, 2011). Second, this time period also 
covers an important period in which union membership and density has declined across most 
European and North American countries (Schnabel, 2013; Ebbinghaus, 2002). Coupled with 
tendencies towards bargaining decentralisation in OECD countries, this trend has fundamentally 
contributed to the weakening of collective bargaining in many circumstances (Ribeiro, 2016; 
Bosch, 2015; Haipeter and Lehndorff, 2014; Katz, 1993). Finally, this time period captures 
ideological change, as Keynesianism and other paradigms were eclipsed by the rise of neoliberal 
ideology. According to many, this viewpoint overemphasising individualism and economic 
rationalism has undermined actors’ capacity to achieve societal goals (Quiggin, 2012; Crouch, 
2011). Thus, this thesis aims to explore how collective bargaining actors have acted in light of 
these changes in recent decades. 
 
3.2.4 Data collection: Qualitative interviews and official documents 
The core data source will be qualitative interview data. One key reason for this is that there exists 
no comprehensive quantitative data source on collective bargaining strategies towards worker 
risk. Thus, qualitative interviews will be administered in order to extract information on what 
strategies, organisational and institutional contexts, and characteristics relating to actors are 
relevant to worker risk in the context of the retail sector in each country. This strategy is 
particularly critical as no research on collective bargaining in retail has been carried out for this 
purpose. This research strategy enables this project to tease out a range of possible explanations, 
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as most quantitative studies are restricted by their data sources, limiting the scope of possible 
explanations for the phenomena under investigation.  
This study combines the use of convenience and snowball sampling, two methodological 
strategies for identifying and interviewing key informants in the field (Salganik and Heckathorn, 
2004). The objective is to select key representatives through my research network who will 
recommend interviewees that possess critical knowledge pertaining to collective bargaining for 
each company, as well the sector. These sampling strategies enable this study to target 
respondents who are best positioned to speak on the topic of collective bargaining and risk in the 
retail sector of their respective countries 
This project draws on semi-structured interviews with respondents who were chosen to capture 
viewpoints from within and beyond the firm. 97 semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
managers, union representatives, and expert witnesses (think tank researchers, HR consultants, 
mediators) with insider knowledge of major chains in each country (Table 3.8). This includes 
special interviews (with older and retired workers) to capture a historical perspective. This also 
includes 17 preliminary interviews with researchers working with think tanks and academic 
research centres which were conducted for context. These were carried out with key academics 
and practitioners through a research placement with the European Trade Union Institute (2015) 
and related research on employee benefit negotiations conducted with professor Marc-André 
Gagnon at Carleton University (2012-2015). 
Table 3.8 – Interviews by country 
Country Canada Germany Sweden United States 
Worker 
representatives 
25 11 10 9 
Employer 
representatives 
11 6 4 1 
Expert witnesses  7 6 5 2 
Total 43 23 19 12 
 
These interviews were semi-structured. Semi-structured interviews represent a mid-point 
between structured and unstructured interviews. According to an influential paper on 
organisational research by Qu and Dumay (2011: 246), “the semi-structured interview involves 
prepared questioning guided by identified themes in a consistent and systematic manner 
interposed with probes designed to elicit more elaborate responses”. Generally, these types of 
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interviews use questioning under broad themes, and are flexible in terms of the order and content 
of interview discussions. Through this broad form of questioning, one can capture different 
aspects of reality relating to facts, meaning, as well as local contexts. Thus, the major strength of 
the semi-structured interview is that there are no boundaries in terms of the types of realities that 
may be uncovered through this methodology.  
This study relied on an in-depth interview topic guide to administer the interviews (Annex 1). A 
consent form was also prepared (Annex 2). In order to test the key hypotheses presented earlier, 
these semi-structured interviews were organised according to four themes: the evolution of risks 
since 1980; the impacts of collective bargaining strategies; the impacts of organisational and 
institutional contexts; and the impacts of actor-related characteristics. These themes contained 
questions, and often sub-questions, to tease out more elaborate responses from the interviewees. 
Furthermore, interview respondents were asked to provide information relating to the strategies 
of other actors in order to arrive at a more balanced understanding of each actor’s role in 
precipitating risk outcomes in collective bargaining. Interviewees were also provided with a 
consent form which outlined the project’s research objective and informed them of their rights in 
the research process.  
This data will be triangulated with other sources made available by the interviewees’ 
organisations and other relevant secondary sources. First, this data was complemented by an 
analysis of 20 collective agreements. Based on an informed analysis of the secondary literature 
(Hacker et al., 2014; Bonnet et al., 2003; Standing, 2002), provisions pertaining to wages, 
working hours, pensions, and health care were examined to identify trends in insecurity over 
time. This data was used to construct tables analyzing trends in risk from 1980 and 2016. This 
amounted eight agreements in the year 1980: a sectoral agreement in Germany, a sectoral 
agreement in Sweden, an industry agreement in New York City, one chain-level agreement in 
New England, two chain-level agreements in Quebec, and two chain-level agreements in 
Ontario. Twelve agreements were examined in the year 2016: a sectoral agreement in Germany, 
a sectoral agreement in Sweden, two chain-level agreements in New York City, one chain-level 
agreement in New England, five store-level agreements in Quebec, and two chain level 
agreements in Ontario. These agreements were chosen for their representativeness of trends in 
the chains examined for this research (as corroborated by company and union representatives in 
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the preliminary research). In Quebec, the agreements were used to analyze trends in bargaining 
units as opposed to chains, since these units survived transfers of ownerships across various 
companies during the time periods that were observed. Official documents (corporate, union, and 
government) and the secondary literature were also reviewed to validate observations drawn 
from the interviews and collective agreements. Second, other official documents (e.g. company 
reports) were examined. The overall aim was to identify how the influence of strategies, 
organisational performance, and institutions, as described in the interviews, matches up with the 
content of company and union records, as well as any other documentation highlighted by this 
study’s respondents, in other official sources, or in the secondary literature.  
 
3.2.5 Data analysis 
The interviews were recorded, transcribed and coded for analysis. The interviews were 
transcribed verbatim. This was followed by two types of coding. The first type was first-level 
coding, which involved converting the longer verbatim transcriptions into brief summaries 
focused on the core elements of the interviews. Thus, the information was condensed into a more 
succinct and readable format for preliminary analysis. This facilitated “pattern coding”. Pattern 
coding entails “grouping those summaries into a smaller number of sets, themes, or constructs” 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994: 69). This enabled the bulk of the interview data to be organised into 
groupings around analytical themes that relate to the core hypotheses tested in this thesis. 
This data was then organised into various types of matrices and tables for analysis. The analysis 
began with the construction of meta-matrices, which are “master charts assembling descriptive 
data from each of several cases in a standard format” (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 135). These 
charts enabled the study to organise the data by case, in order to understand the key experiences 
of each case with respect to the dynamics of risk and collective bargaining. After identifying 
specific themes pertaining to each case, the study conducted further analysis through clustering 
in order to capture cross-cutting themes across the companies and jurisdictions. This was 
achieved through Clustered Summary Tables, in which the data was clustered according to 
themes rather than by case, to understand the commonalities and divergences across the cases. 
These matrices and tables were used to convey the core results of this study, and the extent that 
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they lead to the validation, rejection, or refinement of the key hypotheses presented in this 
project.  
 
3.2.6 Ethics 
The data gathered for this project also feeds into the Interuniversity Research Centre on 
Globalization and Work’s (CRIMT) “Restructuring Social Norms in Globalized Workplaces: 
Asymmetric Integration, Institutions and Actors in Multinational Companies” project. Gregor 
Murray (CRIMT’s Director) and Christian Lévesque (CRIMT’s Co-Director) are the principal 
investigators for this project which was financed by the Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council (SSHRC). Given the thesis’ integration into this larger research project, it also 
falls under the ethics certificate that was approved for this project in the September of 2008. This 
project therefore conforms to the requirements for maintaining the confidentiality of research 
participants, the right to refuse participation, and to providing research participants with control 
over their contribution to the research process, as committed to in the certificate.  
 
3.2.7 Limitations of this study 
It is important to recognise that there are two types of limitations to this study; validity and 
generalizability. As regards validity, a major limitation of this study is its use of qualitative 
interviews to assess bargaining trends over several decades. This is a challenge for three reasons. 
First, it will be difficult to find respondents that are knowledgeable of these trends over such a 
long period. Second, there is the fact many respondents may find it difficult to track the various 
aspects of economic security since 1980. This is why triangulation is so important. By 
complimenting the interview data with company and union records, and secondary sources in the 
scientific and commercial literature, this study will use these records to fill the gaps in 
interviewers’ accounts of how risks and bargaining trends have evolved over recent decades. 
Third, strategy can be a sensitive topic for practitioners in the field. Thus, this study recognises 
that even interviews can fail to capture important aspects of collective bargaining that 
interviewers may be hesitant to reveal through their discussions. For example, interviewees may 
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hide the content of actor strategies that may pertain to trade secrets or may conflict with an 
organisation’s public relations strategy. However, this why a critical analysis of the data and 
constant interaction with actors in the field to develop practical knowledge, a technique 
borrowed from phronetic social science (Flyvbjerg, 2001), is integral to the research process. 
Thus, specific probing questions will be posed and responses will be cross-verified across 
different categories of interviews to facilitate a deep comprehension of the issues under 
examination. 
In terms of the possibility of generalisation (Payne and Williams, 2005), the interview method 
will limit the observations to a select group of respondents, whose views may not reflect those of 
peers in their organisations. There is also an issue as to the representativeness of the companies 
under study, as their experiences may not be representative of other companies in their 
jurisdiction. In addition, there is the question of how cases in this particular industry can inform 
our understanding of the relationship between collective bargaining and risk in workplaces more 
broadly. While these problems are not unique to this qualitative study, it was an important 
consideration for the sampling strategy which involves selecting respondents who are most 
knowledgeable of their sector and companies. The case selection process was rigorous and 
informed through multiple preliminary interviews with key practitioners and expert witnesses in 
the field (through the ETUI’s professional network in particular), as well as considerable 
research reviewing industry documentation and other secondary sources. This comparative case 
study, like all comparative case-studies, are needed to complement large N studies as they 
provide critical information on both contexts and in developing a sophisticated understanding of 
critical causal mechanisms of relevance to social science research (Edwards and Belanger, 2008; 
Flyvbjerg, 2006). Thus, this study aims to make an important contribution by capturing key 
contextual elements that are not present in large N studies. 
 
3.3 Summary and thesis articles 
This study employs a comparative contextualised case-study methodology to study how actor 
strategies, contexts, and actor-attributes impact worker risk. With a focus on food retail, this 
study uses semi-structured interviews, coupled with official documents and various 
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organisations’ databases, to qualitatively assess how collective bargaining has impacted this 
industry’s workers in Canada, Germany, Sweden, and the United States from 1980 to 2016. The 
objective is to describe trends in risk over time and across cases, and to explain those trends.  
The hypotheses flowing from the thesis framework are examined in three articles. The first 
article examines multi-dimensional risk trends in food retail across each country, exploring how 
bargaining structures (H1.6), social policies (H3.4), and employment standards (H3.5) affect 
insecurity. The second article examines how labour-management partnerships (H3.1) affect risk 
in different bargaining structures (H1.6). This is achieved by comparing two Canadian 
supermarkets with two Swedish supermarkets. While bargaining structures and labour-
management partnerships are most prominently investigated, this piece also provides insights on 
the effects of organisational performance (H1.2) and employment standards (H3.5). The third 
article examines how contextual factors (price competition [H1.1], organisational performance 
[H1.2], financialisation [H1.3], workplace fissuring [H1.4], market coordination [H1.5], and 
bargaining structures [H1.6]), actor attributes (union power and strategic capabilities [H2]), and 
actor strategies (labour-management partnerships [H3.1], firm commitment strategies [H3.2], 
union mobilisation strategies [H3.3], and employment standards [H3.5])  affect insecurity in all 
eight supermarket chains examined in this thesis. The aim is to delineate the relative influence of 
each set of factors and how they interact to risk outcomes in each case.  
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Chapter 4 
Rethinking Risk and its Evolution: A Four-Country Study of Work in Food Retail 
(Article 1) 
Abstract: 
This article seeks to chart the evolution of worker risk in different industrialised economies. It 
engages the welfare regime, risk shift, and segmentation literatures, proposing that each 
theoretical stream represents an important dimension of risk. A framework incorporating these 
dimensions is developed and applied to case-study evidence from supermarket chains in four 
countries. While supermarkets in all four countries have experienced increases in risk, the form 
and degree of these increases differ markedly in each setting. The argument is that risk research 
fails to capture its multidimensional nature, leading to the neglect of its variegated sources and 
outcomes.  
 
Scholars are demonstrating considerable interest in worker risk. Research suggests that workers 
now count on less to survive while uncertain out-of-pocket expenses (e.g. health care) are 
threatening many with poverty (Osberg and Sharpe, 2014; Häusermann et al., 2015; Hacker, 
2006). Worker precariousness is on the rise, undermining the stability of the traditional 
employment relationship and its associated benefits for workers (Standing, 2011; Kalleberg, 
2009). The ubiquity of risk has led to widespread theorisation on the subject. Researchers have 
aimed to bring to light what exactly is happening to workers and how we can act to remedy the 
situation. But are current characterisations of risk adequate for understanding its sources and 
effects on workers? 
This article seeks to chart the evolution of risks in different industrialised economies. In doing 
so, it identifies three key approaches in the literature. First, welfare regime research examines the 
generosity of public and private sources of risk alleviation and their outcomes for workers and 
citizens (Seeleib-Kaiser, 2008; Klein, 2003; Esping-Andersen, 1990). Second, the risk 
individualisation literature examines who bears responsibility for risk alleviation, emphasising 
shifts in its management from firms and states onto individuals (Hacker, 2006; Cobb, 2015; 
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Beck, 2000). Finally, the segmentation literature examines how the exclusive nature of internal 
labour markets isolates bad risks to specific categories of workers (Doeringer and Piore, 1971; 
Cranford et al., 2006; Osterman, 1987; Osterman and Burton, 2005; Crouch, 2015).  Each stream 
treats important aspects of risk in isolation, yet there is a need to bridge these literatures in 
assessing how risks change over time.  
This article argues that the generosity, individualisation, and segmentation literatures each 
address different dimensions of risk. It develops a Risk Allocation Framework, seeking to 
explore how risks move and interact across these dimensions. The purpose of this article is not to 
explain what drives risks across these dimensions, but rather to provide a more fine-grained 
understanding of how risk evolves through time and place. This framework is applied to explore 
risk trends in low-wage work, drawing from qualitative research of food retail work in Canada, 
Germany, Sweden, and the United States. 
The article is structured as follows: first, a theoretical overview of the dimensions of generosity, 
individualisation, and segmentation; second, the application of the framework to risk trends 
facing supermarket workers in four countries; third, an analysis of the framework’s contribution 
to our understanding of these trends; and, finally, an overview of the findings and their 
implications. 
 
4.1 The risk allocation framework 
At its most basic level, risk refers to workers’ vulnerability to economic uncertainty (e.g. Hacker 
et al., 2014; Western et al., 2012; Bossert and D'ambrosio, 2013; Hacker, 2006). The main threat 
facing workers is variability. This pertains to variability in wages and benefits, but also in the 
whole gamut of social arrangements that provide workers with some form of safety net in 
adverse circumstances (Osberg and Sharpe, 2011; Hacker, 2006).  Workers are highly exposed to 
risk when the chances of incurring economic loss and the extent of that loss are high. However, 
the reverse is true when both are low.   
The premise of the risk allocation framework developed below is that a focus on variability alone 
is insufficient. Rather, it is essential to identify different dimensions of risk. Three such 
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dimensions are presented in Table 4.1. The first dimension, informed by the welfare regime 
literature, explores the generosity of resources that alleviate worker risk. Second, drawing from 
the “risk shift” literature (Hacker, 2006; Beck, 2000), individualisation reflects the extent that the 
costs incurred from risks are born by the individual, as opposed to firms or the state. Finally, 
borrowing from the work on internal and external labour markets, segmentation reflects the 
extent that poor risk experiences are isolated specific categories of workers. Each of these 
dimensions is elaborated in the following sections.  
Table 4.1 – Definitions of Risk Dimensions 
Dimension Definition 
Generosity  The level of private and public resources available to alleviate risks 
Individualisation  The extent that the costs incurred from risks are born by the individual, as 
opposed to firms or the state 
Segmentation The extent that workers’ risk experiences are differentiated by employment 
status and social location 
 
4.1.1 Generosity 
Generosity addresses the resources provided by private and public sources to alleviate risks. In 
his landmark book, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990) 
examined the capacities of different welfare regimes for de-commodification, an indication of 
their generosity in providing individuals with resources to cope with risks inherent in the market. 
The more generous the welfare provisions of public and private actors, the greater is the regime’s 
capacity for mitigating undesired risks. This work sparked an interest in the private and public 
welfare mix, creating a point of departure for further research on the importance of both state-
provided and occupational forms of welfare for shielding citizens and workers from uncertainty 
(Seeleib-Kaiser et al., 2012; Powell and Barrientos, 2004).  
Drawing on public and private sources of risk mitigation, the dimension of generosity captures 
this risk dynamic. This concept refers to the resources workers receive to cushion themselves 
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from financial hardship. It presumes a context where the “dividing line” of public and private 
spaces for risk mitigation is contested by social actors (Seeleib-Kaiser, 2008; Klein, 2003). 
While the welfare state literature focusses on more conventional forms of social protection 
(Burchardt and Obolenskaya, 2016; Seeleib-Kaiser, 2008; Klein, 2003; Hacker, 2002), such as 
public and private benefits, the concept of generosity described for this framework focusses on 
all resources guaranteed to individual workers by their employers and the state. This can refer to 
salaries, working hours, retirement incomes, health care benefits, and others identified for their 
relevance to risk (Bonnet et al., 2003). Linking this broader set of resources to risk is not 
unusual, and can be found in many literatures that link commodification and de-commodification 
to the entire gamut of resources and social rights that affect them. For example, the citizenship 
literature has long recognised how both employment and the state figure in risk mitigation 
(Fudge, 2005; Arthurs, 1967; Marshall, 1950).  
 
4.1.2 Individualisation 
While the generosity of private and public resources matters for risk, so too does the pooling of 
risk amongst workers, citizens, and owners of capital. Research has cast light on how forms of 
risk sharing once spearheaded by private companies and governments have eroded, resulting in 
the devolution of responsibility for risks onto individuals (Hacker, 2006; Beck, 2000). 
Collectivised risks bear two key features. First, risks are collectivised when entities, typically 
firms or the state, cope with uncertainty rather than individuals. Second, in coping with this 
uncertainty, these entities provide workers with a guarantee. For instance, should there be a 
downturn in the economy or company profits, the firm or the state is nonetheless bound to 
providing workers with a minimum contribution to shield them from hardship. Higher guarantees 
lead to lower risks for workers. When these guarantees erode, risks are individualised, leaving 
workers and citizens alone in dealing with the consequences.  
Collective bargaining matters to risk individualisation. Some examples illustrate trends in this 
dimension. It can be illustrated through the rise of concession bargaining (MacDonald, 2014) and 
escalator clauses (Cousineau et al., 1983), both of which erode guarantees in wages and other 
conditions, leaving workers to cope with costs of market uncertainty that were previously 
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absorbed by corporations. Working hour stability has also been threatened by individualisation, 
as companies seek more flexible scheduling arrangements in adjusting to supplier flows and 
consumer demands (Lambert et al., 2012). Finally, in the American context, traditional 
guarantees for most of the costs associated with health and pension benefits have steadily eroded, 
only to be replaced by savings accounts or abdicated altogether (Hacker, 2006; Cobb, 2015). 
While these benefit arrangements may provide more cost certainty to private companies, they 
produce future instabilities that can lead to high debts and bankruptcies for many workers.  
The state has also contributed to individualisation. The core trend is towards welfare state 
retrenchment, or what some call welfare state restructuring. Governments have faced immense 
pressures to recalibrate or even privatise critical component of their welfare states, in hopes that 
unions, employers, and individual workers fill the gaps (Johnston et al., 2011; Schelkle, 2011). 
Retrenchment has contributed to the growth of private debt which has supplanted public debt as 
the core driver of economic demand (Crouch, 2009), leading to devastating consequences for 
citizens and workers.  With the state playing a weaker role in the provision of social protection, 
workers and citizens are facing unprecedented levels of debt and bankruptcies relating to poor 
wages, illness, and retirement (Hacker, 2006; Porter, 2012; Himmelstein et al., 2009). 
 
4.1.3 Segmentation 
The segmentation of risks addresses how forms of generosity and individualisation differ across 
categories of workers, whose employment status or social location provide few possibilities for 
cross-over. It draws inspiration from the dual labour market hypothesis, which posits the 
existence of a privileged “internal labour market” and a “secondary labour market” comprised of 
the economically disadvantaged (Doeringer and Piore, 1971). However, contemporary 
segmentation debates have surpassed the simplicities of the initial internal/external dichotomy, 
by drawing attention to other forms of differentiation within firms or across social location, such 
as gender, race, or age. 
Segmentation addresses how rules generated from within and outside of firms create barriers to 
better working conditions for certain categories of workers. Within the firm, these include 
official company policies - as well as norms and customs - that regulate recruitment (limiting 
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“ports of entry”) and promotions, pay scales, allocate training, and basic forms of basic job 
security (Osterman and Burton, 2005; Osterman, 1987; Osterman, 1982; Althauser and 
Kalleberg, 1981). The rules tend to be beneficial for those in standard work arrangements 
Kalleberg, 2003), but also cause discrimination. For example, research finds that women often 
possess “differentiated access to organisational power”, as firms dominated by male managers 
tend to reinforce norms and customs that lead lower wage outcomes for women (Hultin, M., & 
Szulkin, R., 1999; Peetz, 2015; Cranford et al., 2006).  
Despite the importance of within-firm segmentation, the importance of external rules such as 
regulation remains. For instance, some French and German low-wage employers abuse exit 
options in old state regulations to hire and exploit atypical workers outside of core firm 
structures (Jaehrling and Méhaut, 2013; Doellgast, 2012). Furthermore, evidence from Canada 
and the United States demonstrates how two-tiered wage and benefit arrangements in collective 
agreements inherently discriminate against younger workers (MacNeil, 2013). External rules 
may diminish segmentation, as research suggests that universal employment standards, 
comprehensive welfare, and improved access to union structures diminishes differentiation 
(Häusermann and Schwander, 2012). 
 
4.1.4 The risk allocation framework: An integrative approach 
The risk allocation framework addresses how risk trajectories along different dimensions impact 
workers. This is illustrated in Figure 4.1. The key contribution of this perspective is not in its 
elaboration of these dimensions, as each has been adequately treated in their respective literature 
streams. Rather, it provides for a more integrated approach to understanding how risks evolve. 
First, it posits that all three dimensions are needed to understand the nature and evolution of risk. 
These dimensions may move in the same direction, leading workers uniformly towards greater or 
less insecurity. However, risk movements may also be contradictory, leading to different risk 
combinations for diverse types of workers. Thus, risk trends can be both multi-dimensional and 
multi-directional. The implications of the argument, as will be explored below, is that such an 
approach offers greater analytical sensitivity to diverse labour market trends than one-
dimensional models, such as the “risk shift” literature (Hacker, 2006). 
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Figure 4.1 – Risk Allocation Diagram 
 
Second, these dimensions are interconnected. That is, changes in one dimension affect changes 
in the others. For example, an increase in generosity would be paired with a rise in segmentation, 
if only privileged workers (e.g. union members) were affected. On the contrary, increases in 
generosity to marginalised workers, such as a rise in the minimum wage, would lead to more 
integrated risk outcomes. These interconnections should not distract from the fact that these three 
dimensions are distinct. They refer to very different features of the risks with which workers 
must contend: changes in resource generosity; changes in the individualisation of risk burdens; 
and changes in how risks are segmented across categories of workers. 
 
4.2 Research design and methodology 
The research design is a multi-case comparison of supermarket chains in four countries. Risk 
trajectories in supermarket chains were mapped across two coordinated economies (Germany 
and Sweden) and two liberal market economies (Canada and the United States). More 
specifically, the cases were chosen because they exhibit different levels of bargaining coverage 
 93 
 
and centralisation (see Table 4.2). Given that bargaining coverage and coordination relate to 
variations in working conditions cross-nationally (Carré et al., 2010; Doellgast and Benassi, 
2014; Doellgast et al., 2009), the presumption is that this diversity would also make for an 
interesting comparison of risks. It was also chosen because North American labour regulations 
impacting retail tend to be more flexible than those in European countries (Carré et al., 2010). 
Moreover, since Canada is a federation whose subnational governments hold principal 
responsibility for social policy and labour regulation, the experiences of supermarkets in these 
subnational jurisdictions were isolated. Within Canada, Quebec and Ontario are compared 
because their supermarkets operate under similar labour relations and welfare state models, but 
food retail in Quebec has decentralised.  
The primary focus is on unionised chains, due to their relevance in the sector and the possibility 
of taking the role of collective bargaining for the different dimensions of risk into account. 
However, the experiences of non-union chains are also addressed as they are relevant both to 
trends in segmentation and in collective bargaining.  
Table 4.2 – Bargaining Coverage and Centralisation by Case* 
 United States Canada Germany Sweden 
 NYC ON QC NRW  
Bargaining Coverage*      
2015 30% 50% 80% 30% 95% 
1980 80% 80% 90% 100% 95% 
Bargaining Coordination      
2015 Chain-wide Chain-wide Store-based Sectoral Sectoral 
1980 Multi-
employer 
Chain-wide Chain-wide Sectoral Sectoral 
 
Sources: Bargaining coverage is based on estimates provided by the major union in each country. Centralisation was 
confirmed through interviews and an analysis of the collective agreements.  
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Food retail was chosen because it represents the epitome of worker insecurity. An ILO (2015: 1) 
report indicates that “no industry has experienced greater diversification in its waged 
employment over the last four decades than retail commerce, where different forms of atypical, 
non-standard employment practices have now attained standard status”. Standing (2011) has 
shown that retail workers writ large are the largest segment of the growing “precariat”. 
Meanwhile, a growing body of research also suggests that job quality in food retail varies 
considerably across, and even within, countries (Carré and Tilly, 2017; Carré et al., 2010; 
Coulter, 2014). While this sector is notorious for spreading poor working conditions across large 
segments of workers, it is also a sector that has been subject to much experimentation across 
national and sub-national boundaries. 
In terms of data collection, 97 semi-structured interviews2 were conducted with managers, union 
representatives, and expert witnesses with insider knowledge of major chains in each country. 
This includes special interviews (with older and retired workers) to capture a historical 
perspective. This also includes 17 preliminary interviews with researchers working with think 
tanks and academic research centres which were conducted for context. This data was 
complemented by an analysis of 20 collective agreements, official documents (corporate, union, 
and government), and the secondary literature. Trends from 1980 to 2016 were analysed. Based 
on an informed analysis of the secondary literature (Hacker et al., 2014; Bonnet et al., 2003; 
Standing, 2002), the empirical analysis focuses on trends in wages, working hours, pensions, and 
health care. Unless indicated otherwise, all working hour and compensation figures are derived 
from union estimates in the four countries and an analysis of the collective agreements.  
 
4.3 Research Findings 
Table 4.3 presents an overview of the main risk trends facing food retail workers in the four 
countries investigated. These trends refer to the three dimensions of the risk allocation 
framework mobilised in this analysis, including trends in wages, working hours, pensions, and 
health care from 1980 to 2016. As emerges from the analysis below, there were clear cross-
                                                          
2 In compliance with research norms for ethics, all interviewees and their organisations will remain anonymous. 
Interviewees had the right to refuse participation in any aspect of the research process 
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country differences in risk trends along the three dimensions, even though all workers were from 
the same sector. Moreover, and notably as regards segmentation, there was also significant 
variation within cases. Each of the national cases is explored in further detail below, beginning 
with the liberal market economies (Unites States and Canada) and then proceeding with the 
coordinated market economies (Germany and Sweden).  
Table 4.3 – Description of Main Trends (1980-2016) 
Country Levels of Generosity Forms of Individualisation Types of Segmentation 
United 
States 
• No real wage increases 
• Increase in part-time work3, 
offset by minimum hour 
guarantees  
• Lower private pension and 
health care contributions 
• Fair wage guarantees 
• Higher scheduling variability, 
despite minimum hour 
guarantees 
• Shifts towards contributory 
private pensions 
• Shifts towards health savings 
accounts and annual health 
benefits  
• Collective agreements 
discriminate against part-
timers and youth 
• Non-union workers 
experience inferior working 
conditions 
Canada • Real wage decline 
• Increase in part-time work 
• Lower private pensions 
contributions and 
supplemental health 
benefits, offset by 
resilience of universal 
public retirement and health 
benefits 
• Fair wage guarantees and 
further collectivisation through 
spread of minimum wage plus 
clauses (Ontario only) 
• Higher scheduling variability 
• Minor shift towards 
contributory private pensions, 
offset by universal public 
retirement benefits 
• Higher co-pays and 
deductibles in supp. health 
benefits 
• Collective agreements 
discriminate against part-
timers and younger workers 
in Ontario, but not Quebec 
• Non-union workers 
experience inferior working 
conditions 
Germany • Real wage increases (for 
those under CAs), linked to 
higher pay supplements for 
unsocial hours  
• Increase in part-time work 
• Lower public pension 
contributions 
• Higher employee health 
care contributions 
• Real wage increases 
guaranteed through sectoral 
agreements, but risk of non-
compliance with CA grows 
• Low scheduling variability in 
firms with strong works-
councils 
• Higher variability in employee 
health care contributions 
• Youth workers receive lower 
wages through the 
apprenticeship system 
• Workers outside of 
collective bargaining 
experience inferior working 
conditions 
 
Sweden • Real wage increases, linked 
to higher pay supplements 
for unsocial hours 
• Rise of part-time work 
• Lower public pension 
contributions 
• Stable minimum public 
retirement and health 
benefits 
• Stable real wage increases 
guaranteed through sectoral 
agreements  
• Low scheduling variabilities 
due to CAs 
• Stable public universal 
retirement and health benefits 
• Youth receive lower wage, 
but are not segmented 
• Collective agreements do 
not discriminate against 
part-timers 
• All major chains have 
signed CAs 
                                                          
3 Defined as workers working typically less than 30 hours per week. 
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4.3.1 United States 
American supermarket workers have been negatively impacted by risk movements in each 
dimension. So much so that their exposure to risks is more elevated than in the other countries. 
In the 1980s, these supermarkets operated like cartels (Lichtenstein, 2009), able to control 
competition and guarantee gainsharing with employees in the process. The most powerful voices 
in bargaining units were those in more skilled professions, such as bakers and butchers, who 
could expect full-time hours, stable real wage increases, and generous health and pension 
benefits. However, less skilled workers (e.g. clerks) also did reasonably well.  
In recent years, instability is the fundamental characteristic of work in the industry.  Generosity 
is in decline. Working hours have rendered most workers precarious. On average, 80% of 
unionised supermarket workers were part-time in 2016, while the reverse was true in the 1980s. 
Wage stagnation in unionised chains translates low hours into poverty-level incomes for most 
workers. Unionised chains make lower investments in health and pensions, especially for part-
timers and new hires. For example, one agreement provides workers hired after 2013 with one-
third of the health benefits received by those workers hired before 2010, and even this is not 
sufficient to meet basic health needs. Combined with weak welfare state protections, these 
workers have altogether fewer resources to buffer against adversity than decades ago. 
The individualised nature of risk-sharing arrangements facing American food retail workers is 
severe. This is particularly true for the mass of part-time workers. These workers are typically 
scheduled only days in advance, and have few controls over their schedules in the long term. 
Moreover, defined benefit (DB) pension arrangements have been supplanted with uncertain 401k 
plans. As one union representative illustrates, “many pension funds have not recovered from the 
recession/depression that we had in 2008-2009. I know for a fact we lost over 25% of our assets, 
which was a tremendous hit [on] our pension fund”. Due to store closings, fewer companies are 
participating in joint-employer benefit arrangements. This creates a disequilibrium between the 
ratio of retirees and incoming funding which threatens the long-term viability of these plans. 
Health savings-account contributions or annual benefits to protect part-timers continue to replace 
traditional insurance, reflecting a national trend across industries (Hacker, 2006). Some counter 
trends are notable, such as the working-hour guarantees of 15 to 21 hours for part-time workers, 
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forcing employers to bear risks for the asymmetries between customer traffic and employee 
schedules, but they fail to compensate for the large-scale individualisation of risks in most areas.  
Segmentation is also ensconced in American supermarkets. Due to competitive pressures, risks 
have been passed on to some groups in the industry. As illustrated above, part-timers are most 
effected by declining generosity and individualisation. Collective agreements in the industry 
typically include clauses that provide newer hires (who are typically younger) with riskier social 
arrangements. This includes lower hourly rates (including weekends and holidays), reduced sick 
and holiday leave, and inferior scheduling guarantees. One local union president describes most 
workers as “career part-timers”. Like in most countries, there are few full-time positions 
available and due to specificities in hiring requirements, existing part-timers cannot expect to 
secure full-time employment in the foreseeable future. They must thereby choose between 
accepting hectic scheduling and lower compensation, or leaving the company altogether. Finally, 
non-unionised workers are most exposed to risks. Research estimates indicate that each Wal-
Mart worker replaces 1.4 retail workers in the market, and has a significant negative impact on 
overall payroll rates (Neumark et al., 2008). Considering that union coverage in United States 
food retail is approximately 20% of the workforce in this industry (as compared to 70% in 1980), 
the majority of workers do not benefit from most risk-sharing arrangements offered by unionised 
chains. 
 
4.3.2 Canada 
Canadian food retailers experienced similar risk trajectories as in the United States. Like the 
United States, the decline of the cartel-like model and the entry of non-union competition in 
Canada also exposed supermarket workers to negative risk trends across each dimension. 
However, these trends are limited by the presence of resilient public programs designed to 
protect workers from risks in old age and illness. 
Negative trends in generosity are troubling. The growth of part-time work has been comparable 
to that of the United States (80% in 2016, compared to 20% in 1980). This trend is exacerbated 
by plummeting real wages. Supermarket workers in Ontario and Quebec generally earned 50% to 
80% of their 1980 real earnings in 2016. Since universal public pensions and most private 
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pension plans in Canada are contributory, lower current incomes provide for less generous 
incomes in retirement. Furthermore, the main private pension plan in the industry has shifted 
towards greater employee contributions, while employer contributions have not kept pace with 
inflation. One former executive describes this as “another thing that has hurt unions and has hurt 
companies. Some of these multi-employer pension plans are so under-funded, it’s shameful.” 
The generosity of health care has been relatively stable, due to the existence of universal health 
care. However, rising co-pays and deductibles have been harmful to workers. This is due to the 
political nature of drug benefit negotiations (O’Brady et al., 2015). 
Risks have also become more individualised in Canada. In a context of declining wealth, this 
means that workers must cope with greater uncertainty alone and have fewer resources on which 
they can draw in order to do so. This is most evident in scheduling practices. Most Canadian 
supermarket chains have adopted computer-operated, just-in-time scheduling, built to reflect last 
minute inventory fluctuations and customer traffic more than employee needs and lifestyles. 
More senior workers have priority on the number of hours they receive, but they need to accept 
whatever hours are offered. According to one union official, “that’s our problem…with people 
that have kids, people that have parents that are sick, people that are studying at school. You’re 
telling them…look we’ve got a lot of hours to give you. If you don’t take them all, you’re 
out...Crazy schedules. That’s the worst part of our industry now.” Furthermore, with no 
minimum-hour guarantees, part-timers suffer from not knowing their income for the next week. 
Public and private pension schemes available to retail workers tend to be contributory, with some 
exceptions. This makes them particularly risky. However, federal Old Age Security providing 
workers with a guaranteed minimum retirement is not and has proven its effectiveness at 
reducing poverty by international standards (Fritzell and Ritakallio, 2010). Apart from 
pharmaceuticals, universal access to free health care has remained stable. Furthermore, there are 
some counter-trends. For example, some chains in Ontario have negotiated “minimum-wage plus 
escalator clauses”, compelling companies to augment the salaries of all workers proportionally to 
increases in the minimum wage, obliging employers to bear some of the risks associated with 
legislative changes to employment standards. Thus, while individualisation is the dominant 
trend, there are signs that certain forms of risk may be alleviated in all chains in the years to 
come.  
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Trends in segmentation differ markedly by province. In Ontario, risks are strongly segmented. 
Part-timers are entitled to lower wage and benefit arrangements, while younger workers are 
indirectly affected by tiered agreements that segment working conditions by date of hire. As one 
firm-side negotiator described, “over time, we had to reduce some labour rates and benefits. So 
you negotiated new hire rates, as people left the business you hired at a lesser rate, and you 
changed some of the benefits that they enjoyed.” Quebec has barred such forms of segmentation 
in the province. This is due to provisions in the legislation on labour relations and standards, 
often called “orphan clauses", which prohibit companies from discriminating against workers 
based on their date of hire. Moreover, non-union workers in both provinces do not benefit from 
various wage, benefit, and working hour arrangements provided by collective agreements. The 
gaps between union and non-union workers are narrowed, however, by the existence of universal 
Old Age Security and health care programs. Being universal, they provide protections to all 
workers in the country, eliminating the gaps produced by private-sector and union-non-union 
cleavages. 
 
4.3.3 Germany 
The German experience is distinct from that of North America. The major difference is in how 
negative trends in generosity and individualisation are segmented to workers not covered by 
collective agreements. In addition, the highly contributory nature of the welfare system 
multiplies the negative individualising and segmentation effects of declining bargaining 
coverage. 
Negative trends in generosity are evident in Germany. The main negative trend is the decline in 
working hour generosity (from 20% part-time to 67% part-time) and its corollary outcomes for 
retirement incomes. The contributory pension scheme provides for low retirement security. One 
union official explains this as the following: “for a large part, employees in the retail sector 
clearly cannot live from their public legal pension, and by a long shot. Many employees are at 
risk of poverty in retirement”. Many low-wage workers in the country are forced into social 
assistance. However, an important counter-trend concerns real wage increases provided through 
collective bargaining. For instance, a low-skilled cashier earned 36% more per month in 2016 
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than in 1980, while the minimum monthly salary of skilled butchers was 30% higher. Moreover, 
pay supplements for what Europeans call “unsocial hours” (evening, nights, and weekends) are 
important and vary from 20% to 120% of the hourly rate. This creates a dynamic where some 
part-timers fare better than full-timers did 30 years ago, though part-timers receiving few shifts 
struggle to maintain an income needed to survive.   
Rates of individualisation have remained largely stable, except for health care. However, there is 
a major divide across the private and public spheres of risk mitigation for retail workers. 
Collective agreements serve to collectivize many aspects of wages and working hours, while 
risks in old age and illness are relegated to risky contributory state programs. Sectoral collective 
agreements provide workers with guaranteed real wage increases, independent of their store or 
chain’s profitability. Escalator clauses give firms some reprieve during an economic downturn. 
However, the social partners affirm that these are applied temporarily and are not subject to 
abuse.  
Collective agreements also limit firms’ ability to deviate from an employee’s average weekly 
hours. As one union representative puts it, if the “contract says 20 hours, but regularly the 
company demands 28 hours. Then you can’t just go back on it all of a sudden. Then you have a 
right to obtain at least 28 hours. Courts have frequently upheld this right”. Moreover, proactive 
works councillors often negotiate agreements providing workers with 2 to 4 weeks’ notice for 
scheduling changes, allowing them to plan for their expenses and family obligations accordingly. 
Contrary to the North American norm of using just-in-time scheduling, German retailers use 
software that adapt scheduling practices to employee preferences (Carré and Tilly, 2017). When 
present, works councillors must approve of these schedules before posting.  
Unfortunately, public pensions and health care are highly individualised. The public pension 
regime, the main source of retirement income for retail workers, has historically been 
contributory. This has been detrimental for low-wage workers whose low current incomes leave 
them with scant earnings in retirement. Controversially, public health care was traditionally 
funded through a parity arrangement in which employees and employers both contributed 
equally. However, the employer’s share has been frozen at a rate of 7.3% since 2005. Employees 
are thereby responsible for the other 7.3%, but also for any shortfalls in health spending needed 
to keep the system solvent, adding more uncertainty in expenses for workers. 
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Trends in segmentation differ from those in North America. Most critically, segmentation within 
stores is comparatively low. For example, part-timers and younger workers enjoy working 
conditions comparable to that of full-timers. Mini-jobs have become more common in the 
industry. These are special work contracts that enable employers to hire workers for less than 
€450 a month (with important income tax exemptions). Yet even these workers enjoy most of the 
same labour standards as their peers, especially in stores covered under collective agreements. 
However, apprentices (usually younger workers from high school) receive lower pay, which 
some argue leads to the abuse of the system. Most salient is that a growing proportion of 
supermarkets, not unlike establishments in other sectors (Doellgast and Greer, 2007), are 
operating outside of traditional bargaining structures. This is due to the steady decline of 
bargaining coverage in the 2000s as political dynamics within the employers’ association eroded 
support for collective bargaining in the sector (Behrens, 2011). For example, one works 
councillor reports that cashiers working for an independent franchise earned “6 thousand euros 
less” than those in corporate stores bound to a collective agreement. This is significant since 
bargaining coverage is estimated as 30% in the sector. The introduction of the 8.50-euro 
minimum wage in 2015 has improved their situation somewhat (Bosch, 2018), as many workers 
earned 5 or 6 euros an hour before this. Nonetheless, the gap remains significant.  
 
4.3.4 Sweden 
 Swedish supermarket workers fared comparatively better than in other countries. By 
comparison, risks facing workers in this industry in Sweden are generous, collective, and 
integrated. However, the rise of part-time work in an industry with no minimum working hours 
has been critical for many.  
The major disturbance in the generosity of resources is the reduction in working hours. While 
full-time hours were once the norm, an estimated 70% of supermarket workers currently work 
part-time. This negatively impacts incomes, as some supermarket workers lack the hours needed 
to maintain a middle-class standard of living. Furthermore, since a significant pillar in the 
Swedish retirement system is its contributory pension scheme, any reduction in current incomes 
has effects that endure into retirement. Like Germany, retail workers rely on public pensions for 
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retirement. Also like Germany, the reduction of working hours and its consequences for current 
and retirement incomes is to some extent offset by trends in wage rates. The typical starting 
wage rate for an adult worker in Sweden is 52% greater than it was in 1980.  Moreover, 
collective agreements in Sweden oblige employers to compensate workers with a 50% to 100% 
supplement for work performed during unsocial hours (evenings, nights, and weekends).  As an 
employers’ association official put it, “part-timers can make as much as full-timers, since the 
wage supplements [for] evening and weekends [are] high. However, full-time workers enjoy this 
too.” Thus, overall generosity has diminished for some, but those maintaining a minimum 
number of hours (many of which are part-timers) can count on a decent income, both currently 
and in retirement, due to the link between current contributions and future earnings, as well as 
the strengths of the Swedish retirement system.  
The highly collective nature of private and public risk-sharing arrangements makes Swedish 
retail workers less vulnerable by comparison. The continuity of sectoral bargaining has ensured 
that workers are guaranteed wage increases, independently of trends in product markets or store 
profitability. As illustrated by a former corporate negotiator, “We haven’t been able to raise the 
prices on food in any way. If you can buy food elsewhere that’s cheaper, you’ll go there. So as a 
consumer, you benefit. But every year you have a higher cost of salary of 2-3%. This creates a 
pressure on business to be very productive.” These agreements have also obliged companies to 
make advanced guarantees on working hours, including a one-month notice for scheduling and 
limiting week-to-week, working-hour reductions. Schedules thereby reflect workers’ needs for 
stability. Moreover, the Swedish social democratic welfare state also provides significant 
guarantees for workers. Its pension system, while containing a pillar based on contributions, still 
provides workers with a guaranteed pension that - like in Canada - is noted for its success at 
reducing poverty internationally (Fritzell and Ritakallio, 2010). Universal health care, while 
under pressure, is still largely government funded and provides access to all who need it. The 
agglomeration of collectivised social arrangements in Sweden is significant, as it provides 
supermarket workers with buffers from a litany of risks. Thus, even those workers most 
negatively affected by decreased working hours enjoy important protections from adverse events 
pertaining to incomes, working hours and old age. 
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Finally, segmentation in Sweden has been weak. Part-timers receive all of the same benefits as 
full-timers, and have the potential to earn as much if pay supplements for unsocial hours are 
taken into account. The gap between youth and ordinary workers has increased. For example, the 
starting rates for workers 16 years of age were 16% lower than those of ordinary workers in 
1980, whereas the gap now stands at 57% (many of whom are amongst the growing number 
temporary workers in the industry). However, this minority of workers are guaranteed pay raises 
with age. Moreover, short-term contract workers are on the rise in the industry. These are 
renewable contracts for terms of six months. The segmentation effect of these contracts is limited 
because these contracts must conform to the terms of the collective agreement. Additionally, 
they may only be renewed four times, after which the employee must be integrated as regular 
workers into the firm. Most importantly, all major chains in Sweden are covered by sectoral 
collective agreements. According to a senior economist with the sectoral union; working 
conditions are “almost the same in every chain”, a fact which prevents the growth of non-union 
competition that would drive a race to the bottom. This is the only country in our four-country 
comparison with no segmentation according to union status. 
 
4.4 Comparative analysis 
A comparison of these four cases leads to some observations. Two of these were empirical. First, 
risk is rising everywhere, as can be observed over the period under investigation. This finding 
resonates with the literature reviewed earlier in this article, confirming that food retail is an 
exemplar of global trends in low-wage work. Decreases in working-hour generosity were the 
single common denominator across the four countries. Negative changes in other areas of risk 
mattered as well. 
Second, risk trends vary across the national cases. In fact, there are more variations than 
similarities in the cross-country differences along the dimensions. However, there are also 
within-country differences. Table 4.4 presents four tends in risk allocation: highly differentiated 
risk, as observed in the United States; moderated risk in the Canadian case; segmented risk in 
Germany; and solidaristic risk in the case of Sweden. 
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The United States has experienced differentiated risk, with negative risk movements in all three 
dimensions. Most American workers have fewer resources at their disposal to mitigate risks, and 
firms are promising them fewer resources to weather economic uncertainty than before. This has 
taken shape along segmented lines, as collective agreements and human resource practices often 
bar part-timers and younger workers from forms of risk mitigation available to older full-time 
workers. Furthermore, most food retail workers are non-union, with protections often inferior to 
that provided by collective agreements. Canada has experienced moderated risk. Its trends 
resemble those of the United States, but their impacts are significantly limited by the universal 
government-provided retirement and health benefits. The gap between workers within and across 
firms (including union versus non-union workers) is therefore less severe. Private benefits are 
less important for workers in both circumstances, since these universal programs are most 
important for mitigating risks in retirement and health. However, segmentation is far more 
prevalent in Ontario than Quebec, due to legislated differences in the acceptance of two-tier 
employment standards.  
Germany has experienced segmented risk. This is because the gap between core and non-core 
workers is most significant among the countries. Full-time workers covered under collective 
agreements have experienced an increase in generosity and no significant form of 
individualisation. The growing number of part-time workers must grapple with fewer working 
hours, but are still subject to important protections afforded by collective agreements and will 
benefit from highly collectivised scheduling arrangements when they have a proactive works 
councillor. However, a growing number of workers are being segmented in firms and franchises 
operating outside of bargaining structures. These workers have greatly inferior working 
conditions, and until 2015, had no minimum wage. This is exacerbated by a welfare regime 
which favours individualisation and segmentation, by relying on uncertain contributory schemes 
to fund public retirement and health benefits. The gap between core and non-core workers in 
Germany is far greater than in the other countries. Finally, Sweden’s experience is one of 
solidaristic risk. The major trend impacting worker risk in Sweden is the decline of working hour 
generosity. Beyond this, workers can still count on strong solidaristic forms of security. Risks are 
still fairly collectivised, since the guarantees in wages, working hours, and benefits ensured by 
firms and the state remain largely unchanged. They are integrated because collective bargaining 
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structures have remained stable throughout the years and ensure that comparable working 
conditions are applied throughout the sector.  
Table 4.4 – Integrated Analysis of Risk Allocation Trends (1980-2016) 
Country Risk Allocation Trend Description of Trend 
United 
States 
• Differentiated risk • Negative risks movements in all dimensions for most, 
though union-affiliated workers still have some protections 
 
Canada •  Moderated risk • Moderate risk movements in all dimensions, due to the 
presence of universal retirement and health benefits. 
Segmentation is higher in Quebec than Ontario. 
 
Germany • Segmented risk • High disparities in risk movements along segmented lines, 
due to gaps in bargaining coverage 
Sweden • Solidaristic risk • Some declines in generosity, but overall generosity and 
collectiveness of social arrangements is high for workers 
 
The empirical analysis of risk trends leads to two analytical observations. The first analytical 
observation concerns the presence of counter-trends to this overall negative movement in risk. 
It's important to capture the dynamic nature of the interconnections between the different 
dimensions of risk. In the United States, the increase in part-time work and scheduling 
variabilities were to some extent offset by the introduction of minimum working-hour 
guarantees. In Canada, many supermarkets have added minimum-wage plus escalator clauses, 
compelling employers to provide all workers with wage increases equivalent to that of increases 
in the minimum wage. Meanwhile, collective agreements in Germany and Sweden have provided 
workers with real wage increases, offsetting some of the negative effects in incomes from the 
decline in working hours.  These examples illustrate that there is no single trend towards higher 
levels of risk and that it is a dynamic process that can be countered along one more dimensions 
of risk allocation. Rather, risk augmentation appears to entail a contradictory dynamic.  
Second, the findings illustrate the importance of examining all relevant sources of risk. All three 
dimensions are needed to analyse risks. This is particularly relevant to comparative research, as 
some dimensions may be relevant to some cases but not others. For example, while risks rose in 
supermarkets across all countries, some dimensions mattered more to some cases than others. 
Most interestingly, the dimensions of individualisation and segmentation were inadequate to 
describing the growth of risk in Sweden. These workers were most negatively affected by the 
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decline of working hour generosity and the problems this posed for maintaining liveable 
incomes. However, the highly collective and integrated nature of social arrangements affecting 
the most relevant risks remained for the most part unchanged in the sector. Meanwhile, in 
Germany, changes in individualisation were not particularly relevant to workers covered under 
collective agreements, however it was a central feature of risks in the growing number of 
establishments operating outside of collective bargaining, where workers did not benefit from 
wage scales, supplemental hours provisions, works agreements on scheduling, and other benefits 
associated with employee representation. The framework can be highlighted to compare 
differences between firms, as there may be considerable cross-dimensional differentiation within 
sectors.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This article argues that a multi-dimensional approach to risks is needed to understand their 
evolution. It proposes a new framework, the Risk Allocation Framework, to explore these 
dimensions. By examining the generosity of resources that alleviate risk, the extent that actors 
have individualised the risk burden, and how risks are segmented across worker categories, it is 
suggested, researchers will be able to see more into what we describe as risk than is the case with 
other approaches oriented towards only one or two dimensions. By bridging the three traditions 
evident in the literature through this integrated approach, researchers will be able to capture the 
holism that is risk, that is, a multi-dimensional and contradictory construct. This argument was 
developed through an analysis of risks in American, Canadian, German, and Swedish 
supermarkets from 1980-2016. The findings confirm the now common narrative that risks are 
rising in most settings (Osberg and Sharpe, 2011; Heery and Salmon, 2000; Hacker, 2006; 
Standing, 2011; Kalleberg, 2009). However, the analysis also offers insight into the breadth of 
variety across the cases. Risks have risen in each case, yet often in different ways, and offering 
different levers for possible mitigation of the worst effects.  
This framework need not be bound to the parameters set by this study, which simply used 
supermarket chains as a testing ground for applying the framework. Future research could 
emphasize other units of analysis, by comparing occupations, sectors, or even national trends in 
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risk. However, as may be deduced from the above illustration, integrating the concepts of 
generosity, individualisation, and segmentation may lead research towards multi-level analysis. 
This is so as this framework teases out various movements of risk not captured by other 
approaches, and helping researchers make connections with various actors and units of analysis 
in the process.  
The Risk Allocation Framework therefore opens new territory for exploring how actors are 
affecting each dimension of risk and how, either advertently or inadvertently, this is affecting 
social arrangements for alleviating risks as a whole. Of great interest is the existence of dynamic 
and contradictory trends. As illustrated in the above analysis, although risks altogether have risen 
in each case, there were also positive movements associated with most cases. This suggests not 
only that risk trends are contradictory, but that they signify a struggle against inevitability. Actor-
oriented research could shed some light on this struggle, and help us understand more about the 
politics of risk dynamics.  
New research could examine firms, unions, and the state, as their importance was alluded to in 
this study, but other actors may be relevant as well, including individual workers, managers, and 
non-governmental organisations. Furthermore, future research can also address risks in specific 
settings, such as addressing how risks take shape through organisational restructuring or with the 
rise of new global value chain configurations. New avenues for research ought to draw on many 
disciplines and fields, including sociology, industrial relations, management, political science, 
labour studies, economics, and others. Not doing so would undermine the richness of the theories 
which underpin this framework. To conclude, the main take-away is that risks are multi-faceted 
in nature. Therefore, theory and research must be sufficiently rich and robust if we are to explore 
all of its facets and formulate effective solutions for its mitigation. 
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Chapter 5 
Partnering Against Risk? An Institutional Comparison of Canadian and Swedish Retailers 
(Article 2) 
Abstract 
Risk refers to levels of economic uncertainty facing workers. This article assesses how labour-
management partnerships affect risk in different institutional settings. It draws on semi-
structured interviews about collective bargaining in Canadian and Swedish retailers – food retail 
specifically - with company managers, employers’ association representatives, worker 
representatives and expert witnesses. Negotiators in both institutional contexts embraced 
partnering as a strategy to generate mutual gains for firm competitiveness and enhanced worker 
security. However, the Swedish partnerships were identified as more compatible with improved 
worker security than those in Canada. The variation is explained by the centralisation of 
bargaining structures and their effects on how actors cooperate in response to market 
competition. Centralised structures had important effects on actor incentives to standardize HR 
practices across firms, the integration of outsiders, and the structural power of unions. Due to its 
focus on a local service sector, retail trade, this article suggests that sectoral dynamics are a key 
factor in understanding the relationship between labour relations and risk. 
 
Risk has risen in most OECD countries (Osberg and Sharpe, 2011). Workers face increased job 
precariousness (Standing, 2011; Kalleberg, 2009); even middle-class jobs are increasingly 
vulnerable (Tang, 2015; Hacker, 2006; Doellgast, 2017).  Much of the explanation relates to new 
government policies whereby traditional safety nets have been undermined by welfare-state 
retrenchment. While social actors such as firms and unions face immense pressures to relieve 
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workers from risk (Johnston et al., 2011, Schelkle, 2011), they are constrained by finite resources 
and the heavy logic of the market. Is high worker risk the “new normal” (Granter et al., 2015) or 
does social actor agency offer the opportunity to shape alternative paths to reduce risk?  
While partnership has been presented as one strategy for revitalising union influence in 
collective bargaining (Heery, 2002), its relationship with worker risk remains a paradox 
(Martinez Lucio and Stuart, 2005).  The few studies that exist are rather pessimistic, suggesting 
that partnerships are too “episodic” (Martinez Lucio and Stuart, 2005) and “asymmetrically” 
weighted against labour (Jenkins, 2007) to produce any substantial improvements to worker 
security. However, contemporary partnership research has proven inadequate at capturing how 
contextual characteristics influence partnerships (Johnstone et al., 2009) and how institutions 
influence collective bargaining across sectors and countries (Price et al., 2014), thus limiting our 
understanding of why partnerships may be beneficial to worker risk in some settings but not 
others.  
This research examines how labour-management partnerships affect risk under different 
bargaining structures. It draws on semi-structured interviews, official records, and collective 
agreements to examine collective bargaining in Canadian and Swedish retailers between 1980 
and 2016, with a focus on food retail. Employers and unions in both countries have fostered 
partnerships under contexts of heightened market competition. However, while faring best in the 
1980s, Canadian workers now suffer from more volatile incomes, unpredictability in scheduling, 
and declining union coverage than their counterparts in Sweden. The difference is partly 
explained by how bargaining structures, along with their impacts on the nature of competition, 
affected the opportunity structures for unions and employers to partner against risk. 
 116 
 
The argument is pursued in four steps: first, a theoretical review of labour-management 
partnerships, their relevance to institutions, and the approach pursued in this article; second, a 
brief overview of the case selection and methods; third, a presentation of the findings and a 
comparison of the food retailers in both contexts; and, in conclusion, an analysis of the argument 
and its contribution to the literature.  
 
5.1 A review of the literature 
A theoretical review of the literature is conducted in the next two sections. The first section 
analyses research on how partnerships interact with risk. The second section outlines the article’s 
approach by identifying institutional factors that matter to labour-management partnerships and 
risk. 
 
5.1.1 Partnerships and risk 
Partnerships have been presented as an alternative to low-road HRM practices focused on 
Taylorism and aggressive labour cost reductions. However, their impacts on risk remain 
underexplored (Martinez Lucio and Stuart, 2005). The focus here is on risk, which refers to the 
extent that social arrangements to protect workers from harm in their material lives are uncertain 
(Hacker, 2006; Heery and Salmon, 2000; Kalleberg, 2009). Thus, workers’ exposure to risks is 
high when variabilities in wages, working hours, pensions, and other related areas, are high. 
They are low when they are stable.  
The more positive view of partnering is inspired by traditional labour negotiation theory (Walton 
and McKersie, 1965), suggesting that partnerships yield “mutual gains” for both employers and 
employees, even in times of heightened competition (Bamber et al., 2009; Kochan and 
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Osterman, 1994). Employers aspire to higher labour productivity and more flexible work 
environments. Unions aim to gain substantial improvements tin working conditions and may 
achieve specific improvements to worker risk, such as employment security, in exchange for 
their collaboration (Heery, 2002). However, a broader array of outcomes has been linked to such 
partnerships, including pay and benefit increases, investments in training, positive changes to 
work organisation, and arrangements for the joint-governance of employment, as the high-
performance work systems literature suggests (Osterman, 2018; Bamber et al., 2009; Appelbaum 
and Batt, 1994; Kochan and Osterman, 1994).  
Critical research on partnerships highlights their negative impact on employee risk. One stream 
has focused on the internal dynamics of partnering (Jenkins, 2007; Evans et al., 2017; Rolfsen, 
2011). Partnering is perceived to undermine unions’ representativeness, as union leaders behave 
more like managers in their deepening commitment to the firm and may even become less 
sensitive to substantive risk concerns, as organisational needs begin to overshadow those of 
workers. Another stream suggests that external factors, such as weak institutional supports and 
market volatility, threaten the potential for partnering under modern capitalism. Focusing on the 
UK, Martinez Lucio and Stuart (2005) find that partnerships tend to be short-lived or 
hierarchically structured by management under regulatory environments that are not supportive 
of collaboration. Others show that the dominance of capital markets and powerful multinationals 
in domestic economies has diminished employers’ capacities to maintain their end of the bargain 
(Thompson, 2003; Dobbins and Dundon, 2015).  
A key question arising from both the positive and critical views of partnership is why 
partnerships are more effective in some settings and not in others. The comparative research that 
does exist focuses on how national and sub-national institutions influence the adoption of 
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partnering strategies. This research has focused on international service sectors such as airlines 
(Bamber et al., 2009; Turnbull et al., 2004) and call centers (Doellgast, 2008; Doellgast, 2010). 
While useful for understanding international product markets, this research excludes local 
service sectors that are most representative of low-wage work, including retail and restaurants, 
where the possibilities for value-added services are weak in many settings (Osterman, 2018; 
Tilly, 2017; Kochan and Osterman, 1994). There are few studies comparing how partnerships 
impact working conditions in local low-wage services across countries and sectors (Price et al., 
2014), and none that examine employee risk.   
 
5.1.2 Understanding partnership and risk in different institutional contexts 
This article posits that institutional context influences partnerships’ effectiveness at mitigating 
risk. It highlights the importance of bargaining structures, as they affect the nature of competition 
in local service sectors. Partnerships in more centralised structures, it is suggested, respond 
differently to heightened market competition than similar arrangements introduced in 
decentralised settings. Drawing on a broader literature on collective bargaining, partnerships and 
risk, the article identifies three features of partnerships that are particularly important for the 
comparative analysis of the impact of labour-management partnerships on workers’ risk.  
A first factor concerns how actors partner to standardize or differentiate human resource 
practices across firms and establishments. This relates to actor calculations on how to align 
competitive objectives with worker interests. Under centralised arrangements, employers and 
unions may support multi-employer arrangements to preserve institutional stability and take 
working conditions out of competition (Sisson, 1987; Katz, 1993; Laroche and Murray, 2012). In 
other settings, the normative preference of employers is for more local arrangements, which 
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places firms’ business conditions at the fore of negotiations, making insecurity a pre-condition to 
competitiveness under high market competition (Marginson et al., 2014; Marginson, 2015b). 
A second factor focuses on how actors cooperate to integrate or exclude outsiders from collective 
bargaining. The initial formulation of insider-outsider theory suggests that workers covered by 
collective bargaining hold considerable power - due to the prohibitive costs of hiring, training, 
and firing employees –  which they use to obtain wages above the “market clearing” level at the 
expense of outsiders (Lindbeck and Snower, 2001; Lindbeck and Snower, 1989). However, 
research also shows that union and management strategies towards the inclusion of workers are 
context-laden. They dependent on factors such as the perceived alignment between insider and 
outsider interests (Benassi and Dorigatti, 2015) and managerial calculations on the importance of 
skill retention (Crouch, 2015). The integration of outsiders represents a form of standardisation, 
as it prevents firms from employing workers outside of collective bargaining to acquire a cost-
advantage on the competition. However, integration deserves special attention because it 
represents not simply a form of differentiation in standard-setting through collective bargaining, 
but the shifting of employment outside of the reach of collective bargaining and its associated 
protections. 
The third factor concerns variation in structural power arising from market competition under 
different institutional settings. Wright (2000) describes structural power as deriving “from the 
location of workers within the economic system”. Research suggests that low competition may 
be a source of structural power for unions, providing them with more authority in negotiating 
forms of security and flexibility in human resource practices (Pulignano et al., 2016). High 
competitive pressures, however, do not necessarily diminish union power under multi-employer 
bargaining (Marginson et al., 2014). While competition may pressure unions to yield to firm 
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contingencies in single-employer bargaining, they may be a source of power for unions under 
centralised bargaining. Under the latter, unions can use employers’ vulnerabilities to competition 
to pressure them to raise labour standards or face potentially crippling industrial action. While 
industrial action is not typically used in collaborative arrangements, the structural power of 
unions can influence the agenda of partnerships, ensuring that security-related issues are treated 
seriously.  
The analysis of these three factors will be applied to partnerships in different institutional 
contexts. The intent is to bridge the divide between analyses of partnerships and bargaining 
centralisation to provide a more nuanced understanding of how partnerships affect risk outcomes 
across different bargaining structures.   
 
5.2 Research design and methodology 
This study involves contextualised comparative case studies of Canadian and Swedish food 
retailers. This method complements research on large populations by providing a deep causal 
analysis through interactions with actors in the field (Edwards and Belanger, 2008). It adheres to 
a “reflexive” research approach, as it involves multiple on-site and off-site encounters with key 
actors in the field over time (Burawoy, 2003).  
In terms of the choice of sector, retail is the single largest service sector and is emblematic of 
precarious work in most countries. The food retail experience is of special interest because there 
remains a significant union presence in this industry internationally, making it a focus for 
experimentation for the improvement of working conditions through collective bargaining (Carré 
and Tilly, 2017; Carré et al., 2010; Coulter, 2014).   
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In terms of institutional settings, Canada and Sweden were chosen to isolate variations in 
bargaining structures. The Canadian province of Quebec is examined, as its retail union espouses 
a collaborative strategy in a highly decentralised bargaining context. In 1980, chain-wide 
agreements covered 90% of food retailers in the province. However, unionised stores chain-wide 
agreements have since been replaced store-level bargaining. 80% of Canadian supermarket 
chains were covered by these agreements in 2016. Swedish bargaining has also been deeply 
collaborative, but in a context where sectoral agreements covered 95% of the retail sector – retail 
food included - from 1980 to 2016. Thus, while coverage rates have been relatively high in both 
countries, Swedish bargaining has remained highly centralised and all-encompassing, while 
Canadian bargaining has been decentralised and much of the workforce is not covered by 
collective agreements. 
The period of observation is from 1980 to 2016. This period captures how major crises in 
collective bargaining and disruptions to the competitive environment affected partnerships in 
both countries. These include the bankruptcy of major unionised chains in Canada, short-lived 
employer militancy in Sweden, and the entry of discount stores in both countries’ food retail 
markets. 
The following companies were examined: CAN-1, CAN-2, SWE-1, and SWE-2. They were 
chosen because each company is involved in a deep partnership with a union, yet under different 
bargaining structures. CAN-1 and CAN-2 are engaged in a deep partnership with the largest 
union local in retail food in the province of Quebec. This local negotiates agreements for most 
stores run under the CAN-1 and CAN-2 banners in the province. This degree of partnership 
differentiates these cases from Canadian union locals who have never achieved the same levels 
of trust and collaboration. Swedish bargaining is sectoral. SWE-1 and SWE-2 are represented by 
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employers’ associations, both of whom have partnered with the country’s only retail union. 
SWE-1 is represented by the country’s employers’ association for retail and SWE-2 is 
represented by a smaller employers’ association representing cooperatives in the country. The 
agreements are virtually the same.   
The other main similarity across all companies is that supermarkets constitute the most common, 
and hence most important, store format. Beyond this, there are more similarities amongst 
companies across countries than within them (Table 5.1). This aspect of the research design 
enables the study to account for differences in company characteristics in assessing how 
partnerships affect worker risk. Collective bargaining covered all stores operated by CAN-2, 
SWE-1, and SWE-2, but not CAN-1 as some of its independent retailers are not union certified. 
There are also differences in the centralisation of HR structures. All stores with SWE-1 are 
independent retailers and thereby set HR policies independently from the lead company. Most 
stores with CAN-1 are similar as they operate under independent retailer or franchise models. 
CAN-2 and SWE-2 adhere to centralised structures in which HR practices are controlled by 
corporate headquarters. Most of the companies are financially stable, in terms of maintaining 
healthy levels of market share and profitability. SWE-2 is the sole exception, whose market share 
and profitability has declined over the past decade. Finally, the companies differ in terms of their 
market share of sales. 
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Table 5.1 – Overview of Food Retailers 
 CAN-1 CAN-2 SWE-1 SWE-2 
Bargaining Unit 
 
Store Store Sector Sector 
# of employees 
 
65,000 192,000* 7,622 7,349 
Main format Supermarkets Supermarkets Supermarkets Supermarkets 
Store coverage 
under collective 
bargaining  
 
84% 100% 100% 100% 
Centralisation of 
HR  
 
Mixed 
 
Centralised Decentralised Centralised 
Financial 
stability 
 
Stable Stable Stable Unstable 
National market 
share 
10.5% 30% 50.8% 
 
19% 
Sources: This table is based on information acquired from each company’s annual reports and the interviewees. 
*Includes some employees outside of non-food retail establishments 
 
The findings are based on the analysis of 62 semi-structured interviews4 with union and 
employer representatives with direct experience in collective bargaining, as well as expert 
witnesses (mediators, consultants, and private researchers). The bulk of these interviews were 
conducted from 2015 to 2017 (some preliminary interviews were conducted from 2012 to 2015). 
43 interviews were conducted on Quebec: 25 with unions, 11 with employer representatives, and 
7 with expert witnesses. 19 interviews were conducted in Sweden: 10 with unions, 4 with 
employer representatives, and 5 with expert witnesses. Most interviews lasted between 60 and 
120 minutes. Many interviewees were contacted multiple times, so that they could elaborate on 
important themes and new developments. A cluster-analysis was performed to identify common 
patterns in each country. The interviews were complemented by a review of company reports, 
media releases and collective agreements to facilitate a deeper analysis of the cases. 6 collective 
agreements were analysed to assess employee risk trends across cases.  
                                                          
4 The interview process complied with strict research norms for ethics. All interviewees and their organisations 
were guaranteed complete anonymity and control over the research process.  
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5.3 Findings 
The next sections explore the research findings of this article. It begins by demonstrating how 
risk trends diverge across the cases. This is followed by an analysis of partnering across the cases 
and a comparative analysis of how institutional factors influenced the effects of partnering on 
risk.  
 
5.3.1 Divergent trends in risk 
An analysis of collective agreements demonstrates a considerable divergence in risk trends 
across workers in both countries. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 compare risk trends in unionised stores that 
are representative of stores and key occupations in CAN-1 and CAN-2 with trends in sectoral 
agreements that are representative of SWE-1 and SWE-2, as well as the entire retail sector in 
Sweden. 
In the 1980s, Canadian food retail workers were more secure than those in Sweden. Incomes 
were considerably higher in Canadian stores; they received significantly higher wage rates and 
full-time hours were the norm. Furthermore, nearly all store workers were covered by collective 
agreements. Swedish workers received lower incomes, as their pay rates were lower and most 
Swedish workers worked part-time. However, the pay was still enough to provide a descent 
standard of living for many workers, bolstered by high supplemental pay rates for “unsocial 
hours” (evenings and weekends). Like CAN-1 and CAN-2, all workers with SWE-1 and SWE-2 
were covered by collective agreements.   
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Table 5.2 – Wage Trends from 1980 to 2016* 
Bargaining Unit CAN-1 (Store) CAN-2 (Store) SWE-1 & SWE-2 (Sector) 
 Clerks Butchers Clerks Butchers All Employees** 
Full-time rates (monthly)      
Maximum - 2016 $2,208.27 $3,104.40 $2,813.20 $3,562.00 $3,235.90 
Maximum - 1980 $1,549.17 $1,653.17 $1,549.17 $1,653.17 $792.09 
Δ in real terms 1980-
2016*** 
-51.11% -35.59% -37.71% -26.09% +60.00% 
      
Minimum - 2016 $1,906.67 $2,036.67 $1,872.00 $1,872.00 $3,001.52 
Minimum - 1980 $1,165.67 $1,198.17 $1,165.67 $1,198.17 $760.01 
Δ in real terms 1980-
2016*** 
-43.90% -41.70% -44.92% -46.41% +54.29% 
      
Part-time rates (hourly)      
Maximum - 2016 $12.74 $17.91 $16.23 $20.55 $19.49 
Minimum - 1980 $8.48 $10.04 $8.48 $10.04 $4.74 
Δ in real terms 1980-
2016*** 
-48.47% -38.81% -34.35% -29.79% +60.53% 
      
Minimum - 2016 $11.00 $11.75 $10.80 $10.80 $18.08 
Minimum - 1980 $6.38 $7.28 $6.38 $7.28 $4.55 
Δ in real terms 1980-
2016*** 
-40.86% -44.64% -41.94% -49.11% +55.21% 
      
Wage supplements - 
unsocial hours 
     
    
2016 $1.10/hour - nights 
No evening premium 
$.50 per hour - nights 
No evening premium 
50-70% - evenings 
100% - weekends 
 
1980**** $2.16/hour - nights 
$8.65/day - evenings 
$2.16/hour - nights 
$8.65/day - evenings 
50-70% - evenings 
100% - weekends 
    
Sources: Collective agreements identified by key officials as representative of company trends. 
*All figures are expressed in Canadian dollars 
**OECD’s Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) for Private Consumption data was used to convert Swedish krona to Canadian dollars 
*** OECD’s Consumer Price Index Data was used to calculate real wage changes using each country’s home currency 
****Expressed in 2016 Canadian dollars 
 
From 1980 to 2016, the risk trends across national lines could hardly be more different. The first 
major divergence is in the wage rates (Table 5.2). Wage rates are low-risk when workers can 
expect real wage stability from one year to the next, but high-risk when they are prone to vary or 
decline over time. Workers with SWE-1 and SWE-2 could count on yearly real wage increases. 
This also applies to supplemental pay rates for work conducted during unsocial hours, which 
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remained largely unchanged throughout this period. When normal and supplemental wage rates 
are accounted for, Swedish workers with three years of tenure can earn up to $39 per hour for 
work performed after noon on Saturdays, and all-day on Sundays and holidays. Workers with 
CAN-1 and CAN-2, however, experienced a precipitous decline in the generosity and certainty 
of wage rates during this period. Even relatively skilled butchers could not count on real wage 
increases year after year, as cost-cutting concessions even affected this occupation during the 36-
year period. Canadian workers also experienced important declines in supplemental pay for 
evenings and nights, which were negligible in 2016.   
The second major divergence concerns uncertainty in working hours (Table 5.3). A major source 
of risk for workers in all four companies was the rise of part-time work from 1980-2016, 
especially for Canadian supermarkets that employed mostly full-timers in 1980. However, SWE-
1 and SWE-2 maintained more working hour security than CAN-1 and CAN-1 over the 36-year 
period. Swedish workers benefitted from long-term scheduling notice and limits on the extent 
that employers can deviate from average weekly hours (9 hours: full-timers, 5 hours: part-
timers). Meanwhile, SWE-1 and SWE-2 are obliged to consult the union on scheduling matters, 
including a special right for workers to enjoy 16 consecutive Saturdays and Sundays off, and 
other rights concerning scheduling around family obligations. The bargaining units held by 
CAN-1 and CAN-1 faced a different trend. Scheduling notice has always been short-term, but 
this is more harmful since work is mostly part-time and store hours have been extended into 
evenings and on weekends. Moreover, requirements to provide workers with minimum hours 
have been lifted, along with seniority provisions. The new norm is to provide the most working 
hours to those workers that are most available to work, regardless of the tenure or personal needs 
of employees. Thus, the rise of part-time work has affected Canadian workers far more than in 
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Sweden, because working hours (and hence incomes) in the Canadian cases vary considerably 
from one week to the next. 
Table 5.3 – Trends in Scheduling from 1980-2016 
 CAN-1 & CAN-2 SWE-1 & SWE-2 
 1980 2016 1980 2016 
     
% Full-time* 80% 20% 42% 30% 
     
Notice of 
scheduling** 
3 days 3 days 1 month 1 month 
     
Minimum hour 
guarantee 
(weekly)** 
7 hours No minimum Within range of annual 
average (FT:9, PT:5) 
Within range of annual 
average (FT:9, PT:5) 
     
Main criteria for 
distributing 
hours** 
Seniority Availability C.A. scheduling 
provisions 
C.A. scheduling 
provisions 
* Represents union estimates of average part-time rates for supermarkets in CAN-1 and CAN-2, and union data representing the 
retail sector as a whole for SWE-1 and SWE-2 (where single-store data was not available). Part-time workers are categorised as 
those working less than 35 hours per week. 
**Based on analyses of key collective agreements representative of CAN-1 and CAN-2, and sectoral agreements for SWE-1 and 
SWE-2. 
 
 
The final major difference relates to the creation of outsiders. CAN-1 and CAN-2 have permitted 
the transfer of essential functions to non-union workers. Non-union workers now perform 
traditional (e.g. shelving) and non-traditional (e.g. cell phone sales) functions within stores. 
These workers lack access to basic protections such as guaranteed rates of pay under salary 
scales, pay supplements, or scheduling protections. This has not occurred in SWE-1 and SWE-2. 
While SWE-1 and SWE-2 have made significant use of temporary 6-month contracts permitted 
under both collective agreements and the law, these employees enjoy the same forms of 
protection as those provided to standard employees.  
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5.3.2 Analysing the effects of partnering on risk  
The following sections analyse the effects of three features of the partnerships on risk in 
Canadian and Swedish supermarkets: in human resource practices across companies and stores, 
in addressing the insider-outsider problem, and in whether market competition was a source of 
structural power.  
 
The Canadian Partnerships 
The Canadian partnerships were initiated as a response to the bankruptcies of two major 
unionised food retailers which accounted for 90% of market share in the early 1980s. The 
bankruptcies came as a shock to the union. Until then, the union’s strategy was self-described as 
“militant”, an aggressive bargaining stance relying on strike threats to win improvements to their 
collective agreements. However, union representatives “saw low-cost competition eating up the 
market share” of unionised stores and calculated that these stores required more flexibility if they 
were to survive in the new competitive environment.  
Officials in the retail union in Quebec province boast that they stopped treating employers “as 
the enemy” in response to market change, a view they believe distinguishes them from other 
locals in the country. Managers in the province also embraced collaboration. Based in a French-
speaking province with a unique union friendly heritage, labour relations managers with CAN-1 
and CAN-2 indicated that union legitimacy was an important component of “Quebec values”. 
However, they also calculated that combative relations would be unwise in a legal context where, 
unlike in the neighbouring US, they had no easy exit from collective bargaining. 
Furthermore, unionists became aware of the dangers of strike activity in the industry. Strikes 
threatened store market share and union membership levels. Negotiators for CAN-1 and CAN-2 
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mentioned a well-known set of strikes initiated against a chain of supermarkets by another union 
local in the Thunder Bay region of the province of Ontario. In 2002, this company nearly closed 
three stores –a potential loss of 481 jobs – after a lengthy and costly strike. These stores never 
regained the market share lost during the strike. Thus, company managers are as eager as the 
union to avoid lock-outs. According to an industry expert, CAN-2 cannot afford to strike, since 
“[CAN-2’s stores] have been losing share to [competitors] in a big way in terms of the traditional 
grocers but also to the lower-cost formats”.  
Recognising the risks of strike action, union and company negotiators rely on “other means of 
influence”. This entails negotiating agreements that foster innovation to maintain sales. For 
example, a lead union negotiator described how CAN-1 and CAN-2 need to consult the union 
before introducing any new services that could contravene existing agreements. This creates a 
dynamic where the union has become a partner in innovation, in exchange for a say in how the 
innovation affects workers. CAN-1 and CAN-2 use investments as a source of influence. One 
manager argued that cooperative unions “gets better results” in collective bargaining because 
they maintain a stable investment climate. The command over investment-making is a source of 
considerable power for employers in a context where the union cannot use strikes and is fearful 
of losing members. 
To protect their members jobs, the union collaborated with CAN-1 and CAN-2 in adapting their 
agreements to local market conditions. To facilitate this process, CAN-1 and CAN-2 categorised 
their stores based on factors such as profitability, real estate costs, and the age of stores. For 
example, workers in stores with high performance, low real estate costs, and longer tenure can 
earn up to “2 to 3 dollars more per hour” than stores not matching those metrics. These criteria 
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informed concession-bargaining during the 1980s and 1990s, where wages fell from a peak of 
around “$12.50 an hour to $8.50” an hour and scheduling protections were lifted.  
Comparisons of full-service supermarkets to discount stores fostered downward competition for 
flexibility in collective agreements. While non-union discount stores such as Wal-Mart posed a 
problem, it was the discount stores operated by CAN-1 and CAN-2 that posed the most critical 
threat to traditional stores. As one union leader describes, a CAN-1 discount store can generate 
“$800,000 per week” in sales with only 50 employees, while a full-service store would require 
200 employees for the same volume. Moreover, these discount stores offer lower prices for the 
same goods (e.g. one industry study finds that sugar, oils, and coffee are 12% cheaper in 
unionised discount-chains), and are often strategically positioned in the same neighborhoods as 
supermarkets with CAN-1 and CAN-2.  
The Canadian partnerships also promoted flexible insider-outsider dynamics. One example is the 
introduction of non-union shelvers. Prior to 1983, all shelving was conducted in-house. Based on 
industry practices with non-union retailers, suppliers of “soft drinks, baby food, spices, and 
bread” found that they could improve product turnover by assuming responsibility for shelving 
their products. This put considerable pressure on unionised chains to negotiate purchasing 
agreements that were like those of non-union retailers.  
Another example is the introduction of non-union cell phone kiosks within CAN-2’s stores. The 
intention was to provide a third-party with a “40-square foot spot’ within stores in which they 
could test the model’s profitability. However, CAN-2 wanted its unions to cooperate by letting 
the third-party operate these kiosks with non-union workers during the experimental phase. The 
intent was to “bring up sales in the store” and to attract “new investment”. If successful, the 
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employees would eventually be incorporated into the collective agreement and the whole store’s 
workforce could benefit from its profitability.  
Other locals in the country resisted company efforts to outsource these functions. “No supplier 
was allowed to stock shelves” across stores in other provinces and CAN-2 faced a wave of 
grievances for its cell phone kiosk initiative in the rest of the country. Quebec stores faced no net 
loss in in-store hours from the introduction of non-union shelvers and cell phone kiosk workers 
were eventually integrated in the collective agreement. However, these practices, along with 
others, led to the creation of a non-union segment within stores bereft of the protections provided 
by collective agreements. 
Not surprisingly, there is no cooperation across unionised chains to expand collective bargaining 
coverage. Managers with CAN-1 and CAN-2 have long been vehemently opposed to collective 
arrangements that bind entire sectors. Along with the third largest Canadian food retailer, CAN-1 
and CAN-2 met with the president of the union to discuss how to counter the Wal-Mart threat 
prior to its entry in the Canadian market in 1994. The union proposed sectoral bargaining as a 
win-win solution for unionised retailers and their workers. Sectoral bargaining, it was argued, 
would set working conditions for the entire sector, preventing Wal-Mart from gaining a cost-
advantage on unionised retailers by avoiding unions and applying low-road HR practices to cut 
costs. 
Interviewed managers identified two rationales for resisting the introduction of sectoral 
bargaining. First, managers with CAN-1 and CAN-2 believed that imposing coverage on other 
employers was against their “management philosophy”. They also cited a more pragmatic 
reason: the worry that sectoral bargaining would have a ripple effect on CAN-1 and CAN-2’s 
non-union operations in retail.  
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The union’s complaint-based approach to organising does not contradict this logic. Only stores 
whose employees have filed complaints with the union are targeted for certification. Thus, high 
road firms can continue to exist union free, so long as they respect their employees. “Costco is 
not a problem for us”, said one union leader, who praised this non-union chain for offering high-
end wages and benefit packages.  
 
The Swedish Partnerships 
The bargaining environment in Swedish retail is highly cooperative. According to a senior 
economist with the retail union, colleagues in other countries “struggle to understand how we 
can be enemies at the bargaining table while engaged in such deep collaboration”. The Swedish 
Retail and Wholesale Council is evidence of this “deep collaboration”, with its strong investment 
in research and deliberation in areas of joint-concern to union and management such as 
occupational health and safety, restructuring and job transitions, and skills. 
The current deep collaboration is an outcome of a major conflict that arose in the mid-1990s. 
According to a senior economist with the retail union, the employers’ association for retail was 
embracing “neoliberal ideas” during this period, not to mention an initiative to pressure the union 
to decentralize by substituting company-level agreements for sectoral agreements.  
The conflict between the employers’ association and the union peaked in 1995, when the retail 
employers’ association wanted to lower pay rates for “unsocial hours”. These high rates of pay 
for unsocial hours – the highest in Sweden - were negotiated in the first bargaining round 
following the deregulation of shop opening hours in 1971. Employers initially accepted these 
rates, however, opposition to them increased as consumer demand for products in unsocial hours 
made the cost burden of these pay rates unbearable for employers.  
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This conflict culminated in a sector-wide strike against most retailers in the industry, but not all 
of them, a fact which left the employers divided. Thus, when the retail employers’ association 
retaliated by announcing that its members would initiate two-hour lock-outs every morning, 
those unaffected by the strikes refused to comply in fear of the financial consequences. As put by 
the employers’ association’s lead negotiator: “labour negotiations at that specific time were 
poorly planned and badly executed. Nothing an employers’ [association] can be proud of.”  The 
employers’ association for cooperatives was restricted from entering the conflict, due to an 80-
year-old arrangement restricting them from industrial action. 
The Swedish retail experience is not typical. Its deep collaboration is unique, as most sectors 
have shifted towards “more conflictual bargaining relations” in past decades. Due to this, the 
stability of economic security arrangements in retail is unlike comparable sectors. For example, 
rates of pay (due to weak supplements for unsocial hours) and working hour protections are 
drastically inferior in the restaurant and hotel sectors, where gaps in coverage (75%) and a 
weaker bargaining relationship have prevented the actors from partnering to standardize working 
conditions across firms. 
Unlike Canada, market competition was a source of power for the Swedish retail union. During 
the strike, the retail union was not worried about protecting the market share of individual stores. 
All major chains were covered by sectoral agreements. So rather than focus on preserving 
individual firms’ market share to maintain membership levels, the union concentrated its efforts 
on resisting concessions to please its members.  
Union officials describe their win during the 1995 conflict as having precipitated the turn 
towards deepened collaboration. The employers’ association hired new staff that were more 
 134 
 
sympathetic to the concerns of the labour movement and turned their focus to deepening 
collaboration.  
It is noteworthy that the employers’ association for retail still cooperated with the union in other 
areas throughout the 1995 conflict, including the extension of labour standards to all firms. The 
union, along with SWE-1 and SWE-2, have benefited from standardisation since the 1980s. First, 
there is the obvious benefit of requiring all major competitors to adhere to the same labour 
standards, preventing low-road competitors from undercutting firms that are bound by collective 
agreements. Second, unlike Canada, Swedish bargaining and labour laws interact to shape 
important outcomes for work organisation.  
Most interesting are provisions that encourage cross-training and job rotation. Sweden’s Work 
Environment Act, along with best practices negotiated by the union and the two employers’ 
associations, set industry standards for avoiding monotonous and strenuous work. For example, 
cashiers “shouldn’t sit for more than 2 hours” in peak periods of customer traffic. And similar to 
other blue-collar agreements in Sweden, workers are trained to occupy various posts within the 
store. According to an employers’ representative: “usually, everybody doesn’t do everything, but 
you could ask them to do anything within the store”. The outcome is that job rotation and 
competition on the basis of reduced working hours (i.e. trying to manage stores with the fewest 
number of workers possible) represents the most common HR strategy to cut costs.  
Due to standardisation, the entry of Danish and German discount stores in 2002 and 2003 
respectively did not affect worker risk in SWE-1 and SWE-2. Initially absent from the Swedish 
economy, these discount stores are now major competitors (e.g. earning 6.1% of market share in 
2016). There is no justification for concession bargaining, however, since new entrants conform 
to Swedish standards for working conditions and work organisation in retail.  
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When SWE-2 experienced unstable profitability and diminished market share over the last 
decade, neither side of the negotiating table considered firm-specific concessions to be the 
solution. One union representative blamed their business strategy: “they are 100% focused on 
cost-cutting... So, I asked a question…where is [your strategy for] market share? Where is the 
strategy for increasing the turnover on [inventory]? Not a single word on it. If you’re going to 
have a strategy where you will cut costs, but not increase sales, close the shop and give it to 
someone else.” 
The Swedish partnership has also favoured the integration of outsiders to prevent unfair 
competition. This involved extending coverage to competitors.  A lawyer with the employer’s 
association described this in the following terms: “We want the union to represent all or most 
employers in the [sector]…we usually tell our opponents that we want them to work more in 
getting more members. It’s not common in other countries, but we’re fairly union friendly.” 
Foreign companies are aware of union and employer attitudes towards collective bargaining. 
They engage in frequent consultations with the retail union to ensure a peaceful transition. For 
example, the German discount store discussed earlier, notorious for its anti-union stance in its 
home country, was described as “rather good” at conforming to the Swedish retail agreement by 
a lead official with the retail union. 
The entry of Toys R Us in the mid-1990s sent a signal to foreign retailers interested in the 
Swedish market. After refusing to sign the sectoral retail agreement, the union responded with 
strikes and sympathy actions that amounted to a full-blown boycott of the company. Most 
interestingly, the employer’s association representing SWE-1 broke its association with the 
company, insisting that the company’s actions were not in the interests of its members and 
collective bargaining. They simply didn’t “want companies that pay less wages and have lower 
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working conditions, to sell toys with other companies”, which is why they cooperated with the 
union on this matter. 
The same logic applies to workers within stores. The union and leading grocers have cooperated 
to ensure that all essential functions performed within the store are carried out by workers 
covered by the retail agreement. Those whose work within the store does not relate to these core 
functions, such as “cleaning and janitorial services”, are simply covered by another sector’s 
agreement.  
 
5.3.3 Comparative analysis 
The findings illustrate the connections between three central features of partnerships in both 
institutional contexts and their implications for employee risk (Table 5.4). The first addresses the 
role of structural power in shaping the partnership agenda. The Canadian and Swedish unions 
both had high rates of coverage in 1980. However, the entry of discount stores only destabilised 
union power in the Canadian context. Under store-based bargaining, the Canadian partnerships 
were formed in a context of union weakness, as the ability to strike diminished with the rise of 
new competitors in the market and the need to maintain market share to preserve union presence 
in the sector. This limited the capacity of the union and employers to address broader risk-related 
concerns in collective bargaining. On the other hand, the Swedish partnerships deepened from a 
conflict in which the union used its structural power to punish and divide employers that demand 
concessions. This enabled the union to address broader risk-related concerns, without having to 
worry about maintaining union presence or the individual market share of specific firms.  
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Table 5.4 – Partnering Strategies in Canadian and Swedish Food Retail 
Companies Bargaining 
Structure 
Central Features Relation to Risk 
CAN-1, CAN-2 Store-based  
Low structural power derived from 
market competition  
 
 
Localisation of HR practices 
 
 
Flexible insider-outsider dynamics 
Limits capacity to address broader 
risk-related concerns in collective 
bargaining 
 
Cost-cutting and flexibilisation to 
undercut local competition 
 
Increased use of outsiders to match 
HR practices in non-union firms 
 
 
SWE-1, SWE-2 
Sectoral, all-
encompassing  
High structural power derived from 
market competition 
 
 
Standardisation of HR practices 
 
 
 
Integration of outsiders 
Enables broader risk-related 
concerns to be addressed in 
collective bargaining 
 
Decouples risk from competition by 
enforcing labour standards across 
firms 
 
The transfer of risks to outsiders is 
barred from a factor of competition 
 
Second, sectoral bargaining in Swedish retail provided both employers and unions with a stake in 
cooperating to standardize human resource strategies across firms. This enabled risk issues to be 
decoupled from competition, but also served to protect employers bound to collective 
agreements from being undercut by unfair competition. On the other hand, the decentralised 
structure of Canadian bargaining incentivised CAN-1, CAN-2, and the retail union to cooperate 
in adapting HR practices to local market competition. This negatively impacted risk by 
subjecting unionised workers to cost-cutting and flexibilisation.  
Finally, the different bargaining structures also shaped partnership dynamics with respect to 
outsiders. The Canadian partnerships accepted that select operations and occupations could be 
non-union. The major goal pursued in the partnerships was to ensure that HR practices within 
unionised stores matched those of non-union stores as much as possible, thus introducing the 
creation of a segment of the workforce without the basic protections provided by collective 
agreements. The Swedish partnerships focused on integrating firms and occupations into 
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collective agreements, to prevent the transfer of risks to outsiders from being a factor of 
competition.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
This study explores how institutional contexts – namely bargaining structures – affect the 
potential for partnerships to yield positive outcomes for worker security. The results are subject 
to the generalizability limitation of case studies, but are strengthened by how they provide a 
deeper contextualised analysis of how partnerships shape risk trends in organisations over time.  
This study makes three contributions. First, it provides a more nuanced understanding of how 
partnerships affect employee risk. The underdeveloped literature on this topic generally depicts 
partnerships as being negative for risks, but relies on select single-country studies (Martinez 
Lucio and Stuart, 2005; Jenkins, 2007). More broadly, the results suggest that the dichotomy 
between those supportive of partnerships and those that are not is overly simplistic. For example, 
it was found that partnerships may be more successful against risk under centralised bargaining 
structures which mitigated the more negative aspects of market competition. This is not to 
suggest that a partnership strategy in a context of decentralised bargaining was the wrong 
strategy. Smaller unions in Quebec province had adopted more militant strategies with no 
evidence of superior results. The largest retail union in Quebec argues that its long-term 
partnership strategy that could garner future results but absent major changes to the bargaining 
structure or competitive environment the prospects seem unlikely. 
Second, this research contributes to bridging the gap between research on institutions and 
strategies by demonstrating how they are interrelated. The fact that working conditions in retail 
differ across institutional contexts is recognised in the literature (Carré and Tilly, 2017; Carré et 
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al., 2010; Askenazy et al., 2012; Coulter, 2014). Moreover, the importance of bargaining 
structures to risk is of growing interest (Marginson et al., 2014; Marginson, 2015a). However, 
this study’s focus on companies within two countries limits its generalizability. Further research 
contrasting partnerships in multiple centralised and decentralised sectors, or contrasting 
partnerships with more militant bargaining units, would build on the findings of this article.  
Third, the argument presented in this article resonates with those who suggest that sectoral 
dynamics matter to bargaining outcomes (Bechter et al., 2012).  It applies to negotiations in local 
service sectors, as bargaining structures yield considerable influence over the nature of 
competition in this setting. It does not apply, however, to international service sectors and 
manufacturing, as the competitive landscape for these sectors is outside of the scope of local 
bargaining structures. In other words it is important to take into account such societal effects as 
the importance of national forms of solidarity and coordination (Thelen, 2014). However, a core 
point in this article is that unique features of the partnerships in Swedish retail, namely the deep 
collaboration in all-encompassing bargaining, have helped it to maintain levels of security that 
are higher than in other sectors with the country (e.g. hotels and restaurants).  
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Chapter 6 
Negotiating Insecurity? A Comparison of Bargaining Strategies in North American and 
European Supermarkets 
(Article 3) 
Abstract 
This article examines the effects of bargaining strategies and related contextual variables on 
three dimensions of risk in low-skilled service work. It draws on contextualised case studies of 8 
supermarket chains in Canada, Germany, Sweden, and the United States from 1980 to 2016. The 
data consists of 97 interviews with managers, union representatives, and expert witnesses, as 
well as archival data and collective agreements. Findings point to the importance of both union 
and employer strategies to risk mitigation. However, their impacts can only be understood in 
relation to trends in price competition, institutional change, and the financialisation of corporate 
governance. They also show that union strategies matter less when they are negotiating from a 
position of weakness.  
 
Risky jobs have proliferated in past decades. This rise has fallen under many labels, whether it’s 
the growth of the “precariat” (Standing, 2011) or dead-end “McJobs” (Lindsay and McQuaid, 
2004). Whatever the label, the take-away is that an increasing number of workers, especially 
low-wage service workers (Kalleberg, 2009; Gautié and Schmitt, 2009), are critically exposed to 
economic uncertainty. Low-pay, erratic scheduling, and the dismantling of traditional benefit 
arrangements represent the norm in many industries. It should come as no surprise that growing 
debt burdens and withering income protections are forcing workers to forego the purchase of 
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life’s necessities (e.g. groceries) (Lozza et al., 2013), breaking up families (Roeters et al., 2010; 
Kalmijn, 2007), and contributing to mental health problems such as depression, substance abuse, 
and even suicide (Goldman-Mellor et al., 2010).  
The rise in insecurity has sparked a vigorous debate on the role of collective bargaining in 
shaping its trajectories. Collective bargaining’s role in mitigating risk is undergoing considerable 
stress as the “reconfiguration” of welfare states has expanded the bargaining agenda to address 
new forms of insecurity (Schelkle, 2011) and intensified price competition has contributed to the 
erosion of institutions for employee voice around the world (Greer and Doellgast, 2017). Union 
responses to new pressures vary. Militant unions are using strikes and protests to pressure 
employers into abandoning efforts to shed risks onto their employees. Others have adopted a 
“mutual gains” approach, preferring to invest in their relationship with managers - sometimes 
even partnering with them - under the aspiration that worker security will be preserved through 
the mutual recognition of interests. Meanwhile, some employers are applying commitment 
strategies to maximize employee productivity and product quality (Bamber et al., 2009; Walton 
et al., 2000) while others are resorting to compliance strategies based on discipline and cost-
cutting to maintain their market edge (Kalleberg’s, 2003). Unfortunately, there is a lack of 
research on how bargaining strategies interact with risk (Lucio and Stuart, 2005) and a need for 
cross-national comparisons of how contextual factors are affecting work in low-skilled service 
sectors (Price et al., 2014). 
This article provides an in-depth analysis of how collective bargaining strategies affect risk in 
different contexts. The findings are based on contextualised case studies of 8 supermarket chains 
divided evenly across four countries: Canada, Germany, Sweden, and the United States. The 
comparative angle of this study enables it to account for market-related, institutional and 
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organisational factors, by contrasting chain experiences across and within countries. The study 
also explores how these strategies interacted with contextual change over time (1980 to 2016).   
This research finds that all supermarket chains experienced negative risk outcomes. 
Nevertheless, there was a split across the cases, with four chains being considerably less affected 
by negative risk trends than the others. The findings show that bargaining strategies were of 
much significance to risk outcomes, but that their effects must be understood in relation to those 
of contextual factors.  
This article is organised in five parts: 1) a review of the relevant literatures on risk; 2) the 
research design and case selection; 3) a presentation of the research results; 4) comparative 
analysis to explain the variations across cases; and 5) a conclusion.  
 
6.1 A review of the literature 
6.1.1 Defining risk 
This research focuses on risk. Risk refers to the extent that workers face uncertainty in their 
material lives (Kalleberg, 2009; Heery and Salmon, 2000).  It encompasses variabilities in 
incomes and benefits, but also other areas that affect workers’ ability to cover basic expenses, 
such as scheduling and health benefit arrangements. This article proposes that risks manifest 
themselves through three dimensions (described in Table 6.1). First, originating in the “welfare 
mix” literature (Seeleib-Kaiser et al., 2012; Esping-Andersen, 1990), generosity represents the 
resources provided by social actors (firms and states) to mitigate risk, such as wages or benefit 
contributions. Workers are less hurt by variable working conditions when high resource 
provision helped them save for the future. Second, individualisation is based in the “risk shift” 
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literature (Hacker, 2006; Beck, 2000), representing the extent that the costs of economic 
adversity are borne by individuals as opposed to firms or the state. Much of this relates to 
whether firms or states are bound to providing minimum guarantees independently of economic 
circumstances. For example, working hour risks are highly individualised when firms have full 
discretion to reduce them when faced with real or declining revenues, but collectivised when 
firms are committed to minimum hour guarantees, advanced scheduling notice, or some other 
standard. Third, segmentation draws inspiration from the dualisation literature (Doeringer and 
Piore, 1971), focusing on how working conditions are isolated across labour market segments 
based on employment status and social location (race, age, gender) (Osterman and Burton, 2005; 
Cranford et al., 2006). Its contribution to risk is negative when risks are disproportionately 
offloaded to specific worker segments that have weak opportunities for cross-over. 
 
These three dimensions constitute an integrated framework for analyzing risk trajectories across 
firms.  Low-risk scenarios arise when social arrangements that mitigate risks are generous, 
Dimensions Definition  Examples of increased risk 
Declining 
generosity  
(Increasing 
generosity) 
A reduction in the level of 
private and public resources 
available to alleviate risks 
An Increase in the level of private and 
public resources available to alleviate 
risks 
Wage rate reductions, working hour reductions, lower 
employer benefit contributions 
 
Individualisation 
(Collectivisation) 
The extent that workers must 
bear responsibility for risk 
mitigation alone  
The extent that firms and states 
provide minimum guarantees to 
protect workers from adverse 
circumstances 
 
Abandonment of real wage increase commitments, weakened 
scheduling guarantees, shifts from collectivised insurance to 
savings accounts 
 
Segmentation 
(Integration) 
The extent that risks are 
confined to workers by social 
location or employment status  
The extent that risks are more equally 
spread across categories of workers 
Development of riskier terms of employment for part-timers, 
creation of non-union jobs or establishments, tiered wages 
and benefits discriminate against newer employees 
Table 6.1 – Description of Risk Dimensions: The Case of Increased Risk 
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collectivised, and integrated (i.e. segmentation is weak). High-risk scenarios arise when social 
arrangements are not generous, individualised, and segmented (see Figure 6.1). Mixed outcomes 
are also possible. This is a strength of the framework, in that it facilitates a more nuanced 
understanding of risk by tracing trends across these three dimensions.  
  
 
 
6.1.2 What factors affect risk? 
The aim of this article is to examine the effects of collective bargaining strategies on risk (the 
dependent variable). In order to do so, it explores the effects of a broader range of factors, 
including changes in market dynamics, institutions, and organisational factors, in order to 
delineate the influence of bargaining strategies.  
Figure: 6.1: An Illustration of High-Low Risk Trends 
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Markets 
The concept of marketisation is mobilised to examine how market dynamics affect bargaining 
outcomes. It is defined as the “intensification of price-based competition” (Greer and Doellgast, 
2017). This intensification can be precipitated by many factors, including the entry of new 
competitors to domestic markets, the internationalisation of markets, labour market deregulation, 
the vertical disintegration of the firm, and the arrival of new technology. When marketisation is 
high, profit-margins grow tighter and employers experience considerable pressure to cut costs. 
For example, historical research has documented how Wal-Mart’s successes in supply-chain 
optimisation, anti-union avoidance strategies, and aggressive control of in-store labour costs 
have undermined traditional retailers’ competitive position, pushing them to introduce extreme 
forms of insecurity to compete based on low costs (Lichtenstein, 2009; Carré and Tilly, 2017). 
Marketisation also matters for collective bargaining because it drives competition for weaker 
working conditions across bargaining units (Greer and Hauptmeier, 2016), making it difficult for 
unions to avoid concessions (Pulignano et al., 2016). Thus, intensified price competition should 
exert negative effects on worker risk (Proposition 1). 
Institutions 
Institutional factors are also identified. The first factor is market coordination. The Varieties of 
Capitalism framework (Hall and Soskice, 2001) suggests that firms in coordinated market 
economies invest more in improving working conditions because institutional complementarities 
in their industrial relations institutions emphasize the long term and quality-focused HR systems. 
Its proponents identify complementarities across four areas: corporate governance, training and 
education, collective bargaining, and inter-firm relations. For example, research on Denmark, 
Canada, Germany, Korea and the USA shows that vocational and educational training (VET) is 
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embedded in other national institutions, demonstrating why training fosters innovation and 
improved work outcomes in coordinated market economies (Bosch and Charest, 2008). The 
general premise from this literature is that firms in coordinated economies are less likely to 
impose negative risks on workers, since doing so would contradict incentives derived from their 
institutional contexts (Proposition 2a). 
The second factor is bargaining structure. Research on multi-employer bargaining arrangements 
shows that they mitigate against the negative “externalities” of market competition and “firm 
contingency” on workers (Marginson et al., 2014). This has important effects for insecurity, 
particularly when bargaining coverage is high. This argument speaks to the old adage that large 
firms and unions often-times prefer centralised structures to drive “out low-cost competition” 
(Katz, 1993). By setting common standards across firms, multi-employer agreements prevent 
low-road competition from arising, providing employers with more institutional certainty in 
terms of the competitive environment (Laroche and Murray, 2012). These results presume that 
multi-employer agreements covering high proportions of workers should be associated with 
lower levels of worker risk than single-employer or establishment-level agreements (Proposition 
2b).  
Organisations 
Organisational factors are also of relevance to worker risk. The financialisation of corporate 
governance is singled out for its importance to risk. Krippner (2005: 181) argues that 
financialisation denotes “a pattern of accumulation in which profits accrue primarily through 
financial channels rather than through trade and commodity production”. Publicly listed firms 
have been criticised for their aggressive focus on shareholder value at the expense of 
stakeholders, including customers and workers. Employers can now boost share value by 
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stripping assets and cutting labour costs, even when doing so may damage potential sales growth 
and product quality over the long-term (Foroohar, 2016; Appelbaum and Batt, 2014). Risk 
outcomes are thereby likely to be poorest in companies that are publicly owned (Proposition 3a), 
especially those whose major shareholder is an institutional investor (Proposition 3b).  
 
Bargaining Strategies 
Firm and union bargaining strategies represent the focus of this paper. First, firm bargaining 
strategies are related to their desired HR outcomes. Employers can opt for a compliance strategy 
seeking to bargain for changes that provide them with greater control over their employees 
(Walton et al., 2000; Walton, 1985). Consistent with "Taylorist" doctrine, this strategy does not 
require much concern for the well-being of workers, as its core focus is on applying disciplinary 
actions and routinisation to maintain productivity. Kalleberg’s (2003) critique is that control-
oriented HR models treat workers as “disposable” inputs of production, as “numerical 
flexibility” has become the over-riding objective of firms committed to this strategy.  
Other employers motivate their employees through a commitment strategy. This entails investing 
in employee training, generous compensation practices, and in providing workers with a pleasant 
work environment (Walton et al., 2000; Kochan and Osterman, 1994; Bamber et al., 2009). In a 
sense, commitment strategies resemble “high road” approaches to labour in that employers reap 
the benefits of not being the lowest payer in their market segment (Osterman, 2018). Employers 
committed to this strategy adhere to above-industry labour standards to maintain low levels of 
turnover and loyalty to the organisation. While they benefit from increased commitment, they 
tend to face cost problems (Walton, 1985), particularly in low-skilled service industries where 
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tight profit-margins and low skill requirements (Batt, 2000; Kochan and Osterman, 1994). For 
this reason, firms catering to higher value-added customers are more likely to invest in employee 
commitment than those that do not, due to the higher costs of goods and skill requirements in 
these market segments (Batt, 2000; Batt, 2001). Taking this into account, while commitment 
strategies, as opposed to flexibility strategies, should be associated with lower levels of risk 
(Proposition 4a), their positive impacts will be stronger when coupled with business strategies 
geared towards customer segmentation (Proposition 4b).  
Three types of union strategies are identified. First, a considerable body of literature points to 
mobilisation strategies as a key source of influence for unions (Frege and Kelly, 2003; Heery, 
2002; Boxall and Haynes, 1997) A mobilisation strategy is one in which unions engage their 
workers and other stakeholders (other unions and community groups) to exert coordinated 
pressures onto employers. The premise is that employers facing union mobilisation are less likely 
to propose risky concessions, in fear that union retaliation – in the form of strikes or protests – 
would damage profitability. It follows that union mobilisation strategies will be associated with 
low levels of risk (Proposition 4c).   
Second, “servicing” strategies are those in which unions provide basic collective bargaining 
services to their constituents (consultation and negotiation) and rely on their relationships with 
managers to influence bargaining outcomes (Boxall and Haynes, 1997). The use of servicing 
alone is perceived as strategically “flawed” as it leaves unions unprepared to threaten industrial 
action when their relationships with managers deteriorate (Heery, 2002). Third, partnerships 
complement servicing with a joint commitment to organisational performance (Kochan and 
Osterman, 1994). These strategies have been criticised for facilitating the managerialisation of 
union functions (Rolfsen, 2011; Evans et al., 2017) and risky concessions in environments where 
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leverage is “asymmetrically” stacked against workers (Lucio and Stuart, 2005; Jenkins, 2007). 
While many researchers are critical of these strategies, important research also points to some 
successes with both servicing (Price et al., 2014) and partnering (Bamber et al., 2009; Kochan 
and Osterman). The majority view, on which we draw here, is that servicing (Proposition 4d) and 
partnering (Proposition 4e) are likely to be associated with negative impacts on risk. 
It would be nonsensical to examine actor strategies without paying heed to actors’ ability to 
implement them. The concept of power is therefore mobilised to understand the potential impact 
of union bargaining strategies. Solidaristic power is identified, both internal and external 
(Levesque and Murray, 2010; Levesque and Murray, 2002). Internal solidarity refers to fostering 
“deliberative vitality” and “cohesive collective identities” towards common goals for workers. 
External solidarity addresses coalition building between unions and community actors. The 
strength of this conception of power is its relevance to unions irrespective of their geographical 
location. Addressing these two types, solidaristic power should be associated with lower levels 
of risk (Proposition 4f). 
Each of these propositions are tested to delineate the impacts of both contextual and bargaining 
strategies on risk. They are summarised in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2 – Summary of Propositions 
Propositions Description of proposition 
1 Intensified price competition is associated with higher risk outcomes 
2a Firms in coordinated market economies expose their workers to lower risk outcomes 
2b Multi-employer bargaining structures are associated with lower risk outcomes 
3a Publicly owned companies expose their workers to higher risk outcomes 
3b Firms governed by institutional investors expose their workers to higher risk outcomes 
4a Firm commitment strategies are associated with higher risks outcomes than compliance strategies 
4b Firms catering to high value-added customers expose their workers to lower risk outcomes 
4c Union mobilisation strategies are associated with lower risk outcomes 
4d Servicing strategies are associated with higher risk outcomes 
4e Partnering strategies are associated with higher risk outcomes 
4f Higher levels of solidaristic power are associated with lower risk outcomes 
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6.2 Research design and methodology 
Comparative contextualised case studies of supermarket chains in the retail sector were chosen 
as the best way to conduct this research. The retail sector was chosen for being an iconic low-
wage sector. It is the single largest segment of the growing precariat (Standing, 2011). However, 
international research also points to significant cross-national divergences in job quality in this 
sector (Carré and Tilly, 2017; Grugulis and Bozkurt, 2011; Carré et al., 2010), facilitating fruitful 
comparisons for debunking the “inevitable” nature of bad jobs in low-skilled service work. The 
food retail experience is of focus. Union presence in food retail tends to be much higher than in 
other industries in retail (amongst developed countries), making it a window for the study of 
collective bargaining in the sector. 
Supermarket chains were examined in four national contexts: Canada, Germany, Sweden, and 
the United States. This strategy had the dual purpose of contrasting the effects of coordinated 
(Germany and Sweden) and liberal market (Canada and U.S.) institutions, as well as holding 
them constant by comparing chains within each institutional cluster. Informed by preliminary 
field research, variations within Canada and the United States were also examined to isolate the 
importance of actor strategies and collective bargaining arrangements across sub-national 
jurisdictions. Thus, collective bargaining dynamics in Ontario and Quebec (Canada), as well as 
New York City and New England (U.S.), are compared.  
Two chains were examined in each country. The chains exhibit important similarities. The core 
sales focus of each chain is grocery and they all operate on a full-service model (meat cutting, 
baking, cheese stands, and so forth). Table 6.3 illustrates major differences across chains. The 
chains differ by their jurisdictions’ bargaining level, size (number of stores), ownership 
structures (firm and store), and profitability.  
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The historical period examined in each case is from 1980 to 2016. This timeline was chosen 
because it reflects significant changes in the industry and collective bargaining across the cases 
(identified through preliminary interviews). This enables the research to capture key trends in 
risk, as well as how actors responded to these trends over time.  
To summarize, this research design entails comparative and historical contextualisation of these 
cases. The objective is to chart and account for differences in risk outcomes in different 
institutional contexts over time. In particular, the focus is on the relative role of collective 
bargaining in shaping these risk outcomes.  
Table 6.3 – Case Background: 2016 
 
Chains 
Jurisdiction 
Examined 
Bargaining 
Level 
# of stores 
nationally Firm Ownership  Store Ownership  Profitability 
USA-1 New England Chain 413 Shares spread out thinly across 
various minority shareholders 
Corporate Strong  
USA-2 New York City Chain 14 Privately owned by an 
institutional investor 
Corporate Weak 
CAN-1  
 
Ontario and 
Quebec 
Chain (ON) & 
Store (QC) 
343 Major shareholder is an 
institutional investor 
Corporate, 
Franchise, & 
Independent 
Retail 
Strong 
CAN-2 Ontario and 
Quebec 
Chain (ON) & 
Store (QC) 
400 Major shareholder is a family Corporate Strong 
DEU-1 
 
Country-wide Sector 7,181* Self-owned by several 
independent retailer 
cooperatives 
Corporate & 
Independent 
Retail 
Strong 
DEU-2 
 
Country-wide Sector 282 Major shareholders are families Corporate Weak 
SWE-1 
 
Country-wide Sector 429 Owned by independent retailers Independent 
Retail 
Strong 
SWE-2 
 
Country-wide Sector 241 Consumers cooperative Corporate Weak 
* This estimate is inflated because the store doesn’t disaggregate traditional supermarkets from other store formats 
(e.g. convenience stores) 
Table 6.4 – Interviews by Country 
Country Canada Germany Sweden United States 
Worker 
representatives 
25 11 10 9 
Employer 
representatives 
11 6 4 1 
Expert witnesses  7 6 5 2 
Total 43 23 19 12 
 
The contextualised case-study methodology employs a “reflexive” ethnographical approach 
(Burawoy, 2003), consisting of numerous on-site and off-site interviews, at different points in 
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time with labour market actors and observers able to share their case experience through the 
period of observation. These interviews are complemented by other data sources to situate actor 
strategies in their broader contexts (Edwards and Belanger, 2008). 97 semi-structured interviews5 
were conducted with union representatives, managers and employers’ association 
representatives, and expert witnesses exposed to collective bargaining (e.g. HR consultants, 
mediators, private researchers) (Table 6.4). 17 of these interviews were preliminary. Most of the 
interviews took place from 2015 to 2018 (some preliminary interviews were conducted earlier). 
The higher number of interviews in Canada is explained by the need to investigate the 
experiences of chains (CAN-1 and CAN-2) in two different provinces. Follow-up interviews 
were conducted with certain officials to expand on key areas.  
Coding was used to analyse the data. First-level coding (converting longer transcriptions into 
brief) was followed by “pattern coding” to organize the data by themes used to test the 
hypotheses (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Archival data (company reports, press releases, and 
news media) and collective agreements were analysed to provide contextual understanding and 
triangulate the interview data.  
The strength of this research design and methodology is that it facilitates a deep investigation of 
causal mechanisms pertaining to factors that impact risk. The historical angle is also notable. 
This feature of the research design enables the study to capture dynamics between factors that 
are not possible in research focusing on a single time frame. Two weaknesses in the research 
design and methodology are noteworthy. First, as a limited number of interviewees are examined 
per case, there is the problem of whether these interviewees’ responses are representative of their 
                                                          
5 These interviewees were provided the complete right to consent. In addition to maintaining complete control 
over the research process, they (and their organisations) have been guaranteed complete anonymity in related 
research outputs.  
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cases. This problem is addressed by selecting knowledgeable interviewees and triangulating their 
responses with other data from the field (e.g. archival sources). The study also made use of 
preliminary interviews to inform case and interviewee selection, ensuring that the highest quality 
of data was obtained. Second, there is the challenge of conducting historical research using 
present data sources. Research strategies were used to overcome this challenge. Older generation 
negotiators, retirees, and younger professionals were interviewed to capture dynamics occurring 
at different points of time across the cases. Archival data sources, especially collective 
agreements and media releases, were also analysed to trace risk trends and critical events 
affecting labour relations within the chains.  
 
6.3 Research results 
The following sections present how the cases differ in terms of their exposure to risk, contextual 
factors, and the bargaining strategies of different actors. The first section shows how the risk 
experiences of the supermarket chains are split between high and low risks. The subsequent 
sections examine the contextual and strategic factors associated with each chain. 
 
6.3.1 Comparison of risk trends 
The data suggests that workers in all the supermarket chains experienced some rise in risk. As 
the data exploring its three dimensions (generosity, individualisation, segmentation) reveals, 
however, half of the chains were subject to considerably higher risk increases from 1980 to 2016 
(see Table 6.5).  
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DEU-1, USA-1, CAN-1, and CAN-2 experienced high-risk increases. Most workers in these 
chains experienced a significant net decline in real wages. DEU-1 is an exception, since a 
minority of its workers received wage increases, however these increases did not apply to the 
majority of its workers which were in franchises. Second, not only has part-time work become 
more prevalent in these chains, but scheduling protections are weak. The Canadian chains post 
schedules a few days in advance and provide workers with no input on how scheduling practices 
may meet their personal needs. USA-1 has adopted some restrictions, including a 15-hour 
weekly guarantee for part-timers and rights to refuse work on weekends. However, USA-1 is 
also the only chain whose workers are no longer covered by collectivised health benefits, which 
have been replaced with health savings accounts and annual health benefits that are grossly 
insufficient to meets employee health care needs. In addition, employer contributions to pension 
schemes have declined across all the cases. Segmentation was also high in most of these chains. 
Older full-time workers in USA-1, and CAN-1 and CAN-2’s Ontario subsidiaries received 
superior wage and benefit protections than workers who were either younger or part-time. 
Legislated employment standards prohibited these forms of segmentation in DEU-1 and CAN-1 
and CAN-2’s Quebec subsidiaries. Instead, DEU-1 segmented high risks to its franchises 
operating without collective agreements (60% as of 2016) and the Quebec subsidiaries segment 
risks to workers in less profitable stores.  
SWE-1, SWE-2, DEU-2, and USA-2 experienced low-risk increases. Except for USA-2, workers 
in these chains experienced high real-wage increases. Workers in these chains also receive 
significant wage supplements for work performed in evenings and weekends (SWE-1, SWE-2: 
50-100%; DEU-2: 20-120%; USA-2: 50%). Unlike DEU-1, all of DEU-2’s workers are covered 
by collective agreements and thereby benefit from stable wage rate increases. USA-1’s wage 
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rates have stagnated over the decades. However, it compensates for this by providing most of its 
workers (70%) with full-time hours (exceeding 30 hours per week), with the weekly average 
being 43 hours for those with over two years of tenure with the company. Strong working-hour 
protections are evident across all the cases, for different reasons. For example, SWE-1 and SWE-
2 are required to provide their workers with a month’s scheduling notice, USA-2 provides 
workers with a minimum 21-hour per week guarantee, and DEU-2’s works councils enforce 
strong working-hour protections through their works agreements and veto powers over 
scheduling. Public pensions and health benefits were available in all chains, except for USA-2. 
Unlike USA-1, however, USA-2 provides collectivised defined-benefit pensions and standard 
health insurance (though fees and co-pay arrangements have been introduced) to all its workers. 
These chains also exhibited weak segmentation. All workers in SWE-1 and SWE-2 benefit from 
the same conditions provided by sectoral collective agreements. Like DEU-1’s stores bound by 
collective agreements, DEU-2’s unionised stores are not highly segmented. However, DEU-2 
differs from DEU-1 in that it does not operate stores outside of the collective agreement and its 
works councils are a counterweight to managers wishing to outsource (making it less of a 
problem). USA-2 is far less segmented than its North American counterparts, in that its 
agreements apply to all stores equally and provide all younger workers and part-timers 
significant opportunities to obtain full-time work and enjoy all of the privileges provided to 
standard workers (after 2 years of tenure). It is also remarkable that USA-2 has managed to 
retain traditional pension and health benefits for all of its workers.  
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6.3.2 Contextual change 
Interview respondents highlighted the importance of contextual factors to risk outcomes. Many 
of these factors posed challenges for negotiating improved risk outcomes.  
The first factor was intensified price competition. First, all chains faced cost pressures from low-
cost competitors. Discount and super store formats undercut costs by offering fewer services (no 
bagging, less in-store food preparation, etc.), spending less on store appearance, and maintaining 
aggressive supply-chain strategies. For example, one union official in Quebec described how its 
supermarkets’ labour costs represent “13-16%” of sales, more than double that of discounters 
(“5-6%”), even when both are unionised. Second, non-union chains undercut unionised chains by 
providing their workers with lower compensation and greater labour flexibility. Labour costs in 
DEU-1’s franchises are 12% of sales, compared to 15% in its corporate stores. The lower prices 
offered by these independent operators undermines the competitive edge of stores operated by 
the same lead firm.  
These sources of competition affected the chains at different points in time. USA-1, CAN-1, and 
CAN-2 were impacted by the opening of discount stores and super centers in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. USA-2 caters to an upscale New York City clientele whose demand for premium 
organic and local products bring its stores some of the highest levels of customer traffic in the 
United States. However, this chain has faced unprecedented competition by the gradual entry of 
non-union competitors (e.g. Whole Foods) in its market niche. DEU-1 and DEU-2 have had to 
rethink their competitive strategy since half of stores in the industry provide working conditions 
inferior to that guaranteed through collective bargaining. Discount stores entered the market late 
in Sweden, as foreign discounters from Germany and Denmark entered the market in 2002 and 
2003 respectively, gaining market share ever since.  
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The second factor was institutional, this being the decentralisation of collective bargaining. This 
factor relates to price competition, as bargaining structures affect competitors’ capacities to 
reduce prices through labour cost reductions and flexibility. Bargaining coverage has declined in 
each jurisdiction – except for Sweden. Most German and American competitors were covered by 
agreements in 1980, but unionised chains become part of the shrinking minority over the last two 
decades. Most major chains are still unionised in Canada, but the growth of non-union discount 
chains has added considerable pressures on unionised chains to lower costs. All large chains 
were covered by sectoral agreements in Sweden throughout the 36-year period.   
Bargaining coordination has also declined, especially in the North American cases. USA-1’s 
predicament is that no other major chains are left to force a pattern, due to the mass decline in 
coverage. USA-2 still sets a pattern, but it covers only 30% of the industry (compared to 80% in 
1980). In Ontario province, CAN-1 and CAN-2 have not only abandoned pattern bargaining, but 
negotiate multiple agreements with different sets of working conditions within chains. For 
example, CAN-1 tiered its stores into two separate agreements, providing workers in poor 
performing stores with lower wage and benefit rates. This practice ended in 2012, incorporating 
all workers into a weaker agreement. Pattern bargaining ended in Quebec when CAN-1 and 
CAN-2 enforced store-level bargaining (replacing chain-wide agreements) based on local 
competitiveness factors.  Sectoral agreements and works-councils function similarly in Germany; 
they just cover fewer workers now than before. SWE-1 and SWE-2 have increased discretion in 
negotiating some working conditions (including bonus pay), but minimum standards set by 
collective bargaining are still very comprehensive.  
The third factor, an organisational factor, is the financialisation of corporate governance. This 
was particularly important to USA-1, USA-2, and CAN-2. Each of these chains are publicly 
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listed. CAN-2 and DEU-2 are also publicly listed, but their major shareholders are families. 
Negotiators on both sides argued that this distinction made CAN-2 and DEU-2 more oriented 
towards the long-term. USA-1 is owned by a Dutch conglomerate whose owners, mostly private 
equity firms, do not have a controlling stake in the company. USA-2 went public in 2013, a 
move initiated by the institutional investor that acquired the chain through a leveraged buy-out in 
2007. After filing for bankruptcy in 2016, the chain became private again and was acquired by 
another institutional investor in exchange for debt forgiveness. CAN-1’s major shareholder has 
long been an institutional investor. Due to their focus on shareholder value, union officials 
argued that managers in financialised companies faced more constraints in negotiating. For 
example, the local president in New York City described how “[USA-1] was [once] owned by a 
family in Boston. Now...They come with cuts. They give a billion dollars in profits back to their 
shareholders. It is getting tougher to withhold concession-making with the new company.”  
There was no support for the importance of market coordination - the other institutional factor 
examined for this research - in shaping how collective bargaining outcomes affected risk. For 
example, German respondents described how bargaining coverage and works-councils were the 
key institutions that affected risk, not others relating to their being a coordinated economy. 
German stores not covered by collective agreements or works-councils, such as DEU-1’s 
franchises (as well as stores associated with other chains), offered markedly lower wage rates 
and no scheduling protections, even though they invested heavily in training and operated under 
forms of corporate governance emphasising long-term business strategies.  
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6.3.3 Strategic responses to change 
Employers and unions across the chains adopted different strategies in response to the contextual 
changes examined above. An overview of their strategies and associated risk outcomes is 
described below. It should be noted that DEU-1’s case is a bit more complex, in that its corporate 
stores are subject to different strategic dynamics compared to its franchises.  
In terms of union strategies, USA-1, and CAN-1, and CAN-2’s Ontario locals pursued servicing 
strategies throughout the entire period, relying on their relationship with managers to preserve 
working conditions. CAN-1 and CAN-2’s Quebec local embraced a partnering strategy to protect 
worker interests, but differed from the other locals by how it actively cooperated with 
management in introducing more flexibility in the workplace. None of these strategies proved 
successful in preventing high-risk from arising. USA-2’s local and the European unions all 
responded to contextual change with mobilisation strategies, however DEU-1 is the only chain 
whose mobilisation strategies were not effective at influencing risk outcomes.  
The role of employer strategies is more complicated. Some chains clearly adopted compliance 
strategies. These were USA-1 and CAN-2 who attempted to lower labour costs as much as 
possible through employee discipline and cuts to compensation. However, the commitment 
strategies of the other chains differed considerably. For this reason, this paper identifies three 
types of commitment. First, CAN-1 and DEU-1’s franchises pursued a soft commitment strategy. 
This involved making some minor investments in worker well-being to have a committed and 
productive workforce, such as investing in above-average pay rates (CAN-1) or employee 
training (DEU-1’s franchises), yet opting to make the fewest investments possible to ensure that 
the cost-discrepancy between their stores and that of competitors is minimal. This partly explains 
the similar risk outcomes between firms adhering to compliance and soft commitment strategies.  
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Second, USA-2’s commitment strategy may be uniquely described as hard. This chain made 
investments in training, work climate, and working conditions far exceeding that of its 
competitors. The chain prides itself on tracking its service and product quality compared to other 
chains through internal surveys and “secret shopper” results. The chain leads competitors in the 
same market niche across most service quality categories. This high level of voluntary 
commitment to employee well-being makes the chain exceptional compared to rest of the 
industry. Third, SWE-1, SWE-2, DEU-2, and DEU-1’s corporate stores’ commitment strategies 
may be described as embedded. This occurs when collective bargaining and industrial relations 
legislation make compliance strategies impractical. For example, the high wages associated with 
Swedish and German collective agreements incentivize the use of high-performance practices – 
such as investing in training, consulting employees on business strategies, and job autonomy – to 
extract the most value from each worker.  
Each firm attempted to attract some value-added customers, but USA-2 and DEU-1 exceeded the 
others in targeting customers searching for premium products. USA-2 fostered very collaborative 
relationships with their workers and union, and even absorbed higher personnel costs associated 
with maintaining sophisticated employee training programs and a large full-time workforce. 
According to its VP of Human Resources, the “first thing that you have to worry about is 
employee satisfaction”, which he believed was essential to providing high service quality to 
retain the chain’s upscale New York clientele. The company could absorb these costs through the 
high margins associated with its premium natural and organic products. DEU-1 also focused on 
value-added customers, but the positive effects on risk were not evident in their franchises who 
were not forced to provide significant ameliorations to working conditions. While the franchises 
took advantage of state subsidised training to acquire a highly skilled workforce to provide 
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higher quality products compared to discounters, they were not willing to provide high wages 
and scheduling protections to these workers. 
Union power differed across the cases. The weakness of unions negotiating with USA-1, CAN-1, 
CAN-2, and DEU-1 was cited as a barrier to resisting negative risk trends. USA-1 faced the 
problem of low union density. While the union attempted to build relationships with its members 
and ties with other local unions, it couldn’t muster up the staff and financial means needed to 
effectively build solidarity. Union representatives from CAN-1, and CAN-2 discussed how the 
lack of union involvement in store workplaces was a “weakness” for them, as most workers had 
little to no contact with their union. Furthermore, their union had tense relations with other 
Canadian unions involved in retail, preventing them from pooling their resources to oppose 
employers. DEU-1’s union suffered from low levels of union membership and works-council 
presence within stores. The works-councils that did exist faced severe coordination problems, 
unable to harmonise their strategies over using veto powers and negotiating works agreements. 
Union power was highest in unions negotiating with USA-2, DEU-1, SWE-1, and SWE-2. This 
was considered a source of influence to resisting negative risk trends. USA-2’s union has close 
ties with its workers. Its stores receive bi-monthly visits from union representatives and each 
store has a steward. The NYC local also has close ties to other unions and the community. Union 
presence is strong in DEU-2. This union enjoys high union membership levels within stores. In 
addition, works-councils have been set-up in each store. These works-councils maintain open 
lines of communication and have been able to coordinate for the sake of introducing common 
standards in key risk areas (e.g. works agreements for scheduling). The Swedish retail union that 
negotiates with SWE-1 and SWE-2 is extremely powerful. A high proportion of store workers 
are voluntary members of the union and the union is proud of its capacity to initiate strikes. 
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Moreover, the union maintains a close relationship with other unions, stemming from their 
interactions in enforcing wage rates across different sectors of the economy.  
 
6.4 Explaining the variations 
While the preceding part explored the risk trajectories and the factors that mattered for each 
chain, the following sections seek to provide an integrated analysis of how the factors affect the 
variations observed across the cases. The first two sections examine the interactions across 
contextual and strategic factors to explain the high-risk and low-risk outcomes separately. The 
third section draws out the key factors that explain the differences between the two sets of cases. 
 
6.4.1 Explaining the high-risk cases: USA-1, CAN-1, CAN-2, DEU-1 
The high-risk cases, USA-1, CAN-1, CAN-2, and DEU-1, were negatively affected by 
contextual change. Their unions struggled to negotiate protections for workers while employer 
strategies evolved in response to new pressures facing their stores. 
The strengths of servicing unraveled for USA-1, CAN-1, and CAN-2. While initially successful, 
union representatives with USA-1, CAN-1, and CAN-2 cited weaker gains from their 
relationships with managers over time. Managers cited cost pressures and shareholder interests 
as obstacles to investing in workers and in maintaining collaborative relationships with unions. 
For example, USA-1’s acquisition by a shareholder-driven Dutch retailer in 1995 transformed 
the bargaining relationship. USA-1’s managers who never asked for steep concessions before 
came to the table with “pages and pages of take aways” after the acquisition. The New England 
 169 
 
locals gradually lost crucial provisions from their collective agreement, such as generous pay 
scales and their defined benefit pension plan. In the latest bargaining round, a Massachusetts 
local President stirred controversy by taking a strike vote to resist important wage and benefit 
concessions, citing that they “were ready to go out at Easter if management didn't settle 3 days 
prior”. This shift “landed a respectable deal” for all five locals, yet these gains were hardly 
sufficient to counter the major losses experienced in past decades 
Unlike the other North American union locals, the Quebec union local partnered with 
management in introducing concessions, though its local president calls this “adjusting to the 
market”. This was the justification for a 47% wage reduction in the late 1980s, when CAN-1 and 
CAN-2 renegotiated store contracts purchased from defunct union chains. In addition to cuts in 
wages and benefits, the union also permitted more flexible forms of union coverage. For 
instance, CAN-1 and CAN-2 faced no resistance from the union when they negotiated contracts 
granting certain suppliers the right to stock their own goods. CAN-2 also collaborated with the 
local in setting up non-union mobile phone kiosks, with union affiliation to be negotiated once 
the sales model was perfected. The chains faced grievances for these practices in Ontario. 
Nevertheless, CAN-1 and CAN-2’s contracts are remarkably similar in both provinces.  
USA-1, CAN-1, and CAN-2, union locals felt powerless to resist major concessions. First, the 
unions feared decimating membership levels by invoking strike actions. The New England union 
locals feared that losing their only major chain would cripple the union’s influence in the region. 
Canadian union locals feared a repeat of the chain bankruptcies witnessed in the 1980s and 
1990s. North American union local leaders also worried about employer exit options. For 
example, USA-1 had double breasted operations in New England and could easily shift 
investments to non-union chains should the union become inflexible. CAN-1 and CAN-2 had a 
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tradition of providing voluntary recognition to the union when developing new chains, a practice 
likely to stop if union and employer interests did not align. Second, union democracy was weak 
in stores. A union delegate with CAN-1 observed that “many workers don’t even know that they 
have a union”. The Quebec union local president admitted that this was a “weakness” of theirs. 
Third, union officials complained about not being able to level the playing field through 
organising.  
DEU-1 adopted a double-breasted approach to coping the growth of low-cost competition. Its 
larger corporate stores embraced sectoral agreements, while a growing number of franchises 
affiliated with the chain did not. Only 40% of stores were covered by the agreement as of 2015. 
One works-council study found that workers in franchises earned 6,000 Euros less than those in 
corporate stores, since they earned lower wage rates and were not entitled to cashier and holiday 
bonuses. They also did not benefit from any scheduling protections.  
DEU-1’s union attempted to mobilize its members to resists forms of insecurity within the chain. 
It has a rich history in initiating industrial action and mobilising protests and petitions to counter 
management prerogatives. However, union officials cite weak union presence in the company as 
an obstacle to change.  Works councils are difficult to organize in these franchises. These stores 
are close-knit communities where owners work alongside their workers. Even if it is a right to do 
so in Germany, workers are therefore disinclined to organize works councils out of “loyalty” to 
the owners or in fear of retaliation from peers. This has a negative impact on DEU-1’s corporate 
stores, since “whenever a [corporate supermarket] isn’t doing well, there is always a fear of it 
getting sold to a franchisee”. The union has struggled to coordinate across works councils in 
DEU-1’s corporate stores. Their effects are differentiated as a result. Some works councillors 
negotiate several weeks of scheduling notice and exercise important vetoes over scheduling and 
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staffing. Others are less militant and will not get involved in these matters. Without a strong 
union to enforce a pattern across works councils, some elected officials have catered to 
management needs in exchange for favours such as the promise of full-time employment.  
Since works councils are a “conduit” to organising and membership mobilisation within stores, it 
is no surprise that many regions have difficulty initiating strikes or protests. Officials recognize 
the need to provide better resources to works councils in these stores. As one works councillor 
recounted, “the union is too focused on [DEU-2] since it refused to sign the collective 
agreement…They forget that other companies need their help too, if they are to maintain their 
influence”. 
 
6.4.2 Explaining the low-risk cases: SWE-1, SWE-2, DEU-2, USA-2 
The low-risk cases, SWE-1, SWE-2, DEU-2, and USA-2, were exposed to new pressures from 
contextual change. However, they also faced strong union resistance in response to their efforts 
to introduce concessions. In addition, these chains maintained hard commitment strategies in 
some form to workers throughout the last few decades. 
SWE-1 and SWE-2’s low-risk outcomes are explained by sector-wide union mobilisation and 
solidarity to resist concessions and maintain all-encompassing collective agreements. Strike 
action in the mid-1990s was critical to evading concession-making. The retail employers’ 
association wanted to cut supplementary pay rates for evenings and weekends (the highest in the 
country), culminating in a two-week strike against most retailers in 1995. The employers’ 
association retaliated by instituting two-hour daily lock-outs. Its lead negotiator described this 
measure as “poorly planned and badly executed”. By striking against some employers and not 
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others, the union left the employers divided, as many refused to comply with their own 
association in fear of being implicated in the strike. “This caused a lot of discussion within the 
organisation, so they changed the name and had to start up again…and became more 
cooperative”, said a senior union official.  
SWE-1 and SWE-2 are very supportive of collective bargaining because it provides stability in 
the competitive environment. Unlike in North America, discount chains share no human resource 
advantage in Swedish retail. For example, Lidl maintains a cost advantage over its competitors in 
other countries by operating its stores with as little staff as possible, relying on cross-trained 
workers to man multiple departments in a single shift. However, the Swedish retail agreement 
requires retailers to cross-train their employees while Sweden’s Work Environment Act requires 
them to rotate their workers across departments within chains (e.g. to prevent strain from 
operating the cash for long periods of time). And since high wages and scheduling protections 
are protected by sectoral agreements, all Swedish retailers operate stores with a small number of 
highly trained workers. This is perceived as the only means to cutting labour costs in the 
industry. Interestingly, SWE-1 is the only traditional retailer examined in this study who has 
managed to increase its market share in recent years (est. 50% in 2016) without fear of being 
undercut by low-road competitors. SWE-2 has faced some financial difficulties, yet its 
representatives don’t see collective agreements as the problem. In fact, they believe that SWE-2 
would fare worse if collective bargaining was weakened.  
The commitment model of Swedish retailers hinges on union action to provide them with 
institutional stability. Without this, SWE-1 and SWE-2 would fear that new entrants could 
undermine their high-performance approach in the workplace. For example, Toys R Us tried 
entering the Swedish market without signing the retail agreement in 1995. The retail union strike 
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turned into an all-out boycott of the company when the union forced Toys R Us to sign the 
agreement. Even the employers’ association sided with the union, not only because doing so was 
“rational” from a competitiveness perspective, but because this would “preserve the bargaining 
relationship with the union”. Foreign chains now know that consulting the union is a pre-
requisite to peacefully entering the Swedish retail market. Even Aldi, known for its anti-union 
tactics in Germany was described as “rather good” for its peaceful integration into the Swedish 
retail agreement. 
Compared to DEU-1, DEU-2 was significantly impacted by the German retail union’s 
mobilisation strategies. Moreover, like the Swedish chains, its commitment strategy is 
embedded. Interview respondents from both sides indicated that the chain actively participates in 
the government subsidised training system and would manage workers with considerable job 
autonomy regardless of union-affiliation. However, DEU-1 has long strived to exit the cost 
constraints associated with collective bargaining. A recent conflict with DEU-2 is a striking 
example. The chain exited the agreement in 2015 citing that personnel costs were 30% higher 
than the competition. Until then, DEU-2 had been the only German supermarket chain to fully 
adhere to sectoral agreements. The German retail union succeeded in pressuring the company 
into signing the agreement.  Temporary concessions were made by the union, including a 2-year 
wage freeze (returning to rates specified in the sectoral agreement in 2017) and short-term cuts to 
vacation and Christmas allowances. DEU-2 agreed to freeze executive pay from 2015-2019 in 
return.  
Union officials highlight the importance of union presence within DEU-2’s stores as a factor to 
resisting its exit from the agreement. As explained by one official: “works-councils exist in every 
store in [DEU-2] …In all chains and companies, if we don’t have any works-councils, we don’t 
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have any influence”. The high presence of works-councils was a resource for recruiting workers 
into the union as members and activists. For example, the union organised a protest of over 4,000 
workers at DEU-2’s headquarters and got over 25,000 petition signatures shortly after the 
company left the union in 2015. It threatened further action if DEU-2 did not return to the 
bargaining table. 
DEU-2’s re-entry into the agreement poses some cost problems for the company. Union officials 
noted that it is simpler to pressure chains with “big profit margins” to enter into collective 
bargaining. DEU-2 was historically a big margin store, until German consumers preferences 
began to shift away from big box stores, towards online and small local vendors. As of 2017, 
DEU-2 and the retail union were still in negotiations over a cost structure that could make the 
chain competitive in an imbalanced market. Furthermore, the chain is also integrating new forms 
of automation in their stores. The intent of these innovations is not to create redundancies, but to 
make better use of their high-skilled workers by training them to operate more efficiently. 
USA-2’s union local is the most militant among the North American cases. As put by the local’s 
President, “that thin line is do I keep them working, or do I put the company out of business”. In 
1980, 80% of the industry was unionised. Bargaining was centralised, with 200 people 
negotiating for all ten companies in the same hotel. Collective bargaining has decentralised 
considerably. However, while chain-wide agreements apply to only 30% of stores, this union 
local is among the few in North American retail capable of enforcing pattern bargaining. USA-2 
is pressured to accept basic protections negotiated with other chains. For example, a competing 
chain attempted to abandon the defined benefit plan. “We had to take a strike vote. It was nearly 
unanimous.” (Local President, NYC retail union), which served as a signal that renegotiating 
 175 
 
benefit plans was off the table for USA-2. Nonetheless, other New York locals have given up 
these plans, placing even more pressure on this local to do the same. 
The NYC local’s capacity to mobilize its workers legitimizes its strike threats. It has developed a 
sophisticated technological system to reach its members through social media and texts. 
According to its president, “if we have an emergency meeting, people attend”. The company also 
invests heavily in organising. A union staff member disclosed that “it’s our fear be like our 
union’s New England locals. They rely on [USA-1]. If it closes, they’re finished and they know 
it”. Its 21,000-membership base comes with financial resources to run commercials, rent 
billboard trucks, and organize pickets against non-union chains. Moreover, it participated in 
successful movements that barred Wal-Mart from competing in New York and raised the city’s 
minimum wage. The solidarity across progressive groups was described by officials as a “New 
York thing”. Thus, the union resists risks through both pattern bargaining and in maintaining 
external solidarity to mitigate the threats of low-cost competition. 
USA-2 is the only chain in this study that voluntarily makes substantial investments in workers. 
Its VP of Human Resources prioritizes “employee satisfaction” as a means to providing high 
levels of service to satisfy its upscale New York City clientele. In-house studies suggest that 
USA-2’s employees perform better on a series of indicators (including product knowledge, 
attentiveness, friendliness) than comparable chains. Trend analyses of same-store secret shopper 
results indicate that the company’s service quality has improved over the last eight years. The 
company hires full-time workers because this practice fosters employee commitment and lower 
turnover. The chain financed investments in labour through the high margins of its premium 
products, including specialty items and organics. Consistent with its high-road strategy, USA-2’s 
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HR team also maintains a collaborative relationship with its union local. This includes 
cooperating on many joint-committees and even using union networks as a recruitment tool.  
Working conditions within USA-2 remained intact despite important organisational pressures in 
the past decade. In 2007, a private equity group purchased a controlling stake in the company 
through a leveraged buy-out aimed to expand the chain across the Northeastern US. Financial 
pressures heightened when the company went public in 2013. Faced with the aggressive 
expansion of Whole Foods and Trader Joe’s in USA-2’s market niche, among other factors, the 
company filed for bankruptcy in 2016 after declining same-store sales plummeted the company’s 
stock value. Its chief lender, an investment firm, accepted a 90% equity share and reduced debt-
load to keep the company running. The VP of Human Resources argued that these changes did 
not affect workers because company executives left the HR team “alone for the sake of 
employer-employee relationships… I think there’s some level where they think if they mess 
people’s lives service will be worse”.  
 
6.4.3 Comparative analysis 
Why did four of the eight chains impose greater risks on their workers compared to the others? 
Several factors explain the difference (summarised in Table 6.6). This analysis begins by 
exploring the effects of contextual factors. First, the chains were similar in that they remained 
full-service and faced heightened cost pressures through the entry of new low-cost competitors 
(Proposition 1). Each chain shed risks onto workers in response to these pressures, seeking to 
lower prices through labour cost reductions.  
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The centralisation of collective bargaining was also a factor (Proposition 2b). Actors with each 
of the chains reported that their bargaining structures had decentralised. In the 1980s, SWE-1, 
SWE-2, USA-2, DEU-1 and DEU-2 negotiated centralised agreements alongside employers, 
mitigating the effects of market competition by imposing common labour standards to all firms. 
While USA-1, CAN-1, and CAN-2 negotiated chain-wide agreements in that same period, they 
achieved similar control over the competitive landscape by enforcing a pattern across their 
largest local competitors.  
The competitive landscape was destabilised by decentralisation in all jurisdictions except for 
Sweden. Despite some increases in managerial discretion, the scope of Swedish agreements is 
nonetheless very comprehensive, preventing chains like SWE-1 and SWE-2 from having any 
disadvantage compared to new low-cost competitors in the market. While mobilisation strategies 
have prevented USA-2 and DEU-2 from driving up risk levels through concessions comparable 
to that of the high-risk chains, they still face a cost disadvantage which threatens their long-term 
viability on the market. The continuity of centralised bargaining relates to a “virtuous circle” 
between union solidarity and institutional stability (Doellgast et al., 2018). It is thereby not 
surprising that weaker forms of external solidarity in New England and Canada left their unions’ 
chains increasingly exposed to cost-based competition. 
Evidence on the other contextual factors is mixed. Financialisation was perceived to be 
negatively driving risk in the North American cases, however its effects were circumstantial 
(Propositions 3a-3b). The fact that USA-2’s risk outcomes were superior to that of USA-1 is 
most surprising. USA-2 was driven to bankruptcy by a leveraged buyout from an institutional 
investor after several unprofitable years. Its small size would also lead one to believe that its 
susceptibility to market pressures is insurmountable. USA-1 may have been publicly listed as of 
 178 
 
1995, but its acquisition was not leveraged. In addition, it remained highly profitable and 
maintained its dominant market share in New England. Firm and union representatives with 
USA-2 indicated that union strength and militancy mattered to preventing important concessions 
on important working hour and benefit arrangements, suggesting that the obstacles posed by 
financialisation are not insurmountable. DEU-2 is the only European chain that is publicly held, 
but union strategy and power dynamics have made its workers the most secure in German food 
retail.  
None of the evidence lends supports to the proposition that market coordination matters to 
bargaining outcomes affecting risk (Proposition 2a). The divergence between DEU-1 and DEU-
2’s risk outcomes are significant in this regard. Since 2000, DEU-1’s franchises embraced all 
aspects of Germany’s coordinated market economy, except for collective bargaining. Union 
officials reported that these stores invested as heavily in training as DEU-1’s corporate stores and 
exceeded the industry’s average. Unlike DEU-2, DEU-1 does not adhere to a shareholder model 
of corporate governance (as a consumer cooperative), and in compliance with German 
legislation, union representatives sit on its supervisory board. Despite this, workers in these 
stores were among the most insecure in this study, which suggests that collective bargaining 
arrangements, not market coordination, matter for risk.  
Strategic factors were also of importance. A key factor related to union bargaining strategies. 
The most successful cases were those in which unions adopted mobilisation strategies and had 
the power resources required to implement them (Propositions 4c-4f). SWE-1 and SWE-2’s 
union was successful in mobilising store workers and its national union networks to resist 
employer efforts to lower wage rates and do away with all-encompassing collective agreements. 
DEU-2’s effort to exit sectoral bargaining was thwarted by union coordination to mobilize 
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workers through its works-councils and use them to organize successful protests to damage the 
company’s reputation. Despite the unfavorable legal context for American unions, USA-2 
confronted strong pattern bargaining enforced by the union in collaboration with its militant New 
York coalition of actors.  
 
Unions with the least successful cases pursued alternatives to mobilisation or pursued it from a 
position of weakness. USA-1, CAN-1, and CAN-2’s unions pursued servicing strategies, relying 
on their historical relationship with managers to resist negative changes. The successes of this 
strategy in New England and Ontario eroded as employers demanded more aggressive 
concessions and their unions turned to grievances and occasional strike votes to resist wage cuts 
and managerial efforts to permit non-union personnel within stores. These efforts may have 
prevented minor concessions, but proved insufficient to preventing the most egregious 
concessions made throughout the last several decades. CAN-1 and CAN-2’s Quebec local was 
unique in that it partnered with the companies in introducing concessions to foster trust and 
protect jobs. Interestingly, their outcomes were very similar to these chains’ subsidiaries in 
Ontario. DEU-1’s union had a mobilisation approach to bargaining with the chain, yet lacked 
Table 6.6 – Overview of Case Comparison 
 Contextual Factors Strategic Factors 
Chains 
Intensified 
Price 
Competition 
National 
Institutional 
Framework 
Industry 
bargaining 
decentralisation  Financialisation 
Employer 
Strategies* 
Union 
strategies** 
Customer 
Segmentation 
Union 
Solidarity 
High-risk         
USA-1 High LME High High CP S Medium Low 
CAN-1 High LME High High SC S (ON) / P 
(QC) 
Medium Low 
CAN-2 High LME High Medium CP S (ON) / P 
(QC) 
Medium Low 
DEU-1 High CME High Absent EC / SC M High Low 
         
Low-risk         
USA-2 High LME High High HC M High Medium 
SWE-1 High CME Low Absent EC M Medium High 
SWE-2 High CME Low Absent EC M Medium High 
DEU-2 High CME High Medium EC M Medium High 
*CP= Compliance, SC = Soft Commitment, HC= Hard Commitment, FC = Embedded Commitment 
** S = servicing, P = partnership, M = mobilisation 
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union presence (via works-councils) within stores and the resources needed to amount an 
effective resistance to transfer risks to franchise workers.    
Firm strategies also mattered. Chains adhering to compliance (USA-1 and CAN-1) or soft 
commitment (CAN-2, DEU-1’s franchises) strategies fared considerably worse than those whose 
commitment strategies were hard (USA-2) or embedded (SWE-1, SWE-2, and DEU-1’s 
corporate stores) (Proposition 4a). However, USA-2 was the only successful chain whose 
dedication to employee well-being was entirely voluntary. This was rooted in a perceived 
alignment between employee satisfaction and the chain’s customer segmentation strategy 
(Proposition 4b). Even then, USA-2’s militant union was instrumental in maintaining critical 
components of its high-road strategy, such as preventing the abandonment of traditional benefit 
arrangements through pattern bargaining. The embedded commitment strategies of the European 
chains are a response to union successes in preventing wage and scheduling concessions, as well 
as their influence in maintaining institutions that facilitate high-road forms of work organisation 
(e.g. job rotation in Sweden and skills-oriented production in Germany). None of the cases point 
to managerial decision-making as being at the root of enhanced risk outcomes. On the contrary, 
they are - more often than not - an outcome of union strategy and power.  
An integrated analysis highlights how many factors affect risk. All cases faced higher pressures 
from contextual factors relating to intensified price competition, bargaining decentralisation, or 
financialisation. While employers in the low-risk chains were more committed to employee well-
being than those in high-risk chains, this is more a consequence of union strategies and power 
than the voluntary ambitions of their managers. Thus, what mattered most to the risk outcomes 
facing these chains? The findings discussed above point to the importance of union mobilisation 
and its effects on the solidaristic power held by unions. These effects matter not only for 
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resisting the concession-making attempts of employers, but because of their effects on union 
capacities to extend standards set by collective agreements to the competition.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
This article has investigated the effects of bargaining strategies on risk in different market-
related, institutional, and organisational contexts. This study is unique in that it traces how 
bargaining strategies affect risk over time within and across countries. Some key findings are 
evident. First, it finds that mobilisation strategies and union power are crucial to resisting risk 
through collective bargaining, even in chains facing immense pressures from contextual change. 
Second, it finds that firm commitment strategies also matter, however these strategies were 
rarely entirely voluntary and evolved out of labour-management bargaining interactions. Third, 
union weakness was identified as a significant indicator of success, as unions lacking the power 
to influence chains exhibited very few successes in resisting insecurity, regardless of their chosen 
strategy. Fourth, these strategies did not evolve in a closed system, but evolved from pressures 
emanating from intensified price competition, bargaining decentralisation, and financialisation.  
These findings contribute to a growing body of research that highlights the importance of actor 
strategies to producing secure forms of work (Pulignano and Signoretti, 2016; Benassi and 
Dorigatti, 2015; Dupuis, 2017), however it is the first to contrast various types of strategies 
comparatively. The within-country and cross-country variations show that market-related, 
organisational and institutional factors do not dictate working conditions with firms. These 
outcomes also reflect a process of political contestation by actors pursuing distinct strategies and 
with differential access to power. Thus, this analysis provides a more nuanced understanding of 
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risk outcomes than is provided by more singular lines of analysis, such as those more narrowly 
focused on national models (Baccaro and Howell, 2017; Hall and Soskice, 2001).  
The fact that mobilisation strategies were associated with superior risk outcomes should not 
imply that they suit all circumstances. Bargaining relationships evolve out of specific histories 
and opportunity structures that impact the feasibility of more militant forms of strategising. 
Taking on more aggressive forms of mobilisation could reap considerable rewards in resisting 
concession-making and extending representation across firms in North America, yet also bear the 
risk of provoking even more intense employer opposition and contributing further to the decline 
of labour.   
Two research limitations are noteworthy. First, the case selection does not include unions that 
have combined union strength with a servicing strategy. This exposes the study to criticisms that 
union power may be the deciding factor and that strong unions pursuing a servicing strategy may 
be just as successful as more militant unions. Further research could identify cases in which other 
types of power (structural or institutional, for instance) manifested themselves in instances where 
mobilisation strategies were not implemented. Second, the case’s generalizability is limited to a 
service sector in which competition is largely local. Unions in retail play a special dual role by 
strategizing to resist concession-making while mobilising resources to level the competitive 
landscape by extending coverage or lobbying for new employment standards. Moreover, forms 
of employer exit are limited by geography. The political dynamics are likely very different in 
sectors where competition sets prices internally and where employers have greater capacity for 
exit by relocating capital to other parts of the globe. 
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Chapter 7 
 Integrated Analysis: Towards a Deeper Understanding of Risk Outcomes in Collective 
Bargaining 
This chapter discusses the findings from the preceding three chapters. Since each chapter 
constitutes an article, chapters 4 (Article 1), 5 (Article 2), and 6 (Article 3) will hereafter be 
referred to as articles for the sake of this discussion. The discussion is divided into three parts. 
The first part examines what factors matter to risk, referring to the hypotheses presented earlier 
in this thesis. The second part discusses the major contributions to theory and the relevant 
literatures. The third part provides a synthesised response to the research questions presented at 
the beginning of the thesis.  
 
7.1 What matters to risk? 
The following sections explore the main research findings and their contributions to 
understanding risk trajectories in low-skilled service work. First, these findings relate to how 
risks have evolved over time in supermarkets across Canada, Germany, Sweden, and the United 
States. Second, they also address how various factors have contributed to risk outcomes in stores. 
The main findings are divided into three articles. Each article addresses variables derived from 
the thesis framework. Table 7.1 outlines the results associated with each of the hypotheses 
presented earlier in this thesis. It also indicates the hypotheses discussed in each article. Some of 
the variables listed in the thesis framework are not explicitly identified in the articles, due to their 
weaker relevance to risk outcomes. Why these variables received less attention and some 
observations concerning their effects are also discussed. 
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Table 7.1 – Evaluation of Hypotheses Presented in the Thesis Framework 
 Hypotheses Key Findings 
Contexts 
H1.1 
A3 
Risk outcomes are higher under intensified 
price competition 
Partially true 
- Intensified price competition drives risk by 
imposing labour cost pressures  
- Effects are contingent on actor strategies and 
bargaining structures 
H1.2 
A2, A3 
Risk outcomes are higher when organisational 
performance is weak 
False 
- Organisational performance outcomes were not 
associated with risk 
H1.3 
A3 
Risk outcomes are higher when firm 
governance is financialised 
Partially true 
- Particularly when governed by institutional 
investors 
- Effects are subject to contestation 
H1.4 
A3 
Risk outcomes are higher when workplace 
governance is fissured 
False 
- Fissured workplaces were not associated with risk 
in unionised settings  
H1.5 
A3 
Risk outcomes are lower in coordinated market 
economies 
False 
- Complementarities in coordinated market 
institutions were not associated with risk outcomes  
H1.6 
A1, A2, 
A3 
Risk outcomes are lower under centralised 
bargaining structures 
True 
- Centralised bargaining institutions were 
associated with lower risk outcomes 
Actor Attributes 
H2 
A3 
Risk outcomes are lower when unions are 
strong and possess strategic capabilities 
True 
- Unions possessing solidaristic power resources 
were more capable of resisting risk 
Strategies 
H3.1 
A2, A3 
Risk outcomes are lower under labour-
management partnerships 
Mixed 
- The effects of partnerships were contingent on 
institutional settings 
H3.2 
A3 
Risk outcomes are lower when firms adopt 
commitment strategies 
Mixed 
- Firm commitment strategies mattered, when 
combined with other strategic and institutional 
factors 
H3.3 
A3 
Risk outcomes are lower when unions adopt 
mobilisation strategies 
Mostly True 
- Mobilisation strategies were critical to resisting 
risk 
- Effects were linked to their role in building and 
exercising union power 
H3.4 
A1 
Risk outcomes are lower when states adopt 
social policies to mitigate risk 
True 
- Social policies mattered 
- Their effects alone were not sufficient to prevent 
the most egregious forms of risk 
H3.5 
A1, A2, 
A3 
Risk outcomes are lower in the presence of 
interventionist pro-labour employment 
standards 
True 
- Employment standards mattered 
- Their effects alone were not sufficient to prevent 
the most egregious forms of risk 
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7.1.1 Risk trends in supermarkets 
The research results show that risks have risen in each of the supermarket chains explored in this 
study, regardless of their institutional and organisational context (Articles 1-3). This is not 
surprising. Standing’s (2011) work on the “precariat” has shown how more variable working 
conditions is a global phenomenon. Others have shown that more workers are on the brink of 
poverty than was the case decades ago (Osberg and Sharpe, 2014; Hacker, 2006). However, it 
was nonetheless important to demonstrate that trends in these supermarkets are also indicative of 
augmented risks.    
After finding that risks increased in each supermarket, the articles delved deeper into exploring 
the risk trends facing the supermarkets across countries. By exploring trends in generosity, 
individualisation, and segmentation, it was shown that there was much diversity in the risk 
increases faced by the different supermarkets.  
Article 1 demonstrated the cross-national differences in how risks are spread in food retail. It 
highlighted forms of differentiation across and within countries. First, American workers 
experienced differentiated risk outcomes, as trends along the three dimensions were largely 
negative. These workers have been affected by negative declines in the generosity of wage and 
benefit arrangements, and the gradual diminishment in the number of full-time positions within 
stores. Their risks have also individualised, particularly due to the replacement of traditional 
benefit arrangements with retirement and health savings accounts, or in some cases no benefits at 
all. Furthermore, the most extreme risk experiences have been segmented to part-timers and 
younger workers. Second, Canadian workers have experienced moderated risk outcomes. Trends 
across the dimensions are comparable to American food retail, and even worse in terms of the 
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individualisation of scheduling arrangements. However, the risk outcomes across all three 
dimensions are moderated by the importance of universal public retirement and health care 
schemes. These regimes boost the generosity of resources allocated to retirement and health care 
for these workers, provide forms of collectivisation that make them readily available to workers, 
even under uncertain economic conditions, and reduce segmentation by providing access 
universally to all workers. This is not to say that working conditions are not segmented in 
Canada. Ontario’s supermarket chains segment risks to part-timers and younger workers, while 
Quebec’s supermarket chains provide inferior working conditions to stores deemed of less 
strategic importance according to certain performance criteria. However, the most severe 
segmentation effects are limited to pay and working hour arrangements, since public policies 
provide minimum protections for retirement and illness. 
German workers were affected by segmented risk outcomes, since negative trends in generosity 
and individualisation are most apparent in non-core employment. Workers covered under 
collective agreements faced few negative changes in risk, while workers in franchises not 
covered by collective agreements and without works-council representation were exposed to 
extreme forms of uncertainty. These workers were covered by less generous work arrangements, 
such as lower wages and no pay supplements for unsocial hours, and greater forms of 
individualisation, especially the lack of scheduling guarantees. Swedish workers experienced 
solidaristic risk outcomes, the least negative risk trends among the countries. The only negative 
trend was in generosity, namely expressed through the rise of part-time work. Beyond this, 
Swedish supermarkets provide their workers with highly generous conditions, such as real wage 
guarantees and high supplementary pay for unsocial hours, enabling workers to enjoy a decent 
standard of living. They also collectivize important risks for workers, through strong scheduling 
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protections for instance. What makes their risk outcomes so solidaristic is that all of their 
workers have faced remarkably low increases in risk, since segmentation in terms of employment 
status and social location were weak.  
Article 3 focused on the risk trends of specific supermarkets, as opposed to food retail as a 
whole. It found that some supermarkets were exposed to significantly higher risk increases than 
others. Interestingly, the risk outcomes of chains did not fall into national patterns. While the 
Canadian chains were predominantly high-risk and the Swedish chains were low-risk, there were 
German and American chains in either category.  
Importantly, the major forms of risk experienced by chains in either category stemmed from 
different sources. In terms of the high-risk cases, the American chain that fared worst did so 
because of the low generosity provided in the form of wages and working hour availability, the 
high individualisation of employee benefit arrangements, and in how it segments riskier work 
arrangements to youth and part-time workers. The Canadian cases were high-risk because of 
declines in wage and working hour generosity, the extreme individualisation of scheduling, and 
how they segment workers through tiered bargaining arrangements (Ontario) or across stores 
(Quebec). Meanwhile, the high-risk chain in Germany has shifted few negative risks to workers 
in stores covered by collective agreements, while workers in its franchise stores (60% of all 
stores) have few protections at all, including low generosity in terms of wage and supplemental 
pay arrangements and highly individualised scheduling arrangements that provide no guarantees 
to workers.  
The low-risk cases were so for different reasons as well.  This is most evident in contrasting the 
American chain with those in Europe. The American chain may lack the generous pay rates of 
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the European low-risk cases, but it is the only supermarket chain that collectivizes scheduling 
risks by providing full-time work to most workers who need it, on top of a strong weekly hour 
guarantee for part-time workers. In addition, it is remarkable that the American chain retained 
collectivised benefit structures (defined-benefit pensions and traditional health care) with weak 
forms of segmentation across different employee groups. The low-risk chains in Europe are 
relatively similar. They benefit from highly generous wage and supplemental pay rates, 
collectivised working hour arrangements with strong scheduling protections, and enable most 
employees (all in the Swedish cases) to benefit from these arrangements. A key difference is that 
the German chain has experimented with controversial forms of precarious work (e.g. mini-jobs) 
and has less wage certainty compared to the Swedish stores, yet these trends have not been 
significant enough to erode the most important forms of protection within this chain. 
The outcomes assessed in these articles show that multiple dimensions are needed to assess risk. 
This was ascertained by comparing risk trends in different settings and over time. Since risk 
configurations across the dimensions were differentiated in both the industry and store 
comparisons, these findings show that there is considerable variety in the risk outcomes facing 
workplaces. Risks stemmed from different sources and impacted the dimensions to different 
degrees across the cases. Thus, the chain comparison showed how some can fare better or worse 
than the others for different reasons. This demonstrates the high level of complexity facing risk 
outcomes and why this thesis sought to explore various hypotheses to explain them.  
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7.1.2 Contextual factors that affect risk 
The first contextual factor that mattered was intensified price competition. As explored in 
Article 3, risk was negatively affected by price competition (Hypothesis 1.1), yet some 
exceptions were notable. Research in the area shows the importance of price-based competition 
to firms’ willingness to invest in workers (Greer and Doellgast, 2017; Kochan et al., 1986). As 
firms’ willingness to invest in workers declines, so does their ability to mitigate workers’ 
exposure to risk. Actors from each of the supermarkets in this study cited the importance of 
intensified price competition to their ability to maintain forms of social protection for workers. 
The rising importance of super centers and discounters destabilised the competitive strategies of 
most supermarkets. By relying on few personnel, lower real estate overhead, and lean supply-
chain strategies, low-cost competitors have gained market share in every jurisdiction. Notably, 
the effects of intensified price competition were negative in many of the cases, except those in 
social Sweden. Sweden’s exceptionality is not because their chains felt less cost pressures from 
the rise in price competition, but because of how their bargaining structures made individual 
firms’ business conditions irrelevant to bargaining outcomes.  
The second contextual factor was financialisation. Article 3 illustrated that financialisation had 
negative impacts on risk, but that its impacts were contested (Hypothesis 1.3). The 
financialisation literature shows how publicly owned firms and the implication of institutional 
investors in firm governance restructure the priorities of firms to privilege short-term shareholder 
value at the expense of investing in production and services, workers included (Foroohar, 2016; 
Appelbaum and Rosemary Batt, 2014). This was undoubtedly true for many chains examined in 
this thesis (Article 3). Firms whose major shareholders were institutional investors were less 
inclined to invest in their workers compared to those whose major shareholder was a private 
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family or who operated under a different ownership structure (e.g. consumers cooperative). 
However, the effects of financialisation were not linear and subject to political contestation (as 
will be discussed later). 
The third contextual factor was the bargaining structure. All three articles showed that risks were 
lower under more centralised structures (Hypothesis 1.6). Recent literature finds that multi-
employer arrangements are more conducive to low risk, particularly when they cover a sizeable 
proportion of employers (Marginson et al., 2014; Pulignano et al., 2016). In grouping employers 
together, individual firms’ business conditions become of weaker relevance to collective 
bargaining. Bargaining decentralisation had negative effects on risk outcomes in most of the 
cases (Articles 2 and 3). The increase in low-cost competitors not bound to collective agreements 
contributed to unfair competition, as firms bound to collective agreements experienced pressures 
to lower prices by cutting labour costs. Decentralised bargaining also negatively affected unions. 
Low bargaining coverage caused unions to become fearful that the cost disadvantage faced by 
their employers would negatively affect their ability to survive under an increasingly competitive 
context and prevent their ability to retain levels of bargaining coverage and members.  
The exceptionality of Swedish retail is notable. One reason that traditional supermarket chains in 
Sweden have embraced sectoral bargaining is for competitive purposes. First, all-encompassing 
sectoral agreements prevent new low-cost discount chains from undermining their competitive 
position by offering working conditions below standards set in their agreements. Second, 
collective agreements and government regulations have combined effects on work organisation, 
creating a certain level of uniformity across the entire sector. For example, the chief means of 
cutting costs in Swedish stores is to operate many departments with as few workers as possible. 
This is so because collective bargaining and government regulations incentivize job-rotation and 
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cross-training for all employers. Thus, while job rotation and cross-training is employed to 
acquire a cost advantage by European discounters in other countries, the regulatory environment 
eliminates this advantage in Sweden.  
The other contextual factors examined in this thesis were of little or no significance to risk 
outcomes. Most surprisingly, market coordination did not matter (Hypothesis 1.5), as illustrated 
in Article 3. Hall and Soskice’s (2001) varieties of capitalism framework would predict that 
firms in coordinated market economies invest more in their employees to seize on the 
institutional complementarities of their industrial relations institutions. Others have expanded the 
application of this framework to explaining outcomes in job quality (Doellgast et al., 2009; Esser 
and Olsen, 2011). For market coordination to matter, low-risks would need to be evident in 
Germany, which the literature considers to be among the most coordinated economies in the 
West (Hall and Gingerich, 2009). Yet surprisingly, German stores not bound to collective 
bargaining coverage experienced some of the highest risks amongst the cases examined in this 
research. The high-risk outcomes in these stores are comparable to those of many North 
American chains, not those in Sweden, the second most coordinated economy (Hall and 
Gingerich, 2009).  
The divide across stores bound to collective agreements and those which are not demonstrates 
the importance of bargaining arrangements, not coordinated capitalism, to risk outcomes. 
German stores outside of collective bargaining structures manifested all of the features 
associated with coordinated economies, including participation in the government subsidised 
training system, patient forms of corporate government, and strong inter-firm relations. Yet none 
of these institutions were associated with greater investments in worker security. Once a store 
was shifted outside of collective bargaining institutions, working conditions in that store 
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deteriorated precipitously. If institutional complementarities really mattered to risk, firms would 
have maintained some form of commitment to maintaining forms of social protection for 
workers, even after collective bargaining eroded within the sector.  
The last two contextual factors, organisational performance (Hypothesis 1.2) and fissured 
workplaces (Hypothesis 1.4), were so insignificant that they were not analysed in-depth within 
the articles. As examined in articles 2 and 3, organisational performance was of little relevance 
to risk outcomes within supermarket chains. However, one surprising finding was that the three 
chains whose profitability was most unstable (one in Germany, Sweden, and the United States) 
were among the four chains exhibiting the lowest risk outcomes. This result shows that there is 
no linear relationship between performance and risk outcomes.  
Finally, none of the evidence presented in Article 3 showed that fissured workplaces were more 
conducive to risks in the context of collective bargaining. The franchise model was investigated 
to test its importance. Franchise stores were examined in all of the countries except the United 
States. It is important to distinguish unionised franchise operations from those with no 
agreements. The conditions of unionised franchise stores were comparable to those of corporate 
stores operated in the same jurisdictions in every instance. Thus, while Weil’s (2014) fissured 
workplace theory identifies an important driver of poor working conditions in modern 
workplaces, it does not bear much relevance to situations in which employers are bound to 
collective agreements. However, the fact that franchise stores not bound to collective bargaining 
fared worse is obvious. In these scenarios (e.g. Germany), franchises were a loophole used to 
avoid collective agreements. Thus, the evidence shows that franchise operations negatively 
impacted risk when they represented a form of exit, but not in terms of their fissuring effects. 
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In summary, the findings with regards to the bargaining contexts make important contributions to 
how we understand risk trends. Market-related and organisational factors exert negative 
pressures on risk. However, the outcomes are complex. As will be illustrated in the next section, 
in the case of retail, a focus on contextual characteristics alone is insufficient to explaining risk 
trends facing low-skilled service workers. While these contextual factors exert some pressures on 
employers and unions, their outcomes tend to be contested by actors. It is for this reason that an 
in-depth understanding of actor strategies towards collective bargaining is necessary. 
 
7.1.3 Factors relating to bargaining strategies and power 
The central aim of this thesis has been to examine the role of bargaining strategies in affecting 
risk. Union and employer strategies were found to be of much importance to risk. Article 3 
demonstrated how union mobilisation strategies were critical to resisting negative risk trends 
(Hypothesis 3.3). In this sense, this research supports literature streams which are critical of 
servicing and partnering (Lucio and Stuart, 2005; Jenkins, 2007). However, unlike what is 
argued by these streams, it was not the managerialisation of union identities and functions that 
made servicing so ineffective. It was the lack of a mobilisation strategy and its effects on union 
power. The findings from Article 3 best illustrate its importance. Four of eight supermarket 
chains were found to have experienced significantly lower risk outcomes than the others. Each of 
these chains faced resistance from militant unions that were successful in mobilising both their 
employees and coalitions outside of the organisation. Whether it was in the form of labour 
protests, strikes, or all out boycotts, only unions that fought to retain important forms of 
protection were successful.  
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Mobilisation strategies perform the dual role of shifting firms’ internal priorities to address 
worker risk concerns while enforcing standards across the competition to help unionised 
employers cope with the costs of maintaining important forms of protection. By pursuing 
mobilisation, unions seek to alter firm priorities through the threat of actualising some form of 
pressure. In doing so, firms may lose interest in aggressive concession-making tactics. Firms 
were more fearful of attempting to break agreements when their unions were powerful enough to 
enforce high costs on them for breaking the agreement. This is why only those firms who faced 
immense resistance from their unions abandoned their efforts to pass on risks to workers. 
Article 3 illustrated the importance of firm commitment strategies (Hypothesis 3.2), which tend 
to be of secondary importance relative to other contextual factors. Commitment strategies are 
often treated as a singular concept, juxtaposed with compliance (Walton et al., 2000; Walton, 
1985). The first problem is in fitting employer strategies into two discrete categories. Employers 
either seek commitment from their employees or they do not, leaving no conceptual space for the 
varieties associated with them. The second problem is that this classification is not sensitive to 
the contextual characteristics in which commitment strategies originate.  
Three types of commitment strategies were identified in this thesis. Soft commitment strategies 
involve seeking to motivate workers and acquire their loyalty by providing working conditions 
slightly above those of competitors. Hard commitment strategies involve seeking commitment 
through a deep dedication to employee satisfaction and well-being, beyond simply aiming to 
exceed industry standards for labour conditions. Embedded commitment is a hard commitment 
strategy in which work practices dedicated to improved employee satisfaction and well-being are 
a response to incentives in a particular institutional context.  
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Drawing on this classification, the evidence showed that managers differed in their levels of 
commitment and that contexts mattered. In the European chains, commitment strategies were the 
result of institutional constraints associated with collective bargaining or industrial relations 
legislation. None of the actors associated with these chains described their dedication to 
employee commitment as being entirely voluntary, as most commitment-related HR practices 
were either mandatory or highly incentivised by the institutional setting. The only supermarket 
chain whose hard commitment strategy was voluntary was in New York City, and even then, this 
strategy complemented their customer segmentation strategy and was fostered through 
negotiations with their union. In addition, this chain could only afford its superior investments in 
workers because it catered to high-valued added customers and needed to satisfy the union 
leadership.  
As examined in articles 2 and 3, the effects of labour-management partnerships on risk are mixed 
due to the importance of contextual factors (Hypothesis 3.1). Article 2 found that labour-
management partnerships may be conducive to improved risk outcomes under centralised 
bargaining structures. Drawing on the Swedish cases, unions and employers in this country 
cooperated to prevent new competitors in the market from operating without collective 
agreements and sought to standardize working conditions across the sector to prevent some firms 
from maintaining a cost advantage by lowering labour standards. In addition, the Swedish union 
negotiated from a position of strength, as all-encompassing agreements enabled it to punish firms 
with industrial action without fear of decimating their membership levels. Meanwhile, 
decentralised bargaining in Quebec had the opposite effects on the actors. Due to the presence of 
non-union competition, unions and employers cooperated to differentiate working conditions to 
ensure that stores were competitive in their neighborhoods and introduced more flexible forms of 
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union coverage. The aim was to help unionised stores mimic the human resource practices of 
non-union stores to maintain their competitiveness. Furthermore, Quebec’s unions negotiated 
from a position of weakness, as their single-employer bargaining arrangements left them fearful 
that bankrupting their stores would erode their presence in the sector.   
While Article 2 examined the compatibility of labour-management partnerships with risk 
outcomes in different institutional settings, Article 3 found that the negative outcomes associated 
with partnering in Quebec were no different than those of the union locals that opted for a 
servicing approach in North America. The fact that they were no better than servicing strategies 
at fostering union strength accounted for this similarity.  
It should also be noted that the Swedish union was characterised as having opted for a 
mobilisation strategy in Article 3, paying no attention to the partnering aspect of their bargaining 
strategy in Article 2. The Swedish union has actively pursued both strategies, yet their primary 
response to pressures to augment risk has been to mobilize workers; hence why this core strategy 
was discussed in Article 3, while Article 2 simply sought to tease the relevance of the partnering 
aspects of the union’s strategy towards risk. The strategies adopted by actors are never black and 
white, which is why this thesis focused on the strategic factors that most characterised each case. 
This should not discount the possibility that these cases have experimented with other types of 
strategies, as nearly all actors do.  
The importance of union power was supported in Articles 2 and 3 (Hypothesis 2). It mattered to 
union mobilisation. It is difficult to speak of mobilisation without discussing the concept of 
union power explicitly. This thesis pointed to the importance of solidaristic power – both internal 
and external (Levesque and Murray, 2010). As the comparison in Article 3 shows, opting for a 
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mobilisation strategy alone is not enough. Unions need to harness critical forms of internal 
solidarity (e.g. close ties between union leadership and store workers in New York City and 
Sweden, high works-council presence and coordination in Germany) and external solidarity (e.g. 
New York City’s left-wing coalition, inter-union cooperation in Sweden) if they are to activate 
them. Of course, other forms of power matter too. Article 2 mobilised Wright’s (2000) 
conception of “structural power” to explain why Quebec’s unions chose not to mobilize their 
members and networks to resist concessions, while Swedish unions remained committed to 
doing so. This was because all-encompassing sectoral bargaining gave Swedish unions the power 
to punish individual employers for demanding concessions, even in times of intense competition, 
since they did not worry about losing members by resisting concessions.  Even then, sectoral 
bargaining arrangements were only stable because Swedish unions had the strength required to 
keep them in place.  
Power also matters to firm commitment. The chains whose commitment strategies mattered most 
negotiated with powerful unions. On the one hand, these unions mobilised to force their 
employers to adopt high standards for working conditions, such as retaining traditional benefits 
in New York City or the high levels of pay associated with European collective agreements in 
retail. Once employers are mandated to make significant investments in their workers, they often 
make further ones to ensure that they harness the most productivity from them. On the other 
hand, militant unions may help to maintain some stability in the competitive climate by 
preventing the increase of low-cost competitors. The German retail union was particularly 
successful in forcing discounters to pay collectively bargaining wages, even though they never 
formally signed on to collective agreements. The New York City union local partnered with 
other organisations at the municipal level to prevent the entry of Wal-Mart. These strategies 
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offset some of the risks associated with employers’ commitment strategies. These examples 
show that union mobilisation and power can play an important role in fostering the right climate 
for enabling firm commitment. In return, these firms may be more supportive of the union’s role 
in workplace governance, as it begins to appreciate some of the advantages of union affiliation.  
 
7.1.4 Factors relating to state strategies  
To maintain a logical flow between the articles, the role of state strategies was not addressed 
explicitly. Nonetheless, the findings show that the social policies examined in Article 1 
(Hypothesis 3.4) and employment standards examined in the three articles (Hypothesis 3.5) 
exerted positive effects on risk. First, welfare regimes mattered to risk. Esping-Andersen’s 
(1990) famous welfare regime research has highlighted their importance to decommodifying 
citizens. In other terms, decommodification refers to citizens’ ability to maintain economic 
security irrespective of market conditions. Risk outcomes are likely to be lower under more 
comprehensive welfare regimes. For example, the importance of private retirement and health 
care benefits in the United States was a problem for retail workers in the country. When firms are 
committed to workers, unions are strong, and product competition is stable, workers may enjoy 
considerable protections through private benefit plans. However, the reverse has been true when 
firms become less committed, unions are weakened, and product competition intensifies.  
This was less of an issue in the other three countries, especially Canada and Sweden (Article 1), 
due to the strength of their universal public retirement and health care programs. Not only do 
these programs provide workers with important forms of security, but they reduce segmentation, 
as universal public programs generally apply equally to everyone. In many cases, private benefits 
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in North America are segmented across workers based on their employment status or date of 
hire. The segmentation effects would be eliminated if these private benefits were replaced with 
universal programs. 
Second, labour regulation was also of importance. This includes labour standards. One labour 
standard that was identified for its importance to risk was the minimum wage. These have 
impacts on the generosity of risk mitigation arrangements. For example, Germany and New York 
City have introduced minimum wage increases, which offset some of the negative wage trends 
experienced by workers. Minimum wages also have important effects on segmentation. By 
increasing the minimum wage provided to the lowest paid employees, these regulations reduce 
the disparities across occupational categories within the firm. Another important employment 
standard includes those addressing equal pay for equal work. These have important effects on 
segmentation. For example, Quebec and Germany are both similar in that their laws prevent 
employers from introducing tiered benefits based on part-time status and date of hire. Ontario 
has since introduced similar types of legislation. Segmentation is reduced by enforcing equal 
working conditions for workers who perform the same tasks.  
These two types of state strategies may have had some impacts on the nature and degree of risk 
in the cases. Yet interestingly, high-risk chains were found even in countries whose governments 
have introduced strong policies to provide protections to workers. This includes Canada, whose 
federal and provincial governments have committed themselves to a comprehensive welfare state 
and labour regulations that are of significant importance for risk (such as the minimum wage in 
Ontario and legislation barring tiered wages and benefits in Quebec). The key reason for this is 
that these public policies are restricted to specific aspects of risk. As illustrated throughout this 
thesis, risks come from various sources and manifest themselves across various dimensions. 
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Canadian workers may have access to strong retirement and health care benefits, but low wages, 
few working hours, and weak scheduling protections leave workers unable to meet basic 
expenses. Since public policies never address the full gamut of risk outcomes, they often need to 
be complemented by collective bargaining to address sources of risk that are not being mitigated 
by the state.   
 
7.2 Core contributions to theory and industrial relations literatures 
The exploration of the major research findings of this thesis in the last part made some 
connections to both theory and the literature. However, this was not done explicitly. We now 
address four main theoretical contributions of this thesis: first, to how we understand and 
measure risk; second, to how power dynamics matter to the implementation of actor strategies; 
third, by highlighting the contested nature of contextual factors; and fourth, to the importance of 
an integrated analysis of multiple factors in explaining risk outcomes in collective bargaining.  
 
7.2.1 Highlighting the multidimensional nature of risk 
A major contribution of this work was in developing the theoretical tools to capture the diverse 
ways in which risks change across organisations, sectors, and countries. It does so by mobilising 
three strands in the risk literature. First, “welfare regime” research has mobilised the concept of 
generosity to explain how public and private actors contribute to the social arrangements that 
protect workers and citizens from risk (Seeleib-Kaiser et al., 2012; Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
Second, “risk shift” research has focused on how trends in individualisation have shifted 
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responsibility from who bears the burden for risk from firms and the state onto workers and 
individuals (Hacker, 2006; Beck, 2000). Third, “segmentation” research focuses on the extent 
that negative risk trends concentrate on specific categories of workers – based on employment 
status and social location (Osterman and Burton, 2005; Doeringer and Piore, 1971; D’Amours et 
al., 2017). The problem with these strands is that they examine different dimensions of risk in 
isolation from one another. This thesis has shown that exploring all three is necessary to 
capturing how risks change in workplaces. 
A number of analytical observations stem from the theoretical and empirical work in risk in this 
thesis. First, the framework provides for a more integrated understanding of risk by exploring its 
three dimensions. Integrating these three dimensions of risk enables risk research to capture 
related trends that are often discounted in one-dimensional models. For example, Swedish 
supermarkets were most affected by declines in generosity. A focus on individualisation and 
segmentation alone would have failed to capture this change. Meanwhile, the segmented nature 
of risk trends was most important in Germany. One would have to capture how trends in 
segmentation and individualisation differed between workers covered and not covered by 
collective agreements to understand the evolution of risk in the country’s supermarkets. 
Neglecting the multidimensional nature of risk leads one towards an incomplete picture of its 
trajectories. It is for this reason that the welfare regime (Esping-Andersen, 1990), risk shift 
(Hacker, 2006; Beck, 200), and segmentation (Osterman and Burton, 2005; Doeringer and Piore, 
1971) literatures should complement one another, rather than exist in isolation.  
Second, this thesis highlights the contradictory nature of risk trends. Many point to the growth of 
risk as an international phenomenon (Osberg and Sharpe, 2011; Hacker, 2006; Heery, 2000).  
However, in applying the Risk Allocation Framework, this thesis has shown that the simple 
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pronouncement that risks have increased is unsatisfactory. Risks may be rising along some 
dimensions, but they may be declining in others. For example, the “risk shift” argument focuses 
on the rise of individualised risk sharing arrangements spearheaded by companies and 
governments (Cobb, 2015; Hacker, 2006; Beck, 2000). Unfortunately, the line of analysis 
adopted by this argument’s chief proponents is ill-equipped to capture how relevant changes in 
generosity and segmentation affect risk outcomes. For example, by neglecting the segmented 
nature of risk outcomes in the United States, they lose out on how risk trends differentially affect 
different sub-groups of the working population. American chains examined in this research may 
have resorted to hiring more part-time workers in past years, but they have also strengthened 
scheduling guarantees for these workers (up to 21 hours guaranteed weekly).  Since research 
shows that vulnerable female workers are over-represented in part-time employment and tend to 
have fewer labour market advantages to fall back on compared to men (Cranford et al., 2003; 
Fudge and Vosko, 2001; Bernier et al., 2003), improved scheduling provisions for part-timers 
provides important forms of protection to some female workers. Thus, risk outcomes are rarely 
linear.  
Third, risk trends are interconnected. The risk shift (Cobb, 2015; Hacker, 2006; Beck, 2000), 
welfare regime (Seeleib-Kaiser et al., 2012; Esping-Andersen, 1990), and segmentation (Seeleib-
Kaiser et al., 2012; Esping-Andersen, 1990) literatures have focused on how various factors 
affect risk trends in their own dimension. Yet, trends in one dimension affect the other, a point 
which highlights the importance of the linkages between them. For example, some German 
chains committed to stronger pay and scheduling arrangements in stores covered by collective 
agreements offset these costs by hiring more mini-jobbers and contract workers. In addition, 
stores in Quebec are more willing to offer performance-related pay supplements instead of 
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simple pay increases, demonstrating the trade-offs between the generosity and individualisation 
dimensions of wage setting. While similar linkages are recognised elsewhere in the literature 
(Pulignano et al, 2016), the Risk Allocation Framework provides a means to explicitly recognize 
how different components of insecurity relate to one another.  
Fourth, exploring risk’s multiple dimensions provides for a more nuanced understanding of what 
causes changes to risk. Other literatures have given considerable attention to explaining the 
causes of risk. The welfare regime literature has focused on factors that shift the public-private 
mix, including left-wing social movements (Baldwin, 1990; Esping-Andersen, 1990) and identity 
politics (Béland and Lecours, 2009; Béland and Lecours, 2006). The “risk shift” literature has 
pointed to factors such as the “Personal Responsibility Crusade” policy agenda (Hacker, 2006) or 
the role of unions as the great collectivizer (Cobb, 2015). The segmentation literature has 
focused on the power of insiders (Crouch, 2015) and the rise of nonstandard work (Kalleberg et 
al., 2009).  
This research provides for more integrated explanations of risk outcomes than current risk 
literature by highlighting what factors have influenced change in each dimension. Take the New 
York City chain for example. One of its key successes, the generous provision of full-time work, 
is maintained as part of the employer’s commitment strategy to boost service quality by 
maintaining high worker satisfaction. However, its other key success is in maintaining 
collectivised retirement and health benefits, which is not explained by management strategy, but 
rather the union’s success in enforcing a strong pattern across employers through effective 
worker mobilisation. The German case is also telling, where it is the trade union’s role to 
negotiate for more generous wage rates, yet the works-council’s role in negotiating works-
agreements that affect the individualisation of working hours.  
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The multidimensional approach to risk not only shows that various explanations relating to these 
three dimensions of risk need to be integrated to understand how they have changed, but it paves 
the way for new sets of explanations that address how they relate to one another. For example, a 
key take-away is that unions have greater influence over the outcomes of risk when they have a 
degree of control over the factors that affect each of the dimensions. The Swedish case 
exemplifies this. Its retail union can influence the generosity of wage rates through its role in 
cross-sectoral wage coordination in the country. It can also influence collectivisation through its 
relative power in collective bargaining over scheduling protections (e.g. one month’s scheduling 
notice) with the employers’ association for retail. Finally, the union has the power eliminate 
segmentation by applying blockades against employers who attempt to operate without collective 
agreements or undermine their minimum standards. We see here how the union’s ability to 
strategize and apply its power resources across multiple levels (in some cases directly with the 
employer, in other cases through solidaristic actions with other unions in the country) and to 
different ends (negotiating better agreements or imposing agreements on employers) matters to 
preventing negative trends in the different dimensions of risk. 
 
7.2.2 The contested nature of contextual effects 
In their book Where Bad Jobs are Better: Retail Jobs Across Countries and Companies, Carré 
and Tilly (2017) criticize researchers who overstate the “inevitability” of bad jobs in the face of 
changing contexts. They focus on the importance of institutions and actor strategies in shaping 
job quality outcomes in retail, a sector whose jobs have been wrongly condemned for being 
necessarily low-wage and dead-end in many countries. A growing number of scholars have made 
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similar pronouncements regarding low-wage work in recent years (Doellgast, 2018; Carré and 
Schmitt, 2009). This thesis speaks to this research in its emphasis on the contestability of low-
skilled service work. It finds that contextual effects on service occupations are not linear. Rather, 
they are often subject to contestation. This section focuses on theoretical approaches relating to 
marketisation, financialisation, fissured workplaces, and bargaining decentralisation.  
Some overplay the importance of markets in structuring work outcomes. In The Mutual Gains 
Enterprise, Kochan and Osterman (1994) argue that fast food chain McDonald’s is not a suitable 
candidate for high-road HR systems that promote gainsharing and cooperative labour relations. 
The market environment facing the fast-food industry - among other industries where low-wage, 
low-skilled work is common – forces employers into a narrow model focused on low-pay and 
routinised work to compete. Unless employment standards are modified, poor working 
conditions are likely due to the current competitive requirements of the firm. Meanwhile, Greer 
and Doellgast (2017) mobilised marketisation as an overarching framework to explain the 
negative effects of intensified price competition on institutions and work outcomes. Yet, this 
framework is designed to explain its negative effects on workers, discounting the ways in which 
the effects of marketisation are mitigated or even nullified by actors and institutions.  
This thesis identified some of the ways in which marketisation can be contested. First, its 
negative effects can be resisted by institutional means. The findings point to the importance of 
multi-employer bargaining arrangements in Sweden. By enforcing common labour standards 
through all-encompassing collective agreements, the entry of low-cost competitors could not be 
used as a factor to negotiate concessions, as discount stores were bound to the same standards as 
traditional employers in the sector. This finding is consistent with Marginson et al.’s (2014) 
research which shows how firm contingencies are removed from collective bargaining under 
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strong multi-employer arrangements. A second means relates to firm strategies. The New York 
chain in this study maintained above-average work standards because doing so was consistent 
with its strategic focus on value-added customers, a fact that resonates with the customer 
segmentation literature (Batt, 2000; Batt, 2001). 
The financialisation literature has shown how financialised firms invest less in production or 
services and more in financial methods of profit-making (e.g. share buy-backs) to boost 
shareholder value, leaving workers negatively affected by cycles of cutbacks (Foroohar, 2016; 
Baud and Durand, 2011). The growing role played by institutional investors in corporate 
governance has also been linked to financialisation (Appelbaum and Batt, 2014). Contrary to 
privately owned firms, they are more likely to incur high debt loads (e.g. through leveraged buy-
outs) and introduce forms of restructuring that worsen working conditions in exchange for short-
term gains. The findings show important exceptions to the effects of financialisation argument. 
When the New York chain’s VP of HR was asked why this firm supported his progressive HR 
policies, even though the chain just emerged from bankruptcy, the response was simple: “they 
support the model because it works”. The firm’s business strategy was perceived as a means to 
obtaining extremely high levels of service quality. It was also seen as a means to preventing 
conflict with the union. These strategic concerns mattered, even after the chain was financially 
crippled by a leveraged buy-out that undermined its ability to remain solvent.  
Does this mean that the “maximization of shareholder value” has emerged as a dominant 
ideology (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000) rather than a structural constraint on actors? Can 
shareholder driven interests be pushed into directions that provide more opportunities for 
workers? Addressing these questions more deeply is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it 
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does show that there are opportunities to promote positive workplace change even in companies 
that cater heavily to shareholders and other types of investors with short-term interests.  
The fissured workplaces thesis has shown how lead firms are shedding the responsibilities for 
workplace governance to other value-chain actors (Weil, 2014). It argues that the blurring lines 
of authority over the workplace coupled with unrealistic performance expectations set for 
subsidiary organisations are eroding working conditions as subsidiary organisations aggressively 
constrain labour costs to remain solvent. However, none of the findings of this research 
supported this theory in unionised settings. Why is this so? The fissured workplace argument 
applies to firms in which union presence is low or lacking. However, this research joins those 
who highlight the important role played by unions in the enforcement of labour standards, 
including those set through collective bargaining (Fine, 2017; Howe, 2017). Employee voice 
mechanisms were used to ensure that both employment standards and collective agreements were 
applied in these cases. This emphasizes the role that unions can play in preventing the negative 
effects typically associated with the fissuring of employment relationships.  
The bargaining decentralisation literature has emphasised how declining bargaining coverage 
and the shift to single-employer agreements is exposing bargaining units to greater market 
uncertainty. Decentralisation has been associated with a reorientation of bargaining agendas to 
reflect “firm contingencies” (Marginson et al., 2014), greater managerial control over the 
employment relationship (2003), and the weakening of union power (Pulignano et al., 2016; 
Doellgast and Benassi, 2014). The fact that decentralisation has added new pressures on 
collective bargaining is supported by the research findings. However, this thesis also shows how 
the effects of decentralisation are contested by actors, by highlighting the importance of 
alternative means to extending labour standards by unions. Most particularly, the unions in 
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Germany and New York City have used protest actions and government lobbying to force low-
road employers into raising their labour standards, thereby reducing their competitive edge in the 
market. This speaks to the importance of union capacities in shaping standard setting, both 
within and outside of traditional institutions for exercising employee voice in times of change 
(Bosch, 2018; D’Amours et al., 2017). Since collective bargaining is only one means of 
extending labour standards across employers, this thesis has shown that research on the politics 
of standard setting needs to extend its focus to the variety of standards that are enforced by 
collective worker representation.  
Overall, this thesis has emphasised the contested nature of contextual effects on workers. The 
separate strands of literature discussed above have emphasised the negative outcomes associated 
with specific changes in the workplace. While this may work for uncovering the controversial 
and negative features of marketisation, financialisation, fissuring, and bargaining 
decentralisation, the reality is far more complex. There needs to be greater research attention to 
the role of actors in resisting contextual pressures and the tools that they have at their disposal in 
doing so. It is for this reason that this thesis emphasised the importance of strategies and power 
to risk outcomes. This is discussed in the next section. 
 
7.2.3 The importance of power to strategies 
Mainstream industrial relations research has strangely neglected the importance of power to actor 
strategies in collective bargaining. This constitutes a major critique in this thesis. The targets of 
this critique are strategic choice theory (Kochan, 1986), behavioral theory (Walton and 
McKersie, 1965), and institutional theory (Hall and Soskice, 2001), for the sake of illustration. 
 215 
 
Each of these theories has done a fair job in capturing the rational, emotive, and contextual 
aspects of decision-making. Yet they are all rather naive in refusing to acknowledge the 
importance of power to actor strategies and their outcomes for workers.  
First, this thesis has shown that a focus on “strategic choices” alone neglects the importance of 
how actor power effects the implementation of those choices. Strategic choice theory has 
highlighted how bargaining strategies are a response to changing circumstances (Kochan, 1986). 
These changing circumstances refer to external contexts, such as market change and 
technological innovation, as well as the internal values of managers. This view of bargaining 
strategies presumes that the major problem facing workers lies in actors making the right choices 
and seizing on critical opportunities in a time where markets and technological change are 
shifting the nature of competition.  
However, it seems futile to discuss these choices without assessing the relative power and 
capabilities of actors in enacting these choices. For example, do unions exhibiting weak 
solidarity possess less influence on firm priority setting compared to those where ties with 
members and external actors are robust? This answer presented in this thesis was clearly yes. 
This is perhaps best illustrated by the comparison of two chains in Germany. These chains were 
represented by the same union adhering to the same strategy. They also faced similar threats 
from low-cost competitors and technological change. Yet the work outcomes were remarkably 
superior in one relative to the other. What explains the difference? The answer was simple. The 
union could maintain strong ties with its workers via works-councils in one chain but not the 
other. It was through this vehicle that the union was more successful in challenging managerial 
prerogatives than in other German supermarket chains.  
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Second, this thesis has shown how power dynamics underpin the negotiation process. Behavioral 
theory focuses on how actors make rational calculations to influence the expectations and 
attitudes of their opponents at the bargaining table (Walton and McKersie, 1965). This theory of 
labour negotiation discounts the relevance of contexts and the importance of power to the 
negotiation process. Of course, the initial formulation this theory was designed to inform actor 
strategies at the negotiating table. Its purpose was not to situate actor strategies in their broader 
societal contexts. However, it constitutes the foundation for an entire body of research dedicated 
to exploring the impacts of union and employer decision-making on bargaining outcomes. The 
distinction between integrative and distributive bargaining processes has led many to question 
how managerial strategies to seek commitment or compliance from their workers, or union 
decisions to oppose or collaborate with managers, matters to work outcomes (Walton et al., 
2000; Walton, 1985; Bamber et al., 2009; Kochan and Osterman, 1994; Kochan et al., 2013). Not 
only does this literature maintain a bias in favour of collaborative bargaining dynamics, but it 
negates the importance of power in shaping the outcomes achieved by actors through the 
negotiation process.  
The research findings challenge this literature by questioning whether collaborative labour 
relations can be achieved when workers and their representatives are negotiating from a position 
of weakness. Not only was there little evidence that weak unions can benefit from collaborating 
with managers, but unions enjoy few benefits from collaborating with managers altogether. What 
mattered most was whether unions could build capacity and use their solidaristic power to 
pressure firms into prioritising worker interests. These findings do not fit within the processual 
approach to bargaining which seeks to emphasize the importance of actor strategies within the 
negotiating process. Rather, it speaks to the growing body of research which points to the 
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importance of power dynamics in determining the effects of strategies on workers (Doellgast et 
al. 2018; Dupuis, 2017; Benassi and Vlandas, 2016; Levesque and Murray, 2010). Most 
significantly, this research has highlighted the importance of solidaristic power, both internally 
and externally (Levesque and Murray, 2010), to unions’ capacity to challenge managerial 
discretion. However, it has also shown that a focus on how actors are situated within a broader 
economic context by identifying how “structural power” (Wright, 2000) rooted from unions’ 
relationship with market conditions matters to resisting negative trends in work.  
Third, this thesis shows how the strategic use of union power matters to firm strategies that affect 
workers in coordinated market economies. Hall and Soskice’s (2001) Varieties of Capitalism 
theory views strategies as rational responses to the opportunity structures associated with 
coordinated market economies or liberal market economies. They argue that firm strategies must 
be in harmony with their industrial relations institutions if these firms are to succeed. 
Interestingly, managers and union officials in the German and Swedish chains emphasised the 
importance of union power, not institutions, to working conditions within their supermarkets. In 
fact, working conditions were poor in the German franchises that reported remarkably weak 
levels of union presence and influence. The European employers only provided workers with 
superior working conditions when they were forced to do so by unions. Moreover, each of these 
employers has engaged in efforts to escape the constraints imposed by collective agreements at 
some point within the last few decades.  
Relatedly, this focus on union strategies and power highlights the importance of sectoral 
dynamics to work outcomes in the firm. The Varieties of Capitalism approach has been criticised 
for situating industrialised economies into two ideal types. This thesis rejoins the critics who 
argue that greater attention to the political dynamics that occur within sectors and firms is needed 
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to understand firm strategies towards workers (Bechter et al., 2012; Jaehrling and Mehaut, 2013; 
Doellgast and Greer, 2007). It found that actor strategies result from political interactions 
between unions and firms in response to various types of contextual change in their sector.  
So what does this analysis say about the state of theory in collective bargaining? It suggests that 
mainstream theoretical approaches to collective bargaining are ill-equipped to fully understand 
how strategies interact with work outcomes such as risk. More work on integrating the concept 
of power into our analysis of collective bargaining outcomes is required. Much theorisation has 
been conducted to show how forms of solidaristic (Levesque and Murray, 2010; Levesque and 
Murray, 2002), institutional (Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick, 2010), or structural (Pulignano 
et al., 2016; Wright, 2000) power matter to what unions do. However, more work needs to be 
done to ensure that these notions of power are integrated into future analyses on how bargaining 
strategies impact workers. 
 
7.2.4 Conclusion - Towards an integrated analysis of risk outcomes 
This thesis argues for an integrated analysis of risk outcomes. First, it proposed analysing the 
dimensions of generosity, individualisation, and segmentation to capture holistically the 
dynamics that affect risk. By highlighting these different dimensions of risk, it shows how risk 
outcomes stem from many sources. In some cases, the main instigator of negative risk trends 
may be rooted in a single dimension. In other cases, multiple dimensions may be accountable. In 
addition, risk outcomes represent a variety of both positive and negative trends in risk. Thus, 
risks are only effectively mitigated if their net effect is positive. In addition, these trends do not 
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take place in isolation from one another, but are interconnected. Understanding how these three 
dimensions is inter-related is important to tracing risk trajectories as a whole.  
Second, this thesis has shown how risk outcomes are affected by a variety of factors relating to 
contexts, strategies, and union power. Since changes in risk stem from different dimensions, it 
becomes necessary to explore how a variety of factors influence each dimension to understand 
the entirety that is risk. It also explains why insecurity becomes so difficult to avoid. For 
instance, while unions may achieve some success in stopping risk trends in some dimensions, 
they may not be sufficient to offset those emanating from the other dimensions. This is why the 
concept of power is important to risk. More powerful unions can yield influence in multiple 
arenas to resist negative trends in each risk dimension. The less influence a union has on 
governance within the multinational or standard setting within their sector, the less they are able 
to resist negative risk trends. 
 
7.3 The research questions revisited 
Chapter 1 presented the two fundamental research questions addressed in this thesis. The first 
addressed how risk trends diverge across unionised contexts. The thesis has sought to respond to 
this question by developing and applying the Risk Allocation Framework to capture these 
divergences in supermarkets across countries. It found that companies face a considerable 
diversity of risk experiences, even among those whose risk trends have been negative. This 
distinction represented some novelty for this research. Beyond characterising the growth of risks 
facing workers (Kalleberg, 2009; Heery, 2000; Beck, 2000), this thesis takes the analysis one 
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step further, by showing that not all risk increases are equal. Rather, they reflect trends across 
multiple dimensions, namely generosity, individualisation, and segmentation.  
This background work on the first question raised at the outset of this thesis facilitated an in-
depth examination of a second, and more central question; namely, the impacts of collective 
bargaining strategies on risk outcomes. First, this research found that collective bargaining 
strategies do yield important impacts on risk. Union decisions to mobilise workers, rely on 
servicing, or partner with managers matter for workers. By contrasting union strategies across 
institutional and organisational settings, union mobilisation strategies were found to be a 
powerful tool for resisting negative risk trends and have proven successful in a variety of 
contexts. In addition, firm commitment strategies could yield positive results for workers under 
certain conditions, but only under certain contextual settings and when the level of commitment 
is high.  
Second, strategies adopted to resist risk are power-laden. The importance of union mobilisation 
makes this point obvious. While union mobilisation as a strategy was positively associated with 
risk outcomes, it should also be understood as both an expression of power and a means to 
building power. Unions mobilise workers in order to command more authority in negotiating 
with their employers. However, if they fail to dedicate resources to mobilisation, their capacity to 
do so withers. Commitment strategies are also power-laden. The contexts in which firms develop 
and implement strategies are rooted in power dynamics. This emphasis on power shows how 
powerful unions play an important role in nudging employers towards deepening their 
commitments towards workers and reducing risk in the process. 
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Third, the effects of strategies on risk are sensitive to contextual pressures. Union mobilisation 
and firm commitment are more effective when price competition is low, bargaining structures are 
centralised, and firms are privately held. However, they face important challenges when price 
competition is high, bargaining structures are decentralised, and firm governance is financialised. 
As this research highlights, an analysis of the decisions made by actors alone is insufficient to 
understanding their effects on workers. We need to understand how contextual factors impose 
real constraints on organisations, as these constraints may negatively affect firms’ abilities to 
provide positive working conditions when faced with stresses.  
Finally, actor strategies yield important effects on contexts. Contextual changes can have 
negative effects on worker risk, but these are not without contestation. For example, unions can 
resist bargaining decentralisation through strikes and protests that pressure employers to comply 
with collective agreements. They may also bypass collective bargaining altogether by lobbying 
governments to raise employment standards or to boycott companies that offer poor working 
conditions. Thus, strategies and contexts may be understood as a feedback loop in which one 
always influences the outcomes of the other. Not surprisingly, the more unions influence their 
bargaining contexts, the better it is for workers.  
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Conclusion 
8.1 Summary of thesis 
This thesis contributed to contemporary debates on the evolution of risks in industrialised nations 
and modern corporations. It sought to contribute to these debates by assessing risk trends in 
unionised firms, and the role that contexts, strategies, and actor-attributes play in influencing 
these trends. Below is a summary of the contents and contributions to this debate. 
Chapter 1 examined the international risk literature and surmised that there was a consensus that 
rising risks is a problem in most industrialised nations. It discussed scholarly research on the role 
of states, firms, and unions and found that they have all played a role in shaping risk outcomes 
for workers and citizens. However, it also found that there was insufficient research on the role 
of collective bargaining in shaping risk outcomes for workers. It outlined two research questions 
in response to this problem. First, it asked how risks have evolved across unionised settings. 
Second, it asked what the impacts of collective bargaining strategies are on risk outcomes in 
unionised firms. These two research questions were used to guide the rest of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 sought to explore the role of different theories in explaining how risks diverge across 
unionised settings and the role of collective bargaining strategies in shaping these trends. It 
accomplished this through two objectives. First, it provided the conceptual foundation needed to 
compare risk trends across workplaces; through a Risk Allocation Framework used to measure 
and compare risk outcomes across three dimensions: generosity, individualisation, and 
segmentation. Second, it identified theories relating to the potential role of contextual factors, 
strategies, and actor-attributes in explaining risk outcomes.  
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Chapter 3 identified the research hypotheses and methodology used to guide this thesis. It 
identified several hypotheses associated with the contextual, strategic, and actor-related theories 
presented in Chapter 2. This aim was to delineate the importance of competing explanations of 
risk and to draw connections between the different variables that affect risk. This chapter also 
provided an overview of the comparative longitudinal case-study methodology used for this 
thesis. Eight supermarket chains were examined over time in four countries: Canada, Germany, 
Sweden, and the United States. The experiences of chains in two Canadian provinces were 
examined to contrast differences in institutional and union dynamics within this particular 
national setting.  
The research results are presented in three articles (chapters). Chapter 4 (Article 1) laid the 
theoretical groundwork for exploring risk along the three dimensions proposed for the Risk 
Allocation Framework. Empirically, it found that applying the framework could provide for a 
more nuanced understanding of risk trends. While risks increased in supermarkets across all four 
countries, the increases witnessed in each case differed across the dimensions of generosity, 
segmentation and individualisation. Assessing trends along these dimensions highlighted the 
diverse nature in which risks increase in industries. It provided a useful tool for assessing the 
degree of these shifts and their sources across dimensions. These results demonstrated the 
validity of the multi-dimensional framework to examining risk and provided some analytical 
observations on how it captures aspects of risk that are not typically addressed by one-
dimensional models.  
Chapter 5 (Article 2) conducted a comparison of labour-management partnerships in the 
Canadian and Swedish supermarkets examined in this thesis. It found that bargaining structures 
yield important effects on how employers and unions partner together, which in turn have 
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consequences for risk. Partnering efforts under centralised bargaining structures were oriented 
around the standardisation of HR practices across firms, the integration of outsiders, and 
positively affected the structural power of unions. Meanwhile, partnering in decentralised 
structures were oriented around the localisation of HR practices, flexible insider-outsider 
dynamics, and negatively affected the structural power of unions. While considerable 
institutional research has overplayed the importance of national models to risk outcomes, this 
article showed how the embeddedness of actor strategies in sectoral bargaining structures 
mattered for workers.  
Chapter 6 (Article 3) examined various hypotheses relating to contexts, strategies, and actor-
attributes in order to test the relative influence of bargaining strategies on risk. These hypotheses 
were examined in relation to eight supermarket chains in Canada, Germany, Sweden, and the 
United States. The results point to the importance of union and firm bargaining strategies. They 
also show that the effects of bargaining strategies are closely linked to the levels of solidaristic 
power possessed by unions. In addition, they find that contextual factors matter to risk outcomes, 
but that these effects are not linear and subject to contestation by actors.  
Chapter 7 discusses the research results and their contributions to relevant theories and literatures 
on risk and industrial relations. In addition to providing a synthesised discussion of the research 
findings, the contributions to theory are highlighted. First, it shows how the Risk Allocation 
Framework developed in this thesis surpasses one-dimensional theories of risk by capturing a 
greater variety of risk dynamics. Second, it highlights the contested nature of contextual effects 
on workers, contradicting those who have adopted more deterministic interpretations of how 
marketisation, financialisation, fissured workplaces, and bargaining decentralisation affect 
bargaining outcomes. Third, it criticizes mainstream industrial relations theories for neglecting to 
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incorporate important considerations of power into their analyses of actor strategies. This thesis 
has shown that power must be analysed in explaining the effects of strategies on workers. Fourth, 
it proposes a more integrated frame of analysis for understanding risk outcomes. It does so by 
focusing on how different contexts, strategies, and power effect the different dimensions of risk. 
In doing so, this thesis has emphasised the political nature of risk outcomes. This chapter 
concludes by demonstrating how the results correspond to the research questions presented in 
Chapter 1.  
 
8.2 Research limitations 
The core contributions of this thesis are subject to certain research limitations. Four of these are 
discussed. First, the case selection limits the generalizability of the findings. The goal was to 
provide an in-depth examination of how different bargaining strategies affected risk. This was 
carried out through an examination of bargaining dynamics in eight supermarket chains across 
five jurisdictions. Furthermore, the research design sought to capture the role of numerous 
variables relating to contexts and actor attributes. The obvious strength of this approach is that it 
enables one to find commonalities across different types of settings and actors. The challenge is 
doing so with only two chains per jurisdiction, which limits the extent that the findings may 
apply to cases exhibiting certain similarities. For example, one of the main findings of the thesis 
was that servicing and partnering strategies are ineffective at resisting insecurity, due to their 
relationship with union power. However, research has shown that servicing strategies may be 
conducive to greater union influence on collective bargaining and working conditions under 
certain conditions, such as when unions demonstrate strengths in leadership and in employing 
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narrative resources (Foster, 2018; Foster, 2017) or in institutional contexts that positively affect 
union security (Price et al., 2014). Thus, are the North American locals examined in this study 
typical of retail (or even local services in general) or are they anomalies? 
Second, a single sector was examined for this research. The contextual specificity of retail is 
important. Retail is a local service sector in that competition for sales is isolated to customers in 
a single geographical location. This is especially true for food retail. For example, while e-
commerce has drastically impacted the sales growth of brick and mortar operations in fashion, 
electronics, and other industries in the sector, the growth of online food sales has been relatively 
modest (Coe and Wrigley, 2017). Thus, grocery sales occur in physical proximity to the 
customers’ place of residence. Two implications are most significant. First, retailers do not 
possess the option of relocation when collective bargaining dynamics are deemed not desirable. 
Of course, Wal-Mart has gained infamy for closing North American outlets when unionisation 
drives have succeeded or appeared likely. However, few retailers can afford to pursue the same 
strategy since losses in sales and infrastructural investments would prove too costly for these 
companies. Moreover, unlike manufacturers, retailers cannot shift service jobs overseas. Second, 
the nature of competition in local service sectors is significantly affected by bargaining 
structures. This was demonstrated in Article 2, where it was shown that Swedish retailers wanted 
to preserve high labour standards through strong centralised agreements to prevent low-road 
competition, while Canadian retailers sought cost cutting and labour flexibility to offer prices 
comparable to the non-union competition. This focus on retail limits the generalizability of the 
findings as they do not apply to manufacturing or international service sectors in which price-
setting and sales take place internationally and are thereby outside the reach of local bargaining 
structures.   
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Third, the choice of variables may also be perceived as a limitation. In attempting to explain the 
effects of bargaining strategies on risk, a broad and multi-dimensional concept, this thesis 
integrated numerous variables to provide a comprehensive account of the phenomenon. Due to 
resource constraints, it became necessary to provide more detailed accounts of those variables 
deemed of most importance in the interviews. This leaves a few blind spots in the thesis. For 
example, the role of the state was relegated in importance to other variables, including union 
strategies and power. However, an influential stream in the literature views union mobilisation 
and solidaristic power as rooted in labour law, as European legal frameworks provide unions 
with greater freedoms in exercising their rights to organise and apply industrial actions than 
those of North America (Boyer and Drache, 1996). The differences across the cases examined in 
this thesis speak to this debate. A more detailed examination of the role of the state would 
usefully complement the research findings and address the need to disentangle actor strategies 
from sources of institutional power. 
Fourth, this thesis mobilised a narrow conception of power. This is particularly important since 
the findings highlighted the importance of union power not only to union strategies, but in 
influencing those of employers. The power resources framework developed by Levesque and 
Murray (2010) drawing on forms of union solidarity, narrative resources, and infrastructural 
resources guided the analysis of power in this research. The problem with this conceptualisation 
of union power is its focus on union characteristics and decision-making as opposed to their 
positioning within broader societal structures. It was this reason that Wright’s notion of structural 
power (2000) – focusing on the position of workers within the economic system - was mobilised 
in Article 2. However, the application of this societal conception of power was done after the 
fact, and even this conception of power is limited. Understanding how institutional and markets 
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affect union power could have better captured the role of power in collective bargaining over 
risk. For example, recent research on precarious work has highlighted the importance of 
institutional power to explaining precariousness in low-wage work, particularly in European 
settings (Doellgast et al., 2018). Neglecting the influences of broader societal structures and 
union power could have made the findings more superficial, particularly with respect to the 
understanding bargaining outcomes in social Sweden.  
 
8.3 Implications for practice 
The research findings yield some important implications for practice. Implications for unions, 
firms, and the state are discussed. In terms of unions, union mobilisation was found to be a 
valuable tool for resisting negative risk trends. However, their importance was not identified for 
mobilisation’s sake alone, but reflected a much larger purpose relating to union power. Drawing 
from this, one recommendation is that unions focus on capacity-building to build solidarity in 
their workplaces and communities. This includes not simply organising and coalition-building, 
but in shifting union priorities to work on various capabilities that would enhance their 
effectiveness at mobilising various actors to resist risks in the workplace. Unions also need to 
engage in learning to undertake this change. The ability to critically rethink their roles in 
collective bargaining and social movements is necessary to building solidarity. Some unions are 
trapped in old mindsets, focusing too heavily on servicing their members, inter-union 
competition, or in believing that more militant narratives present too many risks for their 
members. Many union officials fail to see how their actions fit within larger societal movements 
that represent important opportunities for change. Thus, revitalising union capacities involves not 
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only strategic considerations, but normative changes that challenge the ideologies and identities 
of union officials.  
The implication for employers is clear, particularly those in North America. Managers 
interviewed in North America believe that their HR practices are dictated by market forces. The 
high-road is perceived as limited by the extent that market conditions allow. Employers believe 
that providing a relatively pleasant work climate and compensation rates only slightly above 
industry standards is sufficient to retain a productive workforce and moral obligations of a 
modern corporation. The fact that their workers are low-paid and face few consistencies in their 
working conditions is deemed an inevitable consequence of market dynamics.  
The problem with these views is that they are formed in a narrow institutional context. What this 
research shows is that supermarkets can better meet workers’ needs for economic security, but 
that there needs to be a different institutional set-up to achieve this. In Article 2, interviews with 
Canadian negotiators found that employers resisted attempts to introduce sectoral standards on 
the basis that doing so would harm their non-union operations and would contradict the 
philosophy that managers function best autonomously. Employers should reconsider this 
approach. This study and others (e.g. Carré and Tilly, 2017; Laroche and Murray, 2012) has 
shown that employers can benefit from the institutional stability provided by sectoral bargaining 
for competitive purposes. Instead of worrying about how new low-cost entrants might destroy 
their company’s bottom line and pressure them to cut costs so aggressively that they generate 
serious HR problems (e.g. high turnover), employers can seek out to standardize working 
conditions across the sector. This can be done through sectoral bargaining, as in the case of 
Sweden. It can also be done through other institutional means, such as the awards system in 
Australia (Price et al., 2014). In either case, raising sectoral labour standards could improve 
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working conditions and attract a more motivated workforce while eliminating the threats posed 
by low-road competitors.  
This research also has implications for the state. Through public policies, the state can play 
various direct and indirect roles in mitigating the risks experienced by workers (Vallée, 2005). It 
can play a direct role by introducing social policies (e.g. pension programs, universal health care) 
and employment standards (e.g. minimum wages, paid sick leave requirements, equal pay 
legislation) to mitigate worker risk. In doing so, the addressed risk becomes irrelevant to 
collective bargaining, creating space for employers and unions to negotiate other aspects of 
working conditions. The state can also play an indirect role by introducing public policies that 
make it easier to organise and negotiate collective agreements. For example, Hogler (2015) 
shows that right-to-work legislation has contributed to the decline of collective bargaining in the 
United States. Given the rise of radical right-wing politics in the country, many fear that any 
attempts to introduce new laws - such as the Employee Free Choice Act – are bound to fail in the 
current political climate. However, there is hope from abroad. Germany has recently made it 
easier to extend collective agreements. In 2014, the German government has introduced 
legislation facilitating the extension of collective agreements when doing so is in the “public 
interest”. Till then, the German legal requirement was that 50% of workers be covered by 
collective agreements for them to be extended. Any efforts to expand coverage helps to set 
standards across the industry and prevent unfair competition from eroding working conditions. 
The Germans have also experimented with minimum wage setting, which unlike most (if not all) 
Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions, provides trade unions with considerable influence over the process by 
integrating the principles of collective bargaining into its governance (Bosch, 2018). For these 
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purposes, the state plays an important role in directly and indirectly shaping risk outcomes for 
workers.  
To some extent, this analysis begs the question of whether the state should invest more in direct 
or indirect forms of risk mitigation. Investing in direct forms of risk mitigation provides a quick 
fix for a given risk-related area. However, the politics associated with expanding welfare regimes 
or introducing employment standards are so troublesome that the successes of progressive 
governments tend to be restricted to narrow solutions affecting specific areas of risk. These often 
fail to reverse the more significant trends that manifest themselves across many dimensions. 
Governments can also promote collective bargaining indirectly, which yields the potential to 
address a larger number of risk areas through a single mechanism. If sufficiently fostered, 
collective bargaining offers an important form of private governance which can be used to make 
multiple gains independently of the state.  
However, there lies a real risk of what would happen if this strategy failed. Unions have become 
weaker in most OECD countries. A coordinated strategy to strengthen unions, especially in 
environments hostile to these actors (e.g. the United States), undoubtedly presents many 
challenges for public policy. Unfortunately, there is no straight-forward answer to this question. 
Political movements will need to seize opportunities where they are available. So far, North 
American governments have centered on direct means of risk mitigation, such as responding to 
the Fight for 15 or making changes to employment standards. Few policy solutions for some 
form of sectoral standardisation, such as sectoral bargaining, have gained much traction in North 
America. Yet given the results of this research, perhaps the time has come to give more serious 
consideration to this option.  
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8.4 Avenues for further research 
This thesis opens some opportunities for further research on risk. Two are notable. First, the Risk 
Allocation Framework opens new territories for investigating the causes and consequences of 
risk. Comparing risk trends along the three dimensions enables researchers to engage in a deeper 
analysis of why risks differ across different settings. This thesis explored how bargaining 
strategies affect risk in unionised retail. Yet, others could contribute to this research by exploring 
how collective bargaining affects these dimensions in other sectors where the trends, strategies, 
and contexts differ. In addition, further research could focus on the role of other actors in shaping 
risk outcomes. How do management strategies affect these three dimensions of risk across 
different sectors? What is the role of public policy in risk mitigation? This framework opens a 
new space for inquiry into risk dynamics that merits further investigation and could provide 
important insights on how to address the problem of insecurity facing the modern workforce.  
Second, the exploration of bargaining strategies in this thesis has emphasised the relevance of 
power to their adoption and implementation. It also showed how unions play a key role in 
embedding firm strategies, sometimes to the betterment of workers. While considerable research 
has highlighted the role of union strategies to challenging managerial efforts to exploit workers 
(Doellgast et al., 2018, Dupuis, 2017; Benassi and Dorigatti, 2015), there is much more work to 
be done on situating the role of power in the execution of collective bargaining strategies. So 
many have focused on the processes and institutions that shape bargaining strategies without 
adequately accounting for how actor power figures in bargaining dynamics. While the decisions 
taken by actors matter to work outcomes, their relative influence in executing these decisions is 
decisive to their success.  
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Annex 1 - Interview Topic Guide  
Interview Topic Guide 
 
Name of Researcher: 
Sean O’Brady, Doctoral Student and CRIMT Doctoral Researcher, School of Industrial Relations, 
University of Montreal 
 
Supervisor: 
Dr. Gregor Murray, Professor and CRIMT Director, School of Industrial Relations, University of 
Montreal 
 
Title of Thesis: 
What Drives Worker Insecurity in Collective Bargaining? A Comparative Study of Food Retail in 
Canada, Germany, Sweden, and the United States 
 
Title of Affiliate Research Project: 
Restructuring Social Norms in Globalized Workplaces 
 
Please note that this Interview Topic Guide is only provisional and that you have a significant 
degree of control over the process and contents of the interview. You also have the right to refuse 
participation in the project at any point in the interview process (including the right to participate 
in the first place). As indicated in the consent form, your individual identity, in addition to that of 
your organisation, will not be disclosed in any of the research outputs associated with this 
research.  
 
This thesis examines the influence of labour-management relations, in light of organisational and 
institutional contexts, on workers’ economic security in Canada, Germany, Sweden, and the 
United States. In this thesis, the concept of economic security refers to workers’ uncertainties in 
incomes and expenses, particularly in terms of their access to stable salaries, working hours, 
retirement, training, and health care. The general aim is to understand how company managers, 
employee representatives, and the state influence economic security across different firm and 
country contexts. Where possible, changes from 1980 till today will be examined.  
 
This doctoral research is affiliated with the Interuniversity Research Centre on Globalization and 
Work’s (CRIMT) “Restructuring Social Norms in Globalized Workplaces” project. This project 
examines the role of different actors in shaping social norms pertaining to flexibility in the 
workplace across different regions of the world. On account of this, your research contributions 
will contribute to research outputs associated with both the thesis and this broader research 
project.   
 
The below themes and questions will be used to guide the interview. These themes serve only as 
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discussion aid and you should feel free to phrase your own views and to elaborate on the issues 
you feel are most relevant and important. 
 
 
   Introduction. 
 
1.1 Please provide a brief description of the work you do with your organisation. 
 
Theme 1: Evolution of economic security in your supermarkets 
 
2.1 Please describe trends facing your workers in the following areas: 
o Current incomes (salaries, sick leave, vacations, severance pay, and other 
types of leave) and retirement incomes  
o Job security  
o Working hours (e.g. control over schedules) 
o Health care expenses (e.g. for medicine) 
o Types of skills and training 
o Payment for training and equipment needed for job 
 
2.2 Please describe how these trends affect different workers: 
o Are employees treated differently according to their age, ethnicity, or 
gender? 
o Are part-timers, subcontracted workers, or workers in franchises treated 
differently? 
o How about workers across different supermarket chains?  
 
Theme 2: Actor strategies towards workers’ economic security 
 
3.1 What are the supermarket chains’ strategies towards both their workers and 
the union, and how have they positively or negatively impacted worker security?  
 
3.2 What are the union’s strategies (e.g. cooperative or adversarial, solidaristic or 
not)? 
 
3.3 How about government policies? 
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Theme 3: Contextual factors and workers’ economic security 
 
4.1 How have changes in worker treatment affected financial and worker-related 
performance?  
 
4.2 Do the supermarket chains’ ownership structures matter?  
 
4.3 Do trends in sectoral versus establishment-level bargaining matter?  
 
4.4 How about competition across firms in this sector?  
 
 
Theme 4: Factors relating to unions and values 
 
5.1 How powerful is the union, and how competent is it in using its resources? 
 
5.2 What are the types of values and rationales which inform company managers 
in introducing new human resource practices that affect risk? 
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Annex 2 – Consent Form  
CONSENT FORM 
 
Project title:  
Restructuring Social Norms in Globalized Workplaces 
 
Name of the persons responsible for the research: 
Gregor Murray, professor, Université de Montréal (gregor.murray@umontreal.ca) 
Christian Lévesque, professor, HEC Montréal (christian.levesque@hec.ca) 
 
Other researchers: 
University researchers: Christian Dufour and Adelheid Hege, CRIMT, Université de Montréal, 
and Institut de recherches économiques et sociales, Paris 
Doctoral researchers: Sean O'Brady, Mathieu Dupuis*, Raoul Gebert*, and Pierre-Antoine 
Harvey*, School of Industrial Relations, Université de Montréal 
Master’s students: Joelle Cuillerier*, Yinyi Cai*, School of Industrial Relations, Université de 
Montréal 
* Graduated 
 
 
Research objectives  
 
This research aims to assess the impact of transnational regulation, institutional settings and the 
organizational dynamics on the patterns of workplace relations and practices. More specifically, 
this research pursues three objectives:  
 
➢ To assess the evolution of workplace practices, notably those related to the 
organization of production and work, human resource management and labour and 
work relations;  
➢ To identify the links between organizational dynamics (ownership, localisation within 
the commodity chain, strategies the actors at different level, resources of power, etc.) 
and the evolution of these practices;  
➢ To evaluate how transnational regulation (Codes of conduct, European Work 
Councils, Global Union Federation, etc.) and institutional settings (for example, 
national laws and practices) intertwine to facilitate or hinder the diffusion of 
innovative practices and relations at the workplace level.  
 
Research strategy  
 
Our research strategy is based on several case studies in state and privately-owned enterprises 
operating in different institutional settings, notably in Canada, Mexico, UK, Belgium, Germany, 
China and Vietnam. Each case study will entail interviews with representatives of management at 
different levels (corporation, division and plant level) and the local union representatives also at 
different levels (international, national, regional, industrial and local). The collection of data will 
take place in successive phases from 2004 to 2010.  
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Since the researchers will be able to identity the participants, each of them will sign this 
engagement of confidentiality. Considering the nature of this project, a good part of the data will be 
collected abroad. Our team is committed to respecting the ethical requirements in each of these 
countries before gathering the data. In the countries where such a policy does not exist, we will 
apply the same procedures by which we are bound as professors in Canadian universities.  
 
 
Involvement to the project and confidentiality  
 
The participation in this research remains voluntary. At each phase of the research the anonymity 
of the participants and the confidentiality of the data will be assured by the team's members. 
Only the members of the research team (the two researchers and the student researchers under 
the direction of the team leaders) will have access to the information collected and to the identity 
of the participants. In our publications (scientific journals, chapters of books, conferences, etc.), 
the name of the organizations (firms or unions) and of the participants will remain confidential, 
unless they give us specific permission to state the name of their organization.  
 
Advantages and risks  
 
The participation in this research does not include any specific risks for the organizations (firms 
and unions) nor for the individuals. On the other hand, they may obtain several advantages. 
Indeed, this research fits into a larger research program concerning the impact of 
internationalization on the regulation of work in several countries which opens up rich 
comparative possibilities. The participants will have access to all these publications. 
 
Financial aspects  
 
This project is financed by the FQRSC (Fonds québécois de recherche en sciences sociales) and 
the SSHRC (Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada). The participation in 
this research doesn't imply any cost or financial compensation on behalf of the participants.  
 
 
 
 
______________________ 
Sean O’Brady 
Université de Montréal 
   
 
 
 
 
__________________________________ 
Interview conducted on ………..with  
Name of individual 
Name of organization 
 
 
 
